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The increasing economic clout and political influence of India and China has 
spawned significant interest in better understanding the development of the two 
countries from a comparative perspective. Unsurprisingly, much of this research has 
focused on the most visible differences between the two countries, namely the 
differences in their political economies and regime types. This thesis seeks to expand 
on the existing literature by examining less-visible aspects of the comparison, which, 
despite their occasional appearances in commentaries on the two countries, have not 
been thoroughly analyzed from a scholarly perspective, and are often handled in a 
purely descriptive manner devoid of organized structure and concern for causal 
mechanisms. 
The thesis employs the concept of social capital, which has been frequently 
used to explain variations in governance and development, to structure the 
comparison of several neglected but developmentally relevant aspects of the two 
countries. It establishes clear definitions and an organized comparative framework, 
and thus is able to detail the mechanisms of how the social capital–related factors 
impact the development of the two countries, exactly why they are important, and 
what they suggest about ongoing development.  
The thesis argues that development in India and China is increasingly 
contingent upon successful progress in three key areas: the building of a more 
effective bureaucracy (leading to better governance); the increased rule of law; and 
the implementation of more efficient and effective markets. The thesis argues that 
progress in these three areas is aided by the bridging type of social capital, 
characterized by higher levels of generalized and institutionalized trust. While it is 
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difficult to directly measure relevant levels of trust, it is possible to examine the main 
factors that impact levels of trust. Thus, I posit that aspects of development in each 
country that aid the formation of bridging social capital foster progress in the key 
developmental areas, while developments that inhibit the formation of bridging social 
capital inhibit progress. A review of a broad range of literature suggests that three 
factors, which I call social capital components, are critical to the creation or 
destruction of generalized trust and bridging social capital. In short, the thesis argues 
that these components (collective identity, education, and corruption) impact levels of 
bridging social capital and generalized trust, and in turn impact development in the 
two countries. Analyzing these components across India and China, then, significantly 
expands the foundation for understanding development in the two countries. 
This thesis illustrates three core points: Firstly, the existing India and China 
comparative literature, while excellent, leaves several developmentally critical facets 
of the two countries under-explored. Secondly, the concepts of bridging social capital, 
generalized trust, and social capital components can structure an analysis and provide 
significant insight into these under-explored areas of the India and China comparison. 
Lastly, the thesis contests the notion that this complicated comparison can be reduced 
to any simple conclusions. The insights gleaned through the findings of this thesis, 
while insightful and instrumental in expanding the understanding of development in 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
I.I India and China 
Whizzing along at 430 km/h between Shanghai’s modern airport and its 
glittering metropolitan downtown on the world’s fastest train, it is difficult not to be 
overwhelmed by the scale of the transformation that has marked China, the once 
developmental laggard, in recent decades. While the potholed streets of Bombay and 
Delhi do much to disguise the fact at first glance, India’s leap from the perpetual 
stagnation of the “Hindu growth rate” to one of the world’s fastest expanding 
economies is no less staggering.  
By many measures, both India and China have sprung from being bywords for 
backwardness, poverty, misery, and developmental failure, to seeing the word 
“miracle” precede many, if not most, descriptions of their respective growth 
trajectories. Grand superlatives, indeed, fit these two countries well. Their combined 
populations make up nearly 40% of humanity, making each of them more populous 
than the world’s five next largest countries combined.1 When adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (PPP), China has the world’s second largest GDP, ranking only behind 
the USA. Fourth place India is not a laggard either, trailing only Japan and ahead of 
the long list of the powerful Western European countries that dominated the economic 
and social landscapes of the past several centuries.2 Even without a PPP adjustment, 
the staggering growth of both countries means that, barring any major slowdowns, 
they will become in absolute terms amongst the world’s largest economies within the 
next several decades.3  
                                                
1 The official population counts (which may well under-represent reality) list China as having (as of 
2007) 1.3 billion within its borders and India 1.1 billion, which is 20% and 17% of the world’s total 
population respectively.   
2 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2007 data. 
3 The following quote from the aptly entitled book China and India: Towards Global Economic 
Supremacy? captures this sentiment well: “Recent long term econometric projections point out that 
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 As two of the world’s oldest extant civilizations and long-time near mythical 
sources of knowledge and great riches from the European perspective, India and 
China have long also fascinated from a cultural perspective.4 Juxtaposing the 
enormity of their scales with the depths of their cultural heritages, the near 
irresistibility for thinkers throughout the centuries to compare the two great countries 
is intuitive. Their simultaneous emergence from colonial subjugation in the mid 20th 
century, together with their highly similar developmental starting positions but highly 
differential developmental approaches, creates a near natural experiment that serves to 
only further the comparative appeal. The words of a young John F. Kennedy (spoken 
in 1959) capture this excitement well: “No struggle in the world today deserves more 
of our time and attention than that which now grips the attention of all Asia… That is 
the struggle between India and China… for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way 
of life is better.”5    
 The remarkable social, political, and economic transformations that have 
marked the last several decades of India and China’s developmental histories has 
catalyzed a veritable tsunami of new comparative efforts, catapulting the two 
                                                
these two countries, which have today a potential growth capacity as no other country has had in 
history, could, in half a century, be at the top of the economic and political power alongside the US.” 
Rahman, R., Andreu, J. (2006). China and India: Towards Global Economic Supremacy? New Delhi: 
Academic Foundation.   
4 Consider, for example, that the GDP of China and India was amongst the highest in the world at the 
start of the second millenia, and that adjusted for PPP their GDP’s ranked respectively first and second 
in the world from the 1500s through the mid 1800s. Chai, J., Roy, K. (2006). Economic Reform in 
China and India. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 5.   
5 Quoted in: Gilley, B. (2005) “Two Passages to Modernity” in Friedman, E., Gilley, B. (ed.) 2005: 
Asia’s Giants: Comparing China and India, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 22. The “way of life” 
is a reference to the great communist – capitalist battle of the day. Many (perhaps inaccurately) saw 
India and China as an ideal test bed for this ideological confrontation. India’s state-planned economy 
and non-alignment principle did as much to obfuscate clear ideological boundaries during that era as 
China’s fervently market oriented “communist” system does today. Both, for example, initiated 
developmental efforts with a clear socialist orientation, both had an “inward looking” orientation and 
both structured growth through five year plans whose emphasis was strongly on soviet style 
industrialization.  
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countries into the front and center of the world’s collective attention.6 Predictably, 
perhaps, this wave is spearheaded by the business community, as the rise of China and 
India has left few economies untouched and threatens to do nothing short of 
revolutionizing how and where the power that is the boundless and globalized 
business world operates. Chindia – the portmanteau referring jointly to the two 
countries – may indeed become one of the central focal points of the next quarter 
century and beyond.7  
Less visible, but equally intensive, are the academic efforts to bring clarity to 
the changes these two countries have undergone and induced. The topics within this 
realm cover the spectrum from why China and India have developed the way they 
have, to what their current manifestations suggest about continued development, to 
how their experiences help the academic community understand development in 
general the world over. Liberalization, governance, infrastructure, demographics, 
diplomacy, and foreign affairs all figure to some extent within the pages of this 
literature, particularly within the political science discipline. Overwhelmingly, 
however, the emphasis is on whether the development of the past several decades can 
(or will) continue, and whether the most critical components of growth – from 
continued economic liberalization, to social stability, to a stable political environment 
– are firmly anchored in the two countries.  
 
 
                                                
6 While both countries remain poor in absolute terms - 2002 per capita GPD was 960 USD in China 
and 470 USD in India, which includes significant portions of the populations still living in poverty - 
they have logged staggering annual GDP growth rates of 10% and 6% respectively over the past 
quarter century.  
7 Consider, for example, a 2005 article in The Financial Times (Martin Wolf, 23 Feb, 2005, quoted in 
Das, D. (2006) China and India; A tale of two economies. London and New York: Routledge, p. xi) 
which states, “The economic rise of Asia’s giants in the most important story of our age. It heralds the 
end, in the not too distant future, of as much as five centuries of domination by the Europeans and their 
colonial offshoots.” 
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I.II Political Economy, Regime Type, and Alternatives  
A closer inspection of the most prominent comparative political science 
research on India and China of recent years shows two general approaches to the 
comparison.8 By far the most widely represented of these comes from the political 
economy tradition and holds economic liberalization and economic development to be 
the keys to understanding the differences – both past, present, and future – between 
India and China. Titles of this stream, often embellished with bold terms like 
“domination”, “supremacy”, “giants”, and revolutionizing” show little restraint when 
describing the expected economic positions of the two countries in the near future.9  
The respective political economies are fecund grounds for a comparison, as 
Asia’s two giants vary markedly in the gestalt of their political economies. The 
economic liberalization that is often argued to have catalyzed their growth into 
modern economic powerhouses, for example, is considered by many to have started 
ten years earlier and taken a very different form in China than in India.10 Both 
economies show significant variations in economic structure as well. China, for 
example, as the often touted “world’s factory”, is heavily dependent on manufacturing 
and FDI. The international spotlight in India’s case, however, is on that country’s 
service sector, which is in large part home-grown and less reliant on foreign 
financing. These differing economic structures are hypothesized to have far-reaching 
consequences for the two countries which largely determine everything from 
continued growth to political and economic stability. Underpinning this strand of 
                                                
8 Naturally, these two general approaches have porous boundaries and show significant overlap in 
many respects. Nonetheless, research generally tends to focus on one of the two areas as the key focal 
point and differentiating factor in the China – India comparison.  
9 China and India: Towards Economic Global Supremacy (Rahman, R., Andreu, J. 2006); China and 
India: A tale of two economies (Das, D. 2006); Chindia: How India and China are Revolutionizing 
Global Business (Engardio, P. (ed.) 2007); The Elephant and the Dragon: The rise of India and China 
and what it means for all of us (Meredith, R. 2007).  
10 See, for example, Rahman (2006), p. 24.  
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analysis is the rather long-standing supposition that successful development can be 
measured primarily by the degree to which the masses mired in abject poverty can be 
lifted out of that state, and secondarily – though becoming ever more important today 
– the extent to which the two countries can leverage their massive populations in the 
creation of dynamic and wealth generating economies. In brief, the logic behind this 
perspective is that growth out of their previous underdeveloped states is the key to 
prosperity for India and China, and thus constitutes the desired end of all 
developmental activity.    
The second approach places at its focal point the evident differences in regime 
type between the two countries. Irrespective of the accuracy of the (perhaps 
excessively simplified) evaluation, India is widely recognized as the world’s largest 
democracy and China as one of the world’s last authoritarian communist regimes.11 
This perspective might be best summarized by the question “Is wealth all that 
matters?”, as its focus is firmly on such issues as rights, legitimacy, various freedoms, 
cultural integrity and the suggested normative superiority of the democratic system.12 
Central to this line of argument is the implicit assumption that a liberal and 
representative form of government is the only truly sustainable political system, 
especially given the freer flow of ideas endemic to the globalizing world and the 
increased levels of prosperity in the regions under consideration here.13 Following this 
logic, it is suggested that India, having undergone a transition to such a system and 
having now stabilized the requisite institutions over several decades, holds a 
fundamental advantage over China in regards to political and social stability and 
                                                
11 A closer inspection reveals the distinction between China’s “communism” and India’s “democracy” 
to be far more complex than the often boldly made assertions suggest, as a myriad of issues contradict 
the idea of a clean one-dimensional diametric classification.   
12 See, for example, Friedman, E., Gilley, B. (ed.) (2005); Bremmer, I. (2006) The J Curve. New York: 
Simon and Schuster.  
13 In essence, this means a form of government molded on traditionally Western models and principles.  
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smooth continued development, as the (again, argued) inevitable (and tumultuous) 
transition to a liberal system of government faces China in the short to medium term.  
 The political science literature on India and China is often littered with 
suggestions that there has been to date a “lack of serious comparative work on the two 
giants.”14 Perhaps then it can come as no surprise that the majority of those works in 
existence focus on one of the two most obvious and easily discernible differences 
between the countries – the economic systems and their development, or the regime 
type differences. Clearly, these comparisons are rich and doubtlessly provide great 
insight into the developmental trajectories under study. One cannot help, however, to 
question whether this rather narrow focus is comprehensive enough to effectively 
address the most critical questions at hand. The story of a drunkard and lost keys may 
not strike one as overly academic, but is nonetheless an appropriate metaphor in this 
case: having realized that he has lost his keys somewhere between a bar and his home, 
a drunkard is seen crawling on his hands and knees around the same few lamp posts 
for hours on end in the darkness of the early morning hours. When asked by a curious 
passerby if he is sure that he has lost his keys near the lamp posts, he replies “no, but 
this is where the light is”. Indeed, the light on the great landscapes of India and China 
may well illuminate regime types and economic systems more brightly than the vast 
myriad of other features differentiating the two countries, but there is little reason to 
believe that all of the keys to understanding the two giants will fall neatly and 
conveniently within the most brightly lit areas, especially where the efforts to peer 
into these darker corners are not well developed.      
The spectrum of alternative comparative points in the India – China context is 
nearly infinite. The very feel of the two countries could hardly be more different; 
                                                
14 Gilley (2005), p. 249. 
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India often strikes the casual visitor as being awash with lucent color and steeped in 
spiritual belief, while China imparts a more calculated, pragmatic, prosaic, and 
ideologically15 driven feel. Indeed, India and China vary markedly in countless 
fundamental areas ranging from demographic makeup, ancient social norms, and 
modern political culture, to geography, history, and political and economic ambitions. 
In short, both are massive, heterogeneous, and replete with contradictions on a scale 
that makes succinct and coherent generalizations a near impossibility. This, however, 
should not preclude attempts at understanding key differences in these potentially 
“messier” and dimly lit areas.  
 
 
I.III Social Capital, Trust, and Development 
 This thesis is about the India and China comparison. It does not attempt to 
further the existing political economy and regime type based arguments, as these have 
been well-developed in a broad range of outstanding scholarly literature and have 
been refined to include detailed and convincingly argued mechanisms. Rather, this 
thesis addresses the less-visible aspects of the comparison, which, despite their 
occasional appearances in commentaries on the two countries, have not been 
thoroughly analyzed from a scholarly perspective and are often handled in a purely 
descriptive manner devoid of organized structure and concern for causal mechanisms.  
 Specifically, this thesis uses the concept of social capital,16 which has been 
frequently used to explain variations in governance and development,17 to structure 
                                                
15 The ideological fervor of revolutionary China is certainly no longer present in its original form. Far 
from ideology being a thing of the past in China, however, it may well be suggested that the fervor has 
simply changed form, today taking the shape of consumerism.  
16 The concept will be examined in detail in chapter three. Briefly stated, social capital is a concept that 
refers to a set of values or norms within social networks that are argued to facilitate cooperation and 
thus to improve the efficiency of institutions and processes (whether social, economic, or political). 
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the comparison of these perhaps less-visible, but still highly relevant, aspects of the 
two countries. Rather than handling these factors at random, descriptively analyzing 
them and concluding that they are somehow important, the thesis constructs a clear 
structure detailing the mechanisms of how the factors impact the development of the 
two countries, and thus, illustrates exactly why they are important. Thus, by 
establishing clear definitions, concrete mechanisms, and an organized comparative 
framework, this thesis is able to do what the many casual commentaries on these less 
visible factors cannot: it can stand alongside the academically developed political 
economy and regime-type perspectives in offering conclusive insight into substantive 
differences between the two countries.  
 Summarizing the thesis, I contend that continued development in India and 
China is contingent upon successful progress in three key areas: the building of a 
more effective bureaucracy (bringing better governance); the increased rule of law; 
and the implementation of more efficient and effective markets. The concept of social 
capital can structure the analysis of how well India and China perform in these three 
areas. Specifically, I argue that all three areas require a movement towards a bridging 
type of social capital characterized by higher levels of generalized and 
institutionalized trust. While levels of this trust are difficult to directly measure, it is 
possible to isolate and compare factors that directly impact trust levels and thus make 
inferences on the resultant changes in trust levels. Aspects of development in each 
country that aid the formation of bridging social capital will foster progress in the 
three key developmental areas, while the developments which inhibit the formation of 
bridging social capital will inhibit progress. A review of a broad range of literature 
                                                
17 See, for example, the seminal work in this area: Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
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suggests that three areas, which I call social capital components, are critical to the 
creation or destruction of generalized trust and bridging social capital.  
The thesis, in short, argues that these components (collective identity, 
education, and corruption) impact the levels of bridging social capital and generalized 
trust, which in turn have very specific consequences for development in the two 
countries. Analyzing these components across India and China, then, introduces a 
breadth to the understanding of development in the two countries beyond that 
available through the political economy and regime type perspectives alone. 
 
The following sections provide a more detailed overview of the argument, 
broken into chapters. Chapter two briefly reviews the existing literature on India and 
China and argues that most rigorous academic comparisons orient themselves along 
the lines of two perspectives, focusing on the political economies of the two countries 
and/or focusing on the obvious regime type differences. The chapter further argues 
that the existing perspectives, while well developed and insightful, do not cover all 
relevant aspects of the comparison and thus open up a gap for the perspective 
presented in this thesis.   
 
Mutual developmental goals and social capital (Chapter Three): India and 
China are remarkably broad and complicated countries which seem often to move 
simultaneously in a multitude of directions and confound most attempts at 
generalization. Nonetheless, after a review of the existing literature on the two 
countries and a consideration of developmental theory, three mutual developmental 
goals can be identified which are all critical for continued development in both 
countries, characterized by a movement towards a higher quality of life for their 
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citizens, greater material prosperity, stable political institutions, and stable state-
society relations. Chapter three clearly defines these goals, which allows for the 
analysis of trends, characteristics, and developments in India and China against some 
specific end. Furthermore, after establishing a clear definition of social capital, the 
chapter argues that the concept is well suited to analyze both the developmental goals, 
as well as changes within both countries that directly impact the goals.       
 
Bridging social capital: generalized and institutionalized trust (Chapter 
Four):  Juxtaposing the developmental goals of India and China with the social capital 
literature makes clear that a specific type of social capital, namely bridging social 
capital, is of especially high relevance to the developmental process of both countries. 
Chapter four reviews the basis for this argument and clearly defines the terms. 
Furthermore, the chapter argues that bridging social capital can best be analyzed by 
differentiating between two forms of trust, namely generalized and institutionalized 
(GI) trust, and specialized and personalized (SP) trust, as high levels of GI trust foster 
bridging social capital, while a prevalence of SP trust inhibits it. In order to establish 
a comparative starting point, the general endemic trust patterns in India and China are 
examined. 
 
Social capital components (Chapter Five): Using these concepts in a 
comparative framework analyzing differences between India and China, though, 
requires the conceptualization of mechanisms detailing how social capital and trust 
levels change. Trust, however, is invariably difficult to measure directly. Nonetheless, 
insight into trust levels, and especially changes in trust levels, can be gleaned through 
examining those factors that directly impact levels of generalized trust. Chapter five 
 11 
reviews a broad range of literature ranging from socio-psychological individual-level 
experimental research to multi-country survey-based research and finds that three 
factors seem to be instrumental in the creation or destruction of generalized and 
institutionalized trust. I term these factors (collective identity, education, and 
corruption) social capital components. While the relevance of these components is 
supported by a broad and deep foundation of research, I conduct an fs/QCA study on 
the components at the Indian state level to illustrate the mechanisms of how these 
components are critical to bridging social capital levels, as well as to economic and 
social development on the whole. Clearly establishing and defining these mechanisms 
allows for an analysis of how India and China are performing on these factors, which 
in turn provides insight into why they have developed as they have and how their 
current positions lend themselves to continued development.   
  
Collective Identity and social stratification (Chapter Six): The first social 
capital component to be examined, collective identity and social stratification, 
revolves around the concepts of unity, equality, and social cohesion. After 
establishing the theoretical basis for this component and identifying clearly the 
mechanisms involved, it becomes clear how and why the very visible and often 
discussed differences in social structure and diversity in India and China are relevant 
to their respective developments. Specifically, I argue that the social cohesion that 
fosters generalized and institutionalized trust is not a product (as is often suggested in 
popular commentary) of the degree of hetero- or homogeneity of the society, but 
rather of the existence of a common binding identity and the resultant ability of 
individuals to understand others in society as “one of their own”.  
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 The comparison on this component suggests that India faces daunting threats 
to its levels of collective identity. Several indicators suggest, in fact, that Indian 
society today is more fractioned than at previous points in the country’s history, a 
trend that is fueled in part by the increasing divisiveness of India’s ever more 
competitive political system and the increasing appeals to primordial identities in the 
formation of political identity. The very homogenous population and unitary history 
of China, together with that country’s more restrictive political culture, lessens the 
diversity based threats to collective identity. It does not, however, mitigate the 
increasing economic fractionalization resultant from the country’s miraculous growth 
and pace of modernization. Chapter six weighs these factors, alongside several other 
cleavages bifurcating both societies, and suggests how certain trends prevalent in the 
two countries today may affect ongoing development.  
  
Education (Chapter Seven): A broad range of literature supports the assertion 
that education – the second social capital component to be considered – plays a 
significant role in many socially and politically relevant areas. Of those, its 
hypothesized ability to increase levels of generalized and institutionalized trust is of 
particular importance to this thesis. Chapter seven explores the theoretical foundation 
for the assertion and clearly identifies the involved mechanisms before analyzing the 
performance of India and China on education. The chapter finds marked differences 
between the two countries, as the analysis of primary, secondary, and tertiary level 
education reveals that China has far outperformed India in terms of providing its 
citizens with at least a basic level of education. India’s record is especially blighted by 
its terrible record of educating its women and  disadvantaged classes, which is 
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inimical not only to the formation of generalized trust, but also carries further 
deleterious consequences for a wide range of developmentally critical areas.  
  
Corruption (Chapter Eight): The final social capital component deals with the 
problem of corruption, which plagues many developing countries around the world. 
This issue receives some attention from the political economy perspective, though 
approached from that angle the focus is largely on the economic loses of the problem. 
This chapter argues that the costs of corruption are far greater than simply economic, 
as a broad range of research suggests that it greatly inhibits the formation of 
generalized trust and bridging social capital and thus acts as a barrier to progress on 
the two countries’ core developmental goals. After reviewing the relevant literature 
and establishing the causal mechanisms involved, the chapter examines several 
measures of corruption across India and China. While India appears by some 
perspectives to have a greater framework for the control of corruption in place, 
several facets of how corruption is perceived in the two countries precludes the 
making of simple conclusions.  
 
I.IV Purpose of the Thesis 
 As has been suggested, the vast majority of the recent India-China 
comparative literature has a distinct focus on the political economies of the two 
countries (with a particular emphasis on liberalization and development) and the 
regime type differences (with an analysis of the implications of the respective 
democratic and authoritarian regime types). This research seeks to expand on these 
perspectives through the creation of a new comparative perspective and to explore in 
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preliminary terms what this framework (a comparative analysis of India and China 
based on social capital) reveals about development in the two countries.  
 The intention of this thesis is not to disprove or fundamentally replace the 
well-developed existing comparative literature on India and China. It is intended, 
instead, to expand the breadth of the existing research by including several important 
factors into the comparison that either do not factor prominently in the existing 
research, or have to date been approached in a largely descriptive manner outside of 
the rigorous framework of an academic comparison. As a thesis of this type is subject 
to considerable length constraints, and a comparison on topics as broad and multi-
dimensional as collective identity, education, and corruption could fill several 
volumes of books, it is clearly beyond the scope of this work to comprehensively and 
exhaustively compare India and China within the proposed social-capital based 
framework. This work, then, seeks primarily to argue the need for an expanded 
comparative framework for the India – China comparison and to propose how the two 
countries can be meaningfully compared on a social-capital oriented basis. While the 
actual comparison conducted in this thesis does provide some interesting insight, it is 
intended primarily to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed framework and to set the 
foundation for more comprehensive and detailed future research. Stated more 
explicitly then, this thesis has the following three goals: 
 
1. First, the thesis seeks to establish that the gestalts of India and China 
are such that a thorough understanding of their development cannot be 
achieved by comparing differences in their respective political 
economies and/or regime types alone. Thus, the thesis tries to establish, 
there is a need to expand the breadth of the comparison.  
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2. Second, the thesis seeks to establish mechanisms showing how and why 
certain factors outside of the respective political economy and regime 
type-based differences are important. This is done by establish that the 
concepts of bridging social capital, generalized and institutionalized 
trust, and social capital components are vital to better understanding 
development in the two countries.  
3. Lastly, the thesis seeks to establish that the comparison between India 
and China cannot be reduced to simple and one-dimensional 
conclusions, as is too frequently done in analyses of the two countries. 
China cannot be assumed the developmental victor, as its current clear 
economic lead does not constitute a sufficient condition for reaching a 
fully developed state, nor can India be assumed to have qualitatively 
“better” development on account of its more gradual development and 
“more just” system of governance. A comprehensive understanding of 
development in these two countries cannot be won through an analysis 
of any one element and likely will never be gleaned from a single 
regression table.   
 
 
I.V Significance of Research - 
Whether for the sake of better policy formation, an improved development 
theory, a more grounded democratic theory, or merely for the purpose of more clearly 
understanding the dynamics of what will potentially be two of the most influential 
countries in the world of the future, getting the India – China comparison right is of 
utmost importance. The new comparative approach proposed in this thesis may 
advance the efforts to understand the respective developmental trajectories of the two 
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countries, both through the preliminary findings of this thesis and as a structure for 
future research. The general dearth of broad comparative research on these countries 
outside of the political economy and regime type perspectives means that there is 
ample room in the established literature for explorations into the less visible realms of 
the comparison. The inchoate nature of the existing literature also means that a new 
perspective does not need to disprove or overturn existing assertions to constitute a 
relevant contribution to the state of knowledge on this issue: alone to plausibly assert 
that a comparative approach based on social capital, patterns of trust, and social 
capital components can broaden and deepen the understanding of development in the 
two countries, is to offer something of value to the existing research. Ultimately, the 
perspective and findings here compliment the existing knowledge base and provide 
many opportunities to further the comparative understanding of these two countries.  
As India and China are in many respects also “model” developing countries, 
the value of better understanding their developmental trajectories extends beyond 
their own borders to those countries who seek to emulate their successes while 
avoiding the most apparent of their failures. Theoretical and conceptual knowledge 
gleaned from the study of Asia’s giants, then, has wide applicability to the 
(particularly Asian) developing world in general.      
 
I.VI Limitations of Scope – 
 With nearly 40% of the world’s humanity, dozens of languages, ethnic groups, 
and unique cultures, as well as nearly all of the world’s major religions at home 
within their collective borders, it is clear that the complexity of Asia’s two giants 
precludes a comprehensive analysis on any issue, let alone one as multifarious (and 
dimly illuminated) as social capital and its components, especially given the space 
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constraints that this thesis faces. In some respects, then, this thesis will operate with 
broad strokes and the use of necessarily simplified ideal types, though these will be 
supported by empirical observations and established data wherever feasible. The ideal 
types will not always mirror reality perfect, but will nonetheless seek to reach a level 
of complexity that allows them to effectively structure the complex phenomena under 
consideration.  
The nature of both the context and the explored principles also dictates that 
this work cannot, within its limited length, establish and thoroughly prove any 
complex new theoretical approaches. Rather, as argued, the aim of the thesis is to 
challenge the domination of existing India – China comparative perspectives, 
establish the feasibility of an alternative framework and offer a preliminary evaluation 
of what that new perspective entails in regards to development in the two countries. 
There will be no magic bullet and no perfectly explanatory variables; but as Luhmann 
argued with his “reduction of complexity” principle, the most effective responses to 
complexity often do no eliminate or perfectly explain the complexity, but rather 
reduce it to the extent that it can be effectively worked with.18 
 A final word of caution is in order regarding the comparisons carried out 
within this thesis: data, even where it is considered reliable (or at least the most 
reliable amongst what is available) should not to be assumed an infallible 
representation of what is occurring on the ground. This truism holds everywhere, but 
should be especially respected in the case of India and China. Even where there is no 
willful misrepresentation of reality,19 the task of governing collectively nearly three 
                                                
18 See Luhmann, N. (1979) Power and Trust. Chinchester: John Wiley and Sons. 
19 Historically (and to some extent today), this is a problem of great significance, especially in the case 
of China. The process of reporting performance from the local level to the central authorities in Beijing 
has always been a political one, the dire stakes of which have often ensured that a highly skewed 
version of reality is what reaches the top leadership levels and is projected to the outside world. 
 18 
billion individuals is overwhelming enough – capturing accurately what is occurring 
in the two highly complex societies, especially when open access to some sectors, 
geographic regions, and themes is heavily restricted, is task whose thorough 





















                                                
Examples of this abound and include radical misinterpretations of economic performance, public 
health, and social conditions. See, for example: Chai (2006) and Friedman (2005).  
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Chapter Two – Literature review and critique. 
 
II.I Comparing India and China 
 The comparison of India and China is nothing new. From the turn of the first 
millennium through today, these two ancient civilizations and their various political 
manifestations have long fascinated outside observers. Their stellar growth 
performances during the last several decades, however, have ushered in an era of 
previously unmatched interest, frantic almost in its desires to make sense of the two 
giants looming ominously on the horizon. As Dilip Das notes in the opening pages of 
a book on China and India, in recent years major publications including The 
Economist and Business Week have published special issues on India and China, 
prestigious universities including Stanford, Cornell, and Columbia have hosted 
conferences on the critical comparative issues between the two countries, and 
influential think-tanks have launched major research projects into the implications of 
their rise.20 This research all stands alongside the vast bevy of books and academic 
papers published on the countries. The aim of this chapter is to present a succinct 
overview of the knowledge created through these research efforts and to critically 
engage its strengths and weaknesses. As the purpose of this thesis is to engage in the 
debate on the comparative developmental performances of India and China, the large 
body of research conducted on the international security and international relations 
aspect of China’s and India’s growing influence will not be considered here. 
 The obvious starting point for this literature review is to establish what the 
India and China comparative research addresses and which questions it seeks to 
answer. Two rough and often overlapping strands of research can be distinguished 
                                                
20 Das (2006), p. 1. 
 20 
between: the first seeks to understand why China has largely outperformed India on 
many economic and social indicators when the modern political manifestations of the 
two countries had highly similar starting positions both temporally and in terms of 
development levels,21 while the second seeks to better understand where India and 
China are today and in which direction they appear to be developing. While the 
suddenly stalled growth trajectories of previous “miracle” economies suggest that a 
high degree of caution is in order when making projections into the future,22 it is 
highly feasible to consider the extent to which the economic, social, and political 
conditions endemic to the two countries at present constitute a solid foundation for 
continued development. It is this perspective that both the literature review and the 
subsequent arguments and comparisons within this thesis will emphasize. 
 
II.II The Political Economy Perspective 
 The first of the two general perspectives used to better understand India and 
China follows very strongly in the footsteps of the political economy tradition and 
constitutes the vast majority of comparative political science research on the two 
countries. The core argument, in its most succinct form, can be summarized as 
follows: As countries still mired in poverty and backwardness, effective development 
is that which lifts the respective populations out of the most desperate states of 
                                                
21 While some recent work (notably: Friedman, E., Gilley, B. (ed.) (2005)) has questioned the 
assumption of China’s superior performance, it is widely accepted throughout the literature that China 
has had greater success in terms of economic development and in terms of pulling its citizens out of 
dire social conditions that marked both countries during their early post-independence decades.  
22 As the preface to India’s and China’s Recent Experience with Reform and Growth (Tseng, W., 
Cowen, D. (ed.) (2005). New York: Palgrave, p. xix) reminds us, long-term growth projections of such 
diverse countries as Japan, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia, have been wildly off the mark in 
the past and should “provoke some skepticism towards the breathless recent growth projections for the 
two countries over the next half century”. They continue by noting that “[w]hile such projections 
usefully describe the limits of what might be, they should not deflect attention from the fact that these 
are both poor, populous, substantially rural societies attempting to manage the stresses of 
modernization within political frameworks that are still evolving”, and that “[t]he sheer scale of what is 
needed [to continue with the present growth] is unprecedented in human history.”  
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depravity and grants them some basic livelihood securities and an elementary level of 
material well being. Progress, then, is measured largely in terms of economic growth 
and its dependent social indicators, while the post-materialist criteria for well-being 
(together with their political manifestations) that are central to Western conceptions of 
development, are of secondary importance. In the words of China’s great economic 
helmsman Deng Xiaoping himself, “Economic works are the biggest political works 
at present; economic issues are the overriding political issues.”23 Within this 
paradigm, liberalization, effective and efficient markets, and the subsequent 
improvements in economic well-being are the critical points of emphasis and 
considered the keys to continued stable social and political development.24 The 
reasons for this assessment and the high value placed on these factors become clear 
when considering the historical starting points and the subsequent developmental 
efforts of the two countries.  
 
Historical starting points – 
    Their respective ancient histories make it often difficult to designate an 
appropriate starting point for a comparison between India and China. As the emphasis 
of this analysis is decidedly on more recent developments, it suffices to note that both 
countries were vibrant and major economic powers with adequate social development 
by contemporaneous standards until isolationist policies and colonial subjugation 
                                                
23 Deng, X. (1994) Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, Di Er Juan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping), Beijing: 
People’s Publishing House, p. 194, quoted by Guo Dingping (2006) “Democratic Developments and 
Changing Values in China” p. 155, in Inoguchi, T., Carlson, M. (ed.) Governance and Democracy in 
Asia, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. 
24 It is critical to note that the impact of the respective regime types is discussed frequently in the 
political economy strand of literature. This discussion, however, is almost exclusively limited to the 
regime type’s impact on economic development, with very little space dedicated to the potential direct 
consequences for the respective state-society relationships or levels of well-being amongst the 
populations.   
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catalyzed a long period of relative decline that lasted from the early 1800’s well 
through the middle of the twentieth century.25  
 More relevant for this analysis are the economic and social conditions of India 
and China in the years surrounding the foundings of their modern political 
manifestations in 1947 and 1949 respectively. Both, in short, were exceedingly poor 
by nearly any standard, with respective per capita incomes of $609 and $537 in 1952 
(using 1990 dollar values in PPP),26 which amounted to only about ¼ of the 
contemporaneous global average. The true scale of their poverty, however, can only 
be measured by the desperate social conditions facing most of their respective 
populations. Consider, for example, the appalling life expectancy of only 32 year in 
newly independent India. The life expectancy of 40 years in China during the same 
period is but marginally better.   
 
Table 2.1 
India and China at Independence: 
Income and Human Development Starting Conditions 
 
Indicator  Unit Year China  India  Ratio 
Per Capital GDP 
1990$ 
PPP 1952 537 609 0.88 
Population millions 1952 574.8 367 1.57 
Brith rates per 000 1950 37 40 0.93 
Life expectancy years 1950 40 32 1.25 
Infant Mortality per 000 1950 175.5 190 0.92 
Calories per capita 1952 1917 1540 1.24 
Source: Maddison (1998), Swamy (2003) 
 
 Beyond the equally poor starting positions in terms of social indicators and 
income, both were also marked by relatively undeveloped economic systems, the 
                                                
25 Data presented by Angus Madison in Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run (1998) (Paris: 
OECD) illustrates this trend well: as a rough percentage of global GDP (in PPP terms), China and India 
collectively accounted for 45.7% (1700); 48.1% (1820); 24.2% (1890); 9% (1952); 8.4% (1978) and 
15.5% in 1995.  
26 Maddison (1998) 
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structural similarities and differences of which also add significant appeal to the 
comparison. During the initial independence years in the early 1950’s, both countries 
were extensively agrarian, with the vast majority of their respective populations living 
in rural areas. Fully 84% of China’s total workforce was engaged in the agricultural 
sector in 1952, relative to 72% in the case of India.27 Human capital was undeveloped 
and educational standards were abysmal for the bulk of both populations, with literacy 
rates for both barely reaching 20% and primary school enrollment at 49% in China’s 
case and only 21% in India’s. Average years of education per person aged 15-64 was 
a mere 1.6 in China and an even more paltry 1.35 in India.28  
Due in large part to the higher levels of foreign investment under British 
colonial rule, however, India held a substantial advantage over China in terms 
industrialization.29 This advantage was perhaps most evident in India’s vastly superior 
transportation system (particularly in regards to its British engineered and financed 
railroad system). When defining a modern economy as a mineral based energy 
economy (as opposed to an organic economy fueled by land based resources), India’s 
economy was also substantially more modern, the manifestation of which was its 
significantly higher industrial sector output and the higher portion (2.6% of its 
workforce relative to only 1.3% in China) engaged in industrial work. In many 
respects, India was also significantly richer in terms of the natural resources available 
to it. Regarding the availability of arable land, for example, the average Indian farmer 
                                                
27 Chai (2006) 
28 Maddison (1998) 
29 Industrialization in India (under British rule) began in the late nineteenth century, which qualifies 
India as an early industrializing country, particularly amongst developing countries. By the close of the 
Second World War, its industrial output by volume was the seventh highest in the world, though this 
was in part due to the lack of infrastructural damage sustained during the war. The per capita US$6.9 of 
foreign capital invested in India in 1913 relative to the US$3.7 in China illustrates this well. See: 
Maddison, A. (2001). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD.    
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Human Capital, Infrastructure, and Productivity at Independence 
Indicator  Unit Year China  India  Ratio 
Agricultual share of 
employment Percent 1950-52 84 72 1.17 
Crop area per farmer acres 1950-52 0.5 1.67 0.30 
Grain output per capita kg 1950-52 272 281 0.97 
Railroad km/Mpop 1950-52 43 160 0.27 
Electrical power 
per cap 
kw 1950-52 0.005 0.01 0.50 
Coal output 
per cap 
kg 1950-52 96 97 0.99 
Pig iron output 
per cap 
kg 1950-52 2.8 5 0.56 
Crude steel output 
per cap 
kg 1950-52 2 4 0.50 
Cement output 
per cap 
kg 1950-52 4 9 0.44 
Literacy rate percent 1950-52 20 19 1.05 
Primary school enrollment percent 1950-52 49 21 2.33 
Tertiary grads in technology percent 1954 31.4 17.8 1.76 
Source: Maddison (2001), Weisskopf (1980), Swamy (2003) 
 
Yet another divergence marking the starting positions of the two countries 
regards their respective inherited political legacies, which are relevant to the political 
economy perspective in so far as they strongly impacted governance and the ability of 
the countries to manage their respective economies. The PRC inherited a tradition of 
unified rule in China, but the revolutionary and bottom-up nature of the CCP’s 
transition into power ensured that very little governance infrastructure and expertise 
was carried over from the preceding Republic of China regime.31 This contrasts 
strongly with India, which inherited from the British modern political institutions 
                                                
30 By the end of the twentieth century, cultivated land in China made up only about 10% of the total 
area, which pales in comparison to the more than 50% of total area that India is able to cultivate. See, 
for example: Maddison (1998). 
31 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the official name of the modern political manifestation of 
China founded in 1949. It is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
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based on a constitution and rule of law, a well functioning civil service, an established 
law enforcement and judiciary system, and basic – though proven – financial 
institutions.32    
 
Development Strategies – 
 The significant differences in several aspects of the two countries’ starting 
positions do little to support the notion of a perfect natural experiment contrasting 
highly divergent developmental strategies. A closer inspection of these strategies 
further dispels this assertion, as it suggests that the relationship between the 
developmental paths chosen by India and China is far more complicated than the 
ideological rhetoric of the time suggests.  
 Perhaps the most central common trait shared by the two countries was the 
decision to pursue a socialist model of development. As a consequence, several 
features marked the command economic systems of both countries in their first 
decades following independence. The most visible of these was the high degree of 
central planning, which manifested itself in the five-year plans that were to guide 
development. A second visible feature was the prominence of state-owned enterprises, 
which featured heavily in both economies. A third feature was the closely related 
emphasis on Soviet-style industrialization. This, in turn, is again closely related to the 
fourth feature; the “inward looking strategy” adopted by both countries, whose 
intention it was to make the countries self-sufficient through the simultaneous 
development of their domestic markets and industries. Lastly, though of significant 
importance to the developmental trajectories of the two countries, was the high level 
                                                
32 There is great debate (particularly in India) over the value of the British institutions and legacy, 
especially given the high cost of colonial subjugation. This debate is beyond the scope of this work. It 
is, however, clear that many of the relevant institutions increased India’s state capacity in critical areas 
and provided certain governance related options not available to China.  
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of protectionism and long list of special considerations given to agricultural and rural 
economic activities.33    
The central divergence marking the general socialist approach can be found in 
the nature of the models chosen: China’s socialism was fundamentalist and based on 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the lack of private property, while India’s was 
Fabian in its orientation, protective of private property, and based on a democratic 
mode of governance. From a purely political economy perspective, these differences 
carried with them several important consequences for the first decades of 
development. The effect on the respective labor markets was particularly relevant, 
with India’s having been relatively flexible next to China’s heavily controlled 
population.34 The market clearly also played a greater role in factor allocation and 
price determination in India than it did in China, though the license raj ensured that 
state involvement remained high even in the less centrally controlled sectors of the 
economy.35 Lastly, given the high portions of the populations involved in agriculture 
in each country, the divergent approaches to agrarian reform were also significant. 
The consensus in the literature is that China proved more successful in this respect, as 
the changes to the tenurial relationships (through the formation of cooperatives) and 
the production conditions (through more effective use of labor) increased agricultural 
productivity to a greater extent than the respective reforms (abolishment of zamindari 
– landlord – system, but little change in production conditions) in India.36   
                                                
33 Rahman (2006), p. 17. 
34 The houkou system refers to the system of residency and family registration in China. It tightly 
regulated the movement of the population, in particular the movement of poor rural residents into 
cities. See for example: Chai (2006), p. 33. 
35 The license raj refers to the Indian bureaucracy and its extensive system of licensing and regulation, 
which greatly impacted economic activity.  
36 See, for example: Desai, M. (2005) “India and China: An Essay in Comparative Political Economy” 
in Tseng, W., Cowen, D. (ed.) India’s and China’s Recent Experience with Reform and Growth. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan. It must be noted, however, that there is significant debate in the literature 
about the efficacy of reforms during this period. The gains in productivity, some argue, do not justify 
the high human costs of the often politically motivated reforms. Furthermore, in the case of China, 
 27 
 
Pre-reform performance – 
 The economic performances of India and China in the first three decades 
following their independence (roughly 1950 through 1978-80) can be summarized as 
anything from lackluster to poor. With the world in the midst of a “golden age of 
capitalism” marked by record annual average per capita growth rates of nearly 3 
percent, India and China lagged considerably with annual rates of 1.3-1.5 percent and 
2.3 percent respectively.37 These figures are especially poor given the outstanding 
performances of the neighboring to-be Asian tigers (with growth rates above 5 percent 
in these decades) and other Asian countries from Thailand to Malaysia (with rate 
between 3 and 4 percent). 
 Perhaps more significant than the poor income growth records, was the very 
mixed human development record during this period. Both countries, but especially 
China, were quite successful in terms of poverty reduction. The same pattern is 
reflected in the Human Development Index (HDI) improvements during this time 
period, where China made significant advances and India also moved ahead.38 
China’s advances in education, which also far outpaced those in India at the time, set 
the stage for many future advancements. This story, however, is not complete without 
a consideration of the huge costs borne by the respective populations as a result of 
certain political and economic failures of the time. This is most evident in the case of 
China, where a series of catastrophic decisions in the form of the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-1960) and the first several years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
                                                
there is a high degree of skepticism regarding the data available for this time period, as the political 
zeal of the era precluded objective reporting of conditions, and thus obfuscates any picture of the true 
gains of the reforms.  
37 Maddison (2001) 
38 Crafts, N. (1997) “The Human Development Index and Changes in Standards of Living: Some 
Historical Comparisons.” European Review of Economic History, Vol. 1. 
 28 
resulted in the deaths of tens of millions and remarkable losses in terms of human 
capital, resources, and prior advancements.39 India’s history during this era is not as 
blighted in these terms, but a dogmatic adherence to ideological principles and a 
reluctance to reform certain social hierarchical structures certainly contributed to the 
general suffering endemic to the country at the time and to several famines which 
likewise extolled a high human cost. 
 Why did India and China, both rich in legacies, natural resources, and human 
capital, fare so poorly in terms of economic growth relative to their immediate 
neighbors and the remaining world during this period? Getting the answer to this 
question right is especially important for understanding the overwhelming emphasis 
on reform and growth that marks so much of the comparative academic literature on 
the two countries.  
The primary answer was that this era was characterized by extremely poor 
productivity performance and massive inefficiencies in both countries. In China, total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth was virtually absent during the three decades, with 
the meager income gains being solely the result of capital accumulation. A World 
Bank report from the early 1980’s observed that technological development was also 
decades behind the best practices of the day.40 In the case of India, the bloated, 
unproductive, and heavily subsidized public sector, together with rent-seeking 
political activities and the paralyzing system of licensing and regulations, all 
combined to ensure productivity growth remained stagnant and the economy 
                                                
39 While the Cultural Revolution is often described as the period between 1967 and 1977, the intensity 
of the left-turn was already significantly diminished during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when more 
moderate (and economically effective) policies reappeared.  
40 See, for example: Chai (2006) which also references Chow, G. (1993) “Capital formation and 
economic growth in China”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (3), August. 
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remained mired in inefficiencies.41 In both countries, then, the voluntary economic 
isolationism, overwhelming internal interventionism, and the ideologically driven 
political, social, and economic follies all served to hamper significant development 
and economic growth. 
 
Economic reforms – 
 By the late 1970’s, three decades after independence, both India and China 
remained overwhelmingly poor and underdeveloped. Where they had lagged at 
independence, they had by this time fallen even further short of international 
standards and were clearly on the trailing end of Asia’s developmental race. 
Fundamental economic restructuring, however, catalyzed by a leadership change in 
China and a balance of payments crisis in India,42 would reverse this story and would 
turn Asia’s two giants into brilliant economic performers and by extension, into the 
influential objects of fear and admiration they are today. To quote Desai, following 
the reforms “…each country forgot the lessons it had thought it had learned from its 
history, xenophobia, fear of foreign trade and foreign capital, distrust of private 
initiative and decentralization, [and]… adapted to the rhythm of the world economy 
rather than sail against the wind.”43 
                                                
41 To this day India is, in the eyes of many analysts, heavily overregulated. The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and World Bank developed “Doing Business Database” illustrates the business 
environment in the two countries well: the start-up of an industrial firm with up to 50 employees takes 
41 days in China relative to 89 in India; the difficulty of firing an employee (on a 100 point index) is 40 
in China, relative to 90 in India; the time required to register property, land, and buildings in China is 
half of that in India, while the costs amount to only 3% of the property’s value relative to the 13% in 
India. See Das (2006). The database is available on the World Bank website.    
42 While the leadership change in the late 1970’s following the death of Mao Zedong catalyzed the 
reform process in China (under the name of the “open-door policy” in 1978), the underlying cause was 
the fundamental dissatisfaction with the underperformance of the economy in its post-independence 
manifestation, and the ever increasing lag behind those neighbors which it saw as rightfully being 
under its umbrella of influence (particularly Taiwan and Hong Kong). Reforms in India were more 
gradual and had their origins in the 1980’s, though the process began in earnest only in 1991. The 
immediate catalyst was a balance of payments crisis which saw the country nearly bankrupt and almost 
depleted of foreign exchange reserves.  
43 Desai (2005), p. 8. 
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 In practical terms, this adaptation to the world economy can be read as the 
implementations of pragmatic economic reforms and liberalization processes. A 
primary pillar of this was the opening of borders to the import of foreign capital along 
with the parallel shift towards encouraging an export economy. This was achieved 
through the liberalization of financial restrictions and the reduction of trade tariffs.44 
Fundamental internal reforms took the form of reduced levels of state interventionism, 
decreased regulation of business processes, and a redirection (though gradual and far 
from complete) of resources from the inefficient public sectors and state owned 
enterprises (SOEs).45 Perhaps the greatest shift was the turn in mentality away from 
self-sufficiency and an emphasis on home-grown development to a greater acceptance 
of modernization and international best practices, whether in terms of technology, 
procedure, or policy.   
 Since China began its economic reforms in 1978, it has managed to increase 
its income by more than four fold. India’s income has more than doubled since 
initiating its own major reforms in 1991. Average annual growth rates went from 
anemic to amongst the highest in the world post-reform. With this growth, both 
countries (but especially China) have crossed a critical threshold and have become a 
key part of the global economy. This, in turn, has significantly increased their political 
influence and (again, especially in the case of China) ensured that they can no longer 
be ignored. Equally as important as their increased international stature is fact that 
                                                
44 The scale of the deregulation cannot be overstated. Peak import tariffs in India, for example, fell to 
20% in 2004 from a pre-reform high of 155%. These efforts to stimulate greater openness in the 
economy have increased trade as a percentage of GDP from 21% in 1991-92 to greater than 35% in 
2006. In China, whose peak tariffs by comparison are 10.4%, exports grew ten fold to $200 billion 
from 1980 to 1999. See Friedman (2005), p. 61 and p. 81. For another perspective on this 
transformation, consider that China today exports more in a single day than it did in an entire year 
prior to reforms in 1978. See Fang, Z. (ed.) (2004) Stories of China’s Reform and Opening-Up. 
Shenzhen: Story of China Publishing.  
45 A good indicator of the efficacy of these reforms is the mean growth rate of output per worker (i.e., 
increase in worker productivity). An IMF report indicates a 7.9% increase in China and a 3.6% increase 
in India between 1980 and 2000. This compares very favorably to the 0.5% decrease in Latin America 
and the meager 1.5% increase in Industrial countries during the same period.   
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living standards within both countries have improved alongside the increased wealth. 
Recent estimates suggest that China reduced the portion of its population living below 
the poverty line from nearly 64 percent in 1981 to less than 17 percent in 2001, a 
massive reduction over the short two decade period. India’s success has been more 
modest with a reduction of 54.6 percent to 34.7 percent over the same period, but is 
nonetheless a stunning achievement both by international and pre-reform standards.46 
In several other human development realms, particularly in terms of health indicators, 
a similar significant improvement can be established.   
 Aside from the nearly fifteen year delay in initiating economic reforms in 
India, there are several other critical and influential divergences between the reform 
processes in the two countries. Amongst the most visible is China’s remarkable 
success at attracting FDI; at the turn of the millennium, calculations showed China’s 
per capita FDI (the highest in the world behind the United States) to be 10 times 
greater than India’s.47 It is argued, however, that the lesser availability of foreign 
funds has forced a greater degree of financial self-sufficiency on India’s economy, 
which in turn has produced a far more stable, efficient, and sustainable financial 
system. Furthermore, China’s FDI fueled export boom is firmly in the hands of 
foreign multinationals, which has, it is argued, impeded the development of local 
entrepreneurs and indigenous companies. Many see the relative strength of indigenous 
Indian companies, which arguably wield greater influence than multinationals in 
India, as a long term advantage for that country.48 Significantly higher savings rates in 
                                                
46 Chen, S., Ravillion, M (2004) “How Have the World’s Poorest Fared since the Early 1980s?” 
Washington DC: World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3341, June. It must be noted that 
there is a fair degree of contention regarding the issue of poverty reduction, stemming both from doubts 
on data reliability and on the causal connection between the nature of growth experienced during the 
past decades and the poverty reduction.   
47 Maddison (1998)  
48 See for example Huang, Y., Khanna, T. (2005) “Indigenous versus Foreign Business Models” in 
Friedman (2005). 
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China (twice that of India’s), however, provide funds for greater infrastructural 
investment, resulting in superior infrastructure in everything from roads, ports, and 
power to telephone lines relative to India. Table 2.3 effectively illustrates some key 
points of these differential developments. Ultimately, the literature reaches no 
consensus over how these differences will play out in the decades to come. Some 
view the gradual, ground-up, and relatively more homegrown approach of India to 
hold greater long-term prospects, while others see China’s greater infrastructure and 
more conducive economic environment, not to mention its current significant lead, as 
being strong enough to preclude any serious discussion of India catching China in the 
development race.   
 
Table 2.3 
Comparative Improvement since Independence 




Indicator  Unit Year China  India  Ratio China India 
Population B 2000 1.26 1.01 1.25 121 181 
GDP (per capita) $ 2000 3063 2129 1.44 300 200 
HDI 0-1 2000 0.726 0.577 1.26 345 261 
Life Expectancy years 2000 71.4 62.5 1.14 79 95 
Literacy rate percent 2002 91 61 1.49 355 221 
Poverty (%below 
$/day) ppp 2000 16 35 0.46 - - 
Exports US$ B 2000 195 36 5.42 - - 
Railways 000 km 2000 65 63 1.03 - - 
Electrical generation B kW h 1999 1166 417 2.80 - - 
Aircraft passengers per 000 2002 84 12 7.00 - - 
Internet connections per 000 2002 167 40 4.18 - - 
Mobile phones per 000 2002 161 12 13.42 - - 
Source: Crafts (1997), HDR (2002), World Bank (2004) 
 
 In short, much of the comparative political science literature on India and 
China argues that the above discussed reforms and liberalizations heralded in a period 
of unprecedented economic growth, characterized by the transformation of the two 
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countries into the dynamic, open, efficient, and modern economies that ensure them a 
place amongst the most powerful and influential countries in the world. That same 
economic growth likewise takes a central position when explaining the remarkable 
improvements in living standards witnessed in the nearly 60 years since the 
independence of the two countries. Juxtaposing these two positions, it is clear why 
much of the literature focuses on continued reform and continued liberalization as the 
key to understanding the continued development (and thus implicitly also the 
continued stability and well-being) of the two countries and why the implicit 
assumption is that economic growth and development are rightful end goals for these 
once laggard countries.    
 
II.III The Regime Type Perspective 
 It is important to restate that the political economy perspective reviewed above 
does not disregard the importance of the highly divergent regimes in the case of India 
and China. The impact of the regimes on the respective political economies (and 
subsequently on development), in fact, does receive significant attention. There is a 
consensus, for example, that China’s autocratic system allows for more decisive 
decision making and more efficient implementation of policy relative to the 
gradualism and compromise endemic to India’s democratic system. Likewise, there is 
little contention on the impact of the regime differences on other important 
developmental fronts, from income distribution, to savings rates, to the investment 
climate and market stability. In short, the regime type receives attention in so far as it 
impacts primarily the economic development of the respective countries. Questions 
regarding the direct impact of the regimes on, for example, the populations in 
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question, or on social stability, or on the political conditions for continued 
development, receive scant attention.   
 There is another paradigm in the literature, however, that does elevate these 
latter questions to center stage. This perspective starts with the assumption that the 
political economies of India and China are critical to understanding the foundations 
for continued development in the two countries both in human and in economic terms. 
It differentiates itself, however, from the pure political economy perspective in that is 
places the direct impact of regime type on a level of at least equal importance to 
economic development. In other words, this perspective emphasizes the value of the 
regime type independent of its impact on economic development and hypothesizes 
that this independent value will have a significant direct impact on continued 
development parallel to its impact on economic development.  
 Implicit in this perspective are a significant number of (largely normative) 
assumptions, many hinging on the presumed fundamental superiority of the 
democratic system of governance. A quote by Gilley in the concluding chapter of 
Asia’s Giants captures this sentiment well:  
[It is necessary] to consider ‘the ends of government,’ the main 
question of political philosophy and one that cannot be ignored by 
social scientists, journalists, activists, and policy-makers. The notion of 
crude economic indicators like GDP/capita or exports, or of crude 
political indicators like the stability of policies or administrations 
cannot suffice. Religious belief, democratic participation, cultural 
freedom, communal integrity, social volunteerism, and emotional 
freedom seem to be valued more highly – to be the main sources of 
human happiness in all societies.49      
 
The assumption underlying many analyses of regime type impact is that this value of 
democracy will mean that all societies will ultimately seek to transition to such a 
system. India, having made this transition, the argument goes, is in far more stable 
                                                
49 Gilley (2005), p. 250.  
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position to continue with its development than China is, whose system in its present 
form is suggested to be unsustainable. Restated, “[w]hile it is true that in terms of 
short-term indicators, an authoritarian China might appear more stable than a raucous, 
democratic India, over the long term the Chinese polity will have to negotiate a very 
difficult transition from authoritarian rule that will be unpredictable to say the least.”50 
 
II.IV Critical Analysis 
 It is clear that the existing literature greatly contributes to the understanding 
both of why India and China were able to achieve the rapid growth trajectories that 
have marked their recent past, and of how poised both countries are to continue this 
remarkable development. It is similarly clear why the political economy perspective 
forms the foundation of this literature: without efficient and competitive economies, as 
logic and history support, continued growth in India and China would be an 
impossibility. As underdeveloped and still poor countries with sizeable portions of 
their respective populations mired in poverty, this growth engine is indispensable for 
improving the human conditions within their borders.  
 Considering the independent impacts of the respective regime types in addition 
to the political economies adds a further vital component to this comparison. Clearly, 
growth is not a neutral phenomenon, and certain costs associated with how a particular 
regime promotes it may have a significant impact on the human conditions in that 
country. Clearly also, a crisis of either regime could catalyze massive disruptions with 
the potential to render nearly all economic advancements void.  
 But are these two perspectives really sufficient to understand the complex 
comparison between India and China? Do these perspectives have weaknesses that 
                                                
50 Saich, T. (2005), p. 235, italics added. 
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suggest a further comparative approach may provide additional utility for better 
understanding their foundation for continued development? The end of this chapter 
argues that there are several shortcomings within the two perspectives, and that these 
open the door for further analyses on grounds besides political economy and regime 
type. 
 
Political economy perspective critique – 
 Beyond the criticisms levied at the political economy perspective by the regime 
type arguments, several further points challenge the notion that a political economy 
perspective alone can provide a clear picture of the prospects for continued 
development in India and China. Perhaps the most contentious angle of the perspective 
is the very narrow emphasis on economic growth and the underlying assumption that 
this growth is the almost exclusive key to the general development of the two 
countries. The qualitative aspects of growth receive relatively little attention, but when 
considered in detail, challenge some of the assumptions of the perspective. It is, for 
example, a damning attack on the assumption that rapid income growth necessarily and 
directly brings human development that, in India’s case, the most substantial 
improvements in HDI terms were made in the stagnant pre-liberalization period and 
have not kept pace with income growth since then.51 
 A further challenge to the simplicity of the growth – human development 
relationship is the very high degree of inequality that has characterized the rapid 
growth in the two countries. In geographic terms, growth and development have been 
highly skewed. China’s eastern coastline has been the main beneficiary of growth, with 
several of its metropolitan areas reaching HDI levels comparable to those in developed 
                                                
51 Saich (2005), p. 229. 
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Western countries. Its western provinces have significantly lagged and are relatively 
undeveloped.52 Several of India’s southern states (most notably Kerala) have been very 
effective at human development and have left its northern compatriots (most notably 
the BIMARU states) far behind.53 Most significant perhaps is that these regional 
disparities have actually increased during the post-liberalization period of rapid 
growth.        
 Further complicating the growth – development picture is the fact that even 
within similar geographical localities, growth has been highly unequal and has 
bypassed many levels of society. The GINI coefficient, an index which captures the 
distribution of income, shows both countries (though especially China) to be marked 
by significant inequalities.54 Perhaps most alarming, however, and most difficult to 
reconcile with the one-dimensional growth – human development notion, is the fact 
that income inequality has increased in the post-liberalization periods. 
 A final point of contention with the narrow political economy emphasis on 
growth is the question of sustainability. On a plethora of fronts, but especially social 
and environmental, there are serious doubts about whether the growth rates logged by 
India and China in recent decades can continue without creating or exposing 
unpredictable and fundamentally destabilizing fissures.55      
 
                                                
52 Saich (2005), p. 229. 
53 The BIMARU states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, and have been 
laggards in terms of economic and human development. BIMARU is a play on the Hindi word bimar, 
which mean “sick”. Further complicating the relationship between economic growth and human 
development in India is the fact that Kerala, while the clear leader of Indian states in HDI terms, has 
had only moderate economic growth in recent decades and is not one of India’s richest states.   
54 On a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 being a perfectly equitable distribution, the 2001 scores were .32 and .45 for 
India and China respectively. The geographical inequalities which mark the two countries, however, 
mean that this aggregate country-wide statistic may not adequately capture the complexities of 
inequality in either country. Chapter six explores the equality issue in greater depth. See UNDP Human 
Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press, and UNDP (2004) Millennium Development 
Goals. China Progress Report 2003. Beijing: Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in China.   
55 For the case of China, see for example the Stability, Development, and Unity in Contemporary China 
chapter in Tubilewicz, C. (ed.) (2006) Critical Issues in Contemporary China. New York: Routledge. 
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Regime type perspective critique –  
 Perhaps the primary point of concern with the focus on the regime type is that 
India and China are very weak states with limited state capacities, particularly in rural 
areas where the bulk of both populations still reside. This means, in essence, that the 
respective states have limited ability to affect change in certain realms and at certain 
levels of society and the economy. The state and its policies, in other words, are not 
able to “penetrate” into many areas of life, leaving many gaps where the formal 
government has limited influence at best and is powerless at worst.56 In practical terms, 
this manifests itself in the inability (or limited ability) of the state to (among other 
things) win the loyalties of local elites, collect due taxes, influence the informal 
economy, affect social change, and implement policy.57 Local governments, both 
formal and informal, often operate independent of the central governments and are not 
swayed by the directives, structures, or ideologies from above. In short, irrespective of 
regime type, significant portions of social and economic activities in India and China 
follow indigenous patterns with roots which long predate the modern democratic and 
authoritarian systems of the two countries. A focus limited to the formal regimes, then, 
when asking questions on governance and state – society relations, excludes many 
facets of these crucial interactions.  
    A further point of contention with the regime type perspective is the very 
deterministic tone of the argument, particularly in regards to the changes approaching 
                                                
56 While the state level of India’s three-level federalist system largely follows the form of its 
democratically elected central government, the influential local level Panchayat system is based on 
traditional village governance and thus in many respects does not reflect the modern features of India’s 
more visible governance structures. In the case of China, many scholars have arrgued that the extent to 
which the central government is able to excerpt its influence decreases rapidly at both the more local 
levels of government and in the more distant provinces. See, for example: Lui, B. (2002) “How Much 
of China is Ruled by Beijing?” in Blum, S., Jensen, L. (ed.) (2002) China Off Center. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press.   
57 Examples of this abound: in the case of India, for example, it is estimated that the size of 
unaccounted income from the underground economy comprises more than 50% of GDP. See Jha, 
Shikha (1999) “Tax Evasion, Amnesty Schemes, and Black Income: Theory, Evidence, and Issues”, in 
Parikh, K. (ed.) India Development Report 1999-2000.   
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China as it moves further along the development curve. As pointed out by Friedman, 
“…numerous analysts insist that China’s market Leninism cannot last. Either the 
market will create a middle class that will force an opening in the direction of 
democratization or corrupt Brezhnevite party interests (perhaps allying with fascist 
type security forces) that are ever more entrenched will block further reform or things 
will fall apart.”58 But is the inevitability of this really so absolute? Is the assumption 
that China will either transition to a liberal democracy or a face a political crisis and 
collapse of growth not perhaps based too strongly on a foundation of Western norms 
and assumptions? While the notion of an “Asian model”59 of politics and development 
has gone through several cycles of acceptance and rejection in the social scientific 
literature, several features of it are perhaps salient in this case, even if only for their 
role in challenging the very dichotomous view of the regimes and the strongly 
normative Western assumptions underlying them. The trauma of the Cultural 
Revolution, together with extant aspects of Confucian principles, for example, create a 
general desire for stability and order in Chinese society. This has been supported by 
numerous studies and finds widespread acceptance throughout the literature.60 
Furthermore, as Guo points out, “many Chinese believe that there is a conflict between 
order and freedom, in other words, [that] liberalization may cause instability.”61 While 
                                                
58 Friedman (2005), p. 207, italics added. 
59 This is the notion of a system which reflects the relatively more paternalistic, hierarchical, 
communal, and non-confrontational nature of the traditional social and political structures endemic to 
Asia. In many respects, despite modernization, these characteristics remain entrenched within even the 
more politically liberal Asian countries. Many within Asia continue to “tout [the] model of a strong 
state and a weak society as essential to Asian development” and insist that this model “is not only 
successful but [also] reflects Asian values and indigenous traditions more closely than does the 
American system of civil society based on conflictual interest-group bargaining”. Wiarda, H. (2003). 
Civil Society: The American Model and Third World Development. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 73. 
See also amongst many others: Blondel, J., Inoguchi, T. (2006). Political Cultures in Asia and Europe: 
Citizens, states, and societal values. New York: Routledge.   
60 Consider, for example, the overwhelming response in 1998 of Beijing residents to the question “I 
would rather live in an orderly society than in a freer society prone to disruption”, where 55.8% 
strongly agreed, 38.5% agreed, 3.8% disagreed, and 1.9% strongly disagreed. Zhong, Y,. Chen, J., 
Scheb, J. (1998). “Mass political culture in Beijing”, Asian Survey, 38 (8), pp. 763-83. 
61 Guo (2006), p. 146.  
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there is beyond question an increasing interest in some core democratic principles like 
individuality and transparency, “the belief in democratic legitimacy in China is not 
deeply rooted and is conditional, depending on effective performance. Therefore, 
Chinese people, political leaders, and intellectuals in particular, tend to embrace 
authoritarianism at the first sign of trouble.”62 
 The generally high level of support for the CCP at the central and higher levels 
can be seen as at least partly a consequence of this.63 Where China faces the greatest 
crisis of legitimacy and governance confidence is at the local (particularly rural) 
level.64 This is also where, as has been argued, the authoritarian regime so often in the 
spotlight in the comparative literature has the least influence and is the least relevant. If 
nothing else, the general high support for the CCP, the significant improvements the 
Chinese state has made in some areas of governance, and the myriad of cultural factors 
questioning the direct applicability of Western norms and assumptions should preclude 
any discussion of one-dimensional, necessary, and inevitable outcomes based alone on 
the status of China’s regime as an authoritarian system.  
 This same degree of caution can and should be applied to India’s democracy 
and political culture, as they likewise call into question the feasibility of directly 
applying Western norms and assumptions and subsequently making assertions about 
the regime type as a stable foundation for ongoing development. The grounds for this 
caution are many and include the high levels of corruption within the political system, 
                                                
62 Guo (2006), p. 145. 
63 Consider for example that a vast majority of Shanghai youth agree with the statements that “China 
can modernize only under CCP leadership” and the “Socialist system will have stronger survival power 
in the 21st century.” SCCLY (1999). Shanghai Youth at the turn of the century: Shanghai youth 
development report. Shanghai: Xuelin Publishing House. Clearly this is a complex matter and there are 
other demographic groups that would answer such questions less favorably, but it is nonetheless 
undisputed that the central CCP leadership enjoys a very large degree of support from the general 
population.   
64 See, amongst many others: Shambaugh, D. (ed.) (2000). Is China Unstable? Assessing the Factors. 
New York: An East Gate Book. 
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several trends in party structure, the de-secularization of politics, the increase of caste 
based identity politics, as well as some aspects of the endemic democratic culture.  
 It falls far outside of the realm of this work to debate on the subtleties of the 
respective political cultures, political institutions, and political norms of these two 
giant countries. Likewise, the assertion here should not be read as an assuaging of 
China’s authoritarian system or a debasing of India’s democratic system. Rather, the 
suggestion here is that viewing the regime differences as absolute, deterministic, and 
dichotomous disregards the complexity endemic to the two political systems 
Ultimately, then, this chapter suggests that while enlightening, the political economy 
and regime type perspectives that dominate the India – China comparative literature 
leave ample opportunity for further comparative analyses using alternate perspectives.  
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Chapter Three: Developmental Goals and Social Capital   
 
III.I Developmental Goals.   
 This chapter makes the case that a comparison between India and China based 
on social capital can provide utility in understanding development in those two 
countries beyond that available from the prevalent political economy and regime type 
perspectives. In making this case, it is worthwhile to begin by recounting the ultimate 
end goals of India and China; as countries that began their modern independent 
histories in severely underdeveloped states in both economic and human terms, 
effective development, characterized by a higher standard of living for its citizens, 
greater material prosperity, stable institutions, and stable state-society relations, is of 
paramount importance and is the ultimate end goal of each country. This very basic 
assertion finds, whether implicit or explicit, nearly universal agreement in the 
literature.  
 How, though, is this development to occur? Understanding the means towards 
achieving this development is critical, because the nature of the means influences 
which comparative perspectives provide significant clarity and utility. Examining the 
underlying logic of the political economy and regime type perspectives, as well as 
official policies from the respective governments, I propose that three broad (and 
overlapping) developmental goals towards enabling and fostering development in India 
and China can be isolated. Progress on these three fronts, then, can be expected to 
move the countries towards greater economic and human development, while 
stagnation or regression on them can be expected to slow or inhibit further 




I. More responsive and effective governance. 
 Irrespective of regime type considerations there is a general consensus that both 
India and China must provide more responsive and effective governance to facilitate 
further development and withstand the transformations it brings. Specifically, both 
governments must improve the effectiveness of providing services to their respective 
populations and increase their ability to respond to the rapidly changing conditions 
within their countries. Maintaining regime legitimacy, formulating more effective 
policy, and increasing state capacity to carry out that policy are all to greater or lesser 
extents all contingent on this. This principle underlies many of the political economy 
and regime type perspective arguments, as well as much of the wider developmental 
literature.65 Further movement towards a neutral Weberian bureaucracy and increased 
penetration of the state into society can be seen as two main manifestations of this 
improved governance.   
 
II. Increased rule of law. 
  A depersonalization of the legal system and an increased codification of rights 
are seen as necessary steps in the creation of a legal framework that fosters continued 
economic and human development. The highly personalized legal system and lacking 
protection of basic rights in China makes this issue particularly pronounced there, 
though the notoriously inefficient and corrupt Indian legal system means that 
fundamental improvements must also be made in the case of India. The logic 
                                                
65 It should be noted that there are fairly few explicit discussion about governance in the India – China 
comparative literature. Many frequently discussed points, however, from increased revenue collection, 
to more responsive administrators, more effective policy, and administrative decentralization, are all at 
core governance issues. For a basic comparative discussion of governance in the two countries, see 
Mukherji, J. (2005), “The Causes of Differential Development: Beyond Regime Dichotomies,” in 
Friedman, E., Gilley, B. (ed.) (2005). Asia’s Giants: Comparing China and India. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
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underpinning this criterion is particularly well referenced in the regime type literature, 
as it is seen as the foundation for regime legitimacy in the increasingly affluent 
societies of both countries. Furthermore, it is seen as a necessary condition for the 
advanced economic systems India and China are transitioning into and thus makes 
frequent appearances in the political economy literature. 
 
III. More efficient markets. 
 The economic liberalizations of the past several decades have turned India and 
China into modern market-based economies. As effectively argued by the political 
economy literature, there is little doubt that this transition from the previously centrally 
planned and heavily regulated economies is largely responsible for the remarkable 
growth in both countries, as well as their resultant increase in influence across the 
globe. As also argued in the literature, however, this transition is far from complete, 
and significant inefficiencies remain. While improving the efficiency of markets is in 
part reliant on improved governance (through more effective formulation and 
implementation of policy) and increased rule of law (though the protection of property 
rights and the creation of a level playing field), there is a significant independent 
component to this process as well, primarily in the forms of continued 
depersonalization and deregulation of markets, as well as further integration into the 
world economy. 
 
 Measured against many developed countries, India and China clearly have 
many deficiencies in terms of the proposed core development goals: whether in terms 
of market efficiency, good governance, or the efficacy of the legal systems, both 
countries have a checkered history replete with examples of near complete failure. This 
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observation must be reconciled with the remarkable growth rates the two countries 
have posted over the past several decades, as these pale the rates of many countries 
with significantly more efficient markets, better governance, and established and 
equitable legal systems, and thus threaten to debase the argument. The resolution to 
this apparent contradiction lies in the relative levels of development, as it has often 
been suggested that some of the requirements for successful development change along 
various points of the developmental curve. A prominent example of this is the very 
closed and network dependent (read: non-market based) nature of development in 
China’s prosperous Guangdong following liberalization, which is suggested to have 
fueled that region’s very rapid growth. The system, however, has had to transform 
itself gradually into a more market-based system as its prosperity has increased and the 
nature of its economy has changed.66 This same is true of many of the social capital 
components on which China and India are compared in the latter portion of this 
thesis.67 In short, while some of the proposed developmental goals and social capital 
components may not have been critical to early development in India and China, there 
are strong grounds to suggest that they are critical to the achievement of more 
advanced levels of development.      
 
Stable state – society relationship. 
 In addition to the three enumerated goals on which further development is 
contingent, maintaining a stable relationship between their states and societies is 
critical for maintaining an environment conducive to further development in India and 
China. The urgency of this criterion is succinctly captured the assertion of China expert 
Roderick MacFarquhar that “[i]t is in the management of the relationship between the 
                                                
66 Hendrischke, H., Feng, C. (1999), The Political Economy of China’s Provinces: Comparative and 
Competitive Advantage. New York: Routledge. 
67 Again, these are collective identity, education, and corruption. 
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state and their vast societies that the competition between China and India will be 
measured in the next half century.”68 Clearly, any fundamental strife between the 
respective societies and states has great potential to derail all of the ongoing 
developmental efforts. When juxtaposing the fact that both societies are in a state of 
massive transformation (marked by the changing employment structures, corruption, 
floating populations, and greater wealth disparities that have accompanied the rapid 
growth) and are characterized by an unstable mix of traditional and modern political 
cultures with the relatively weak and vulnerable political systems, this is a contingency 
which cannot be entirely discounted.69    
 
III.II Social Capital 
     The concept of social capital, which suffers somewhat from the lack of a universally 
accepted definition but is “generally understood to mean the social structures and 
networks necessary for sustaining collective action, the supposed normative contents of 
these structures (such as trustworthiness and reciprocal relations), as well as-
frequently-the outcome of collective action achieved through such structures,”70 
provides a possible alternative to conducting a comparative assessment of development 
in India and China. This is the case because it has been used to directly address issues 
like governance, institutional performance, and state-society relationships, all of which 
have been argued to be of significant importance to development in India and China. 
                                                
68 MacFarquhar, R. (2005). “Introduction” in Friedman, E., Gilley, B. (ed.) (2005). Asia’s Giants: 
Comparing China and India. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 16. 
69 While prospect of a regime collapse is normally associated with China and the argued 
incompatibility of its authoritarian regime with an increasingly affluent middle class, the religious 
strife, political instability, centrifugal tendencies, and cross-border tensions endemic to India also offer 
ample tinder to ignite fundamental state – society tensions given a sufficient spark. The staggering 
prevalence of protests and riots in both countries (estimated to be in the thousands every year) indicate 
that these sparks are an ever present part of the respective political landscapes. See Meredith (2007); 
Friedman et al. (2005); Tubilewicz (2006); and Corbridge, S., Harriss, J. (2000), Reinventing India: 
liberalization, Hindu nationalism, and popular democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
70 Prakash, S., Selle, P. (2004), Investigating Social Capital: Comparative Perspectives on Civil 
Society, Participation and Governance. New Delhi: Sage Publications, p. 18. 
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This chapter briefly reviews how the concept is defined, why it is an appropriate tool 
for further understanding development in India and China and how it has been applied 
to the two countries in the past.  
 
What is social capital? – 
Social capital is the general term used to describe a relationship-based type of 
capital, held either at the individual or aggregate levels. The concept has its roots in 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu71 and James Coleman,72 though its ascension to 
prominence was catalyzed somewhat later by Robert Putnam’s seminal book entitled 
Making Democracy Work published in 1993.73 While heavily researched in academic 
circles from the late 1990’s onwards, the concept has also been highly influential in 
policy formation, to the extent even that the World Bank has integrated the concept 
into its lending strategies for developing countries under the banner of its Social 
Capital Initiative (SCI).  
Despite the breadth of research, however, there is no generally accepted 
definition of social capital, and as such the concept is applied with a great degree of 
flexibility. The only consensus amongst researchers lies in what a prevalence of social 
capital brings, as it is argued that those individuals (or groups) who are endowed with 
high levels of social capital are conferred certain advantages, whether economic or 
social. Exactly what those advantages are, how they come about, and at what level 
they are to be considered, varies considerably among the different strands of research.  
                                                
71 Bourdieu, P. (1986), “The Form of Capital” in Richardson, J. E. (ed.) Handbook of Theory of 
Research for the Sociology of Education. New York: Greenwood. 
72 Coleman, J. (1988), Social capital in the creation of human capital, American Journal of Sociology, 
94.  
73 Putnam, R. (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
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As Putnam’s conception of social capital still forms the foundation of much 
research, it is perhaps the most suitable for an examination of the concept. Putnam 
himself defines social capital as the “features of social organizations, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions.”74 While the mechanisms remain somewhat nebulous, Dekker 
and Uslaner succinctly capture Putnam’s argument (and relate it to the seminal work 
on civic culture by Almond and Verba) in the writing that “social trust between 
citizens makes their cooperation and voluntary association more alike, membership in 
associations strengthens political competence, social trust lowers the risks of political 
communication, [and] political involvement stimulates system responsiveness and 
democratic performance.”75  
Social capital, then, is seen as something of a missing link, joining together 
natural capital (natural resources), physical capital (infrastructure and other produced 
capital), and human capital, and allowing each to operate effectively. This is 
hypothesized to facilitate growth, reduce the potential for civil strife, and perhaps 
most importantly to the context under consideration here, lubricate state-society 
interaction so as to optimize the performance of economic, political, and social 
institutions. While not free from controversy, a plethora of studies have supported 
these suppositions in the Western context.76  
 
Social Capital in India and China – 
                                                
74 Putnam (1993), p. 167. 
75 Dekker, P., Uslaner, E. (ed.) (2001), Social Capital and Participation in everyday life. London and 
New York: Routledge, p. 2. Almond, G., Verba, S. (1963), The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
76 Putnam (1993) is a suitable example; Putnam found that those areas of Italy (primarily in the North) 
endowed with greater social capital (measured by several indicators of “civicness”) were characterized 
by high institutional performance and better democratic performance (read: good governance) than 
those areas (primarily in the South) with lower levels of social capital. Among many others see also: 
Hall (1999); La Porta et al. (1997); Putnam (2000). 
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 The concept of social capital has found much application in the developing 
non-Western world as well, where rather than being seen as an explanatory factor only 
for democratic and governance related issues, it also is hypothesized to play a critical 
role in development. The World Bank’s SCI alone has published dozens of studies on 
the impact of social capital in areas as diverse as poverty, water and sanitation, 
ethnicity, rural and urban development, credit, and governance, with many focusing on 
the African and Asian contexts.77 India and China are also well represented within this 
literature. Several major academic book-length projects and tens of papers have 
examined social capital in India, while the nature of China’s social capital has received 
much attention from an even broader spectrum of researchers, spanning the disciplines 
of political science and sociology to economics and business researchers. Some of the 
major works and their findings are briefly reviewed below. 
 Social capital research in India has considerable breadth, with some of the 
major works focusing on development and governance, and others on social stability in 
that country’s highly heterogeneous environment. Anirudh Krishna’s 2002 book 
explores how social capital endowment at the village level in Northern India relates to 
economic and social development, communal peace, and governance. His finding 
suggests that high social capital levels, in combination with good local leadership 
(termed agency), is significantly correlated with higher levels of development on all 
considered fronts.78 Ashutosh Varshney’s book, also published in 2002, addresses 
communal violence and the role that bridging social capital79 plays in mitigating it. The 
finding again suggests that communities endowed with high levels of social capital 
                                                
77 A widely read study by two World Bank researchers, for example, concluded that village-level social 
capital in Tanzania was a significant factor in predicting household welfare, even when controlling for 
the effects of income and other assets. Narayan, D., Pritchett, L. (1996), “Cents and sociability: 
household income and social capital in rural Tanzania.” Washington DC: World Bank. 
78 Krishna, A. (2002), Active Social Capital. New York: Columbia University Press. 
79 Bridging social capital refers to a type of social capital that bridges gaps between different social 
groups. This is discussed in further detail in chapter four. 
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(measured in this case by civic ties that cross religious groupings) hold significant 
advantages over communities with lower levels of social capital (here, in the form of 
social stability due to decreased instances of inter-ethnic or inter-religious communal 
violence).80 Many further publications have addressed social capital in India from 
diverse perspectives, and while the results reflect the complexity and lack of 
uniformity endemic to the concept, as a tool to understanding development in that 
country it has shown itself to be of considerable value.81 
 Social capital studies in China display an even greater degree of diversity than 
is the case in the Indian context. While some researchers follow Putnam’s rather 
narrow interpretation of social capital, many – spearheaded by business researchers – 
take a significantly broader perspective in examining the general patterns of social 
networking endemic to China and their impact on economic activity. In the former 
category, the focal point of many studies is development, often at the rural level. 
These, much as is the case in the Indian context, often correlate successful 
development and more responsive local governance to a high endowment of social 
capital.82 The significantly more visible strand of the literature is the latter, whose 
focus is on guanxi, the aforementioned Chinese pattern of social networking.83 This 
research, which has produced numerous book-length works and articles and enjoys 
significant readership outside of the academic community, often suggests that guanxi 
                                                
80 Varshney, A. (2002), Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
81 See in particular the book length collection of studies: Bhattacharyya et al. (eds.) (2004). 
Interrogating Social Capital: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Also see: Morris, 
M. (2002). “Social capital and poverty in India,” IDS Working Paper 61, UK Department for 
International Development; Das, R.J. (2005). “Rural Society, the State and Social Capital in Eastern 
India: A Critical Investigation.” The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 32, Number 1, 48 – 87; 
Gidwani, V. (2002). “New Theory or New Dogma? A Tale of Social Capital and Economic 
Development from Gujarat, India.” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 37, Number 2, 1 
March 2002, pp. 83-112(30). 
82 See, for example: Pye, L. (2001), “Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful 
Concepts for Explaining Asia”, in Rotberg, R. (ed.) Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in 
Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
83 In its simplest form, guanxi simply describes a pattern of social ties and relationships. The concept is 
examined in closer detail in the next chapter.  
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can be conceived of as the local Chinese manifestation of social capital. As such, many 
of the studies examine the impact of the concept on a broad range of areas, from the 
political, legal, and economic, to the social.84 Again, while the nebulous nature of the 
concept prevents significant uniformity across the findings of the research, there is 
little dispute that better understanding social capital (or guanxi, the argued form of it 
endemic to China) can provide significant insight into the development process in 
China.  
 The existing literature has done much to suggest that the concept of social 
capital can significantly further the understanding of development in India and China. 
The reasons are clear; not only has the concept been shown to constitute an important 
aspect of economic growth, but it also is directly relevant to the maintenance of a 
stable state-society relationship85 and to the three identified developmental goals on 
which further economic and human development in both countries has been argued to 
be contingent. Specifically, the tie between strong and effective governance institutions 
and high levels of social capital has been convincingly argued,86 the tie between high 
levels of social capital and more effective markets has been shown,87 and lastly, the tie 
between social capital and effective rule of law can be seen as implicit in social 
capital’s role in improving governance. Beyond this highly compelling reason to 
undertake a comparison of India and China on social capital, there is a second 
significant advantage to employing the concept; its inherent flexibility allows the 
                                                
84 See amongst many others: Luo, Y. (2007), Guanxi and Business, second edition. New Jersey: World 
Scientific; Chen, X.P., Chen, C.C. (2004), “On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process Model 
of Guanxi Development,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 21, 305–324, 2004; Bian, Y. et al 
(2007) “Family Social Capital in Urban China”, in Tang, W., Holzner, B. (ed.) (2007), Social change 
in contemporary China: C.K. Yang and the concept of institutional diffusion. Pittsburg: University of 
Pittsburg Press.   
85 See, for example, Varshney (2002). 
86 See, for example, Putnam (1993).  
87 See, for example, Knack, S., Keefer, P. (1997), “Does social capital have an economic payoff? A 
cross-country investigation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4) 1251 - 1288; Dasgupta, P., 
Serageldin, I. (1999), Social Capital: A Multi-faceted Perspective, Washington DC: World Bank. 
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comparison to be tailored to the unique, complicated, and differential political, social, 
and economic landscapes of India and China, so that it can capture and effectively 
consider certain relevant aspects of development that are frequently bypassed in more 
rigid comparisons.      
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Chapter Four: Trust 
 
IV.I Conceiving of and Measuring Social Capital. 
 While the flexibility inherent in the social capital concept enables the great 
breadth of its applicability, it also presents some fundamental problems. Chief amongst 
these is that the term means many different things to different people, and as such, 
there is no consensus on how the concept can be measured and compared. This is the 
inevitable result of the concept being composed of nebulous traits that exist within the 
minds of individuals, so that measuring it can at best rely on proxy indicators. 
Aggregating these individual level proxy indicators into a meaningful community (or 
even country-wide) macro “score”, presents no less difficulty than one might face in 
constructing a gross national happiness score. This chapter briefly reviews the past 
solutions presented to this quandary and then suggests that in the case of India and 
China, reverting to the concept of trust, the most basic formulation of social capital, 
allows for meaningful comparison and insight.  
 Putnam’s seminal book Making Democracy Work approaches this problem by 
viewing social capital through patterns of associational life and civicness.88 Vibrancy 
of associational life is measured through membership in non-familial and non-
employment related groups, organizations, or clubs. A greater number of associational 
memberships, especially in those groups which expose individuals to others with 
whom they would ordinarily have little contact, is hypothesized to “bridge” individuals 
together and create greater “horizontal” relationships, which in turn foster an 
environment for greater trust and cooperation. Civicness is a measure of individuals’ 
interest in affairs of significance to the community as a whole. In measuring this, 
                                                
88 Putnam (1993) 
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Putnam turns to proxy indicators like newspaper readership, voter turnout, and 
confidence in public institutions.89 Other studies have turned to a great range of 
indicators in their quest to “capture” the existence of strong social networks and 
constructive norms of interactional behavior. Table 4.1 below lists some of the most 




 Number and type of associations or local institutions 
 Extent of participatory decision making 
 Extent of kin homogeneity within the association 
 Perception of extent of community organization 
 Percentage of household expenditure for gifts and transfers 
 
Civil and political society: 
 Index of civil liberties 
 Percentage of population facing political discrimination 
 Percentage of population involved in separatist movements 
 Index of democracy 
 Strength of democratic institutions 
 Political assassinations 
 Degree of decentralization of government 
 
Social integration: 
 Indicator of social mobility 
 Ethnolinguistic fragmentation 
 Prisoners per 100k people 
 Illegitimacy rates 
 Riots and protest demonstrations 
 Divorce rate 
 
Legal and governance aspects: 
 Quality of bureaucracy 
 Independence of court system 
 Repudiation of contracts by government 
 Contract enforceability 
 
Source: Grootaert, C. (2001), pp. 22-23. 
 
 
 What is immediately clear from this list is that the employed social capital 
indicators are not only very diverse, but also highly context dependent. An index of 
democracy is highly dependant on interpretation and normative assumptions and as 
such is problematic as an objective comparative criterion. Endemic familial patterns 
                                                
89 Putnam (1993) 
 55 
(not to mention institutions like the caste system in India) dictate that something as 
simple as the number of “associations” an individual is attached to cannot be 
interpreted identically across different regions and cultures and cannot be assumed to 
indicate anything of universal value. Newspaper readership may indicate civic interest 
in Italy or many other Western contexts, but the measure quickly becomes less 
objective in a country like India, where newspapers are shared and dissemination of 
information in general follows patterns foreign to the West. Even the use of proprietary 
surveys is problematic in cross-cultural comparative studies, as the very manifestations 
of social capital (not just the indicators) are hypothesized to show substantial variation 
across different regions, countries, and systems.90    
 
IV.II Trust 
 Given the great difficulties in conceptualizing and measuring social capital 
even in ideal settings, it is clearly a tenuous task to construct a conceptualization of 
social capital that will provide a meaningful and consistent perspective across the 
highly complicated and divergent Indian and Chinese contexts. Most traditional 
indicators (network membership, voter turnout, etc) have significant limitations in 
these contexts and are hardly comparable. Survey data also presents many problems 
and again is of limited comparative use given the remarkable level of difference 
between the systems. Does this then mean that the social capital concept cannot be 
effectively conceptualized in a way to all for a meaningful comparison between India 
and China? I argue that reducing the concept to its most basic element – trust – allows 
it to structure a comparison that will address the most critical aspects of development 
                                                
90 The frequent assertion in China related social capital research that guanxi is the form of social capital 
endemic to China is a good example of this. Guanxi has many characteristics that fundamentally 
differentiate it from Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital, and yet, many argue that it is 
nonetheless the most appropriate conceptualization of the concept in that context. This is discussed in 
detail in the latter part of this chapter. See, for example: Luo (2007) and Wang (2000). 
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in India and China – the three developmental goals and a stable state-society 
relationship – while avoiding the many of the difficulties associated with 
conceptualization and measurement that complicate the more narrow interpretation of 
the concept based on civicness and associational vibrancy. 
 
Trust and social capital –  
 Using trust to help conceptualize social capital is nothing revolutionary; trust 
plays an important, if implicit, role even in Putnam’s rather narrow conceptualization 
of social capital.91 Far more explicit is its role within Francis Fukuyama’s 
conceptualization: “Social capital can be defined simply as an instantiated set of 
informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to 
cooperate with one another. If members of the group come to expect that others will 
behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Trust acts as a 
lubricant that makes any group or organization run more efficiently.”92 Trust, then, can 
be used as a way of approaching the concept of social capital. More specifically, as an 
established avenue towards conceptualizing social capital, examining the nature of 
trust and trust networks within India and China can provide a better understanding of 
development in those countries.  
 Using trust as a basis for comparison between India and China requires that the 
concept be examined and clearly conceptualized. While few would dispute “the clear 
and simple fact that, without trust, the everyday social life which we take for granted is 
                                                
91 Returning to Putnam’s definition of social capital as the “features of social organization, such as 
trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putnam 1993, p. 167), it is clear that trust is a relevant component in a broader array of 
components that comprise the concept.  
92 Fukuyama, F. (2000), “Social Capital”, in Harrison, L., Huntington, S. (ed.) (2000) Culture Matters: 
How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books, p. 98. 
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simply not possible,”93 the concept is one that does not receive much objective and 
critical examination in everyday life. In seeking a clear understanding of the concept, 
one can turn to the seminal work of Niklas Luhmann, which states that “[t]o show trust 
is to anticipate the future. It is to behave as though the future were certain.”94 In this 
sense, trust allows actions and decisions to be made in the face of a complex and not 
fully understood reality. It is, in essence, the ultimate simplification mechanism. 
Extrapolating this into the context of modern life, it becomes clear that trust lies at the 
heart of every action and thought: one cannot see into the future while waiting at a bus 
stop to definitively determine whether the expected bus will actually stop, nor does one 
know in advance whether the money offered in exchange for the trip will be accepted. 
Continuing, one doesn’t know in advance whether the bus will follow its designated 
route, nor whether the fellow passenger one sits next to will not commit a violent act 
upon us. Trust allows us to expect that, despite the inevitable uncertainty, given events 
will occur. All aspects of modern economic, social, and political systems follow this 
principle: exchange of money for goods and services to be rendered, investment in a 
community for expected future gain, and the faith put in a state’s power for the sake of 
an expected social stability, amongst many other possible examples, all rely on the 




                                                
93 Good, D. (1988), “Individuals, interpersonal relations, and trust,” in Gambetta, D. (ed.) (1988) Trust: 
Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p 32.  
94 Luhmann (1979), p. 10.  
95 Countless research has also substantiated the role trust plays in successful economic and political 
development, both within the field of political science and outside. See for example: Warren, M. (ed.) 
(1999), Democracy and Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Rothstein, B. (2005), Social 
Traps and the Problem of Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Sztompka, P. (1999), Trust: 
A Sociological Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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Types of trust - 
 Clearly, this broad and generalized conceptualization of trust is not readily 
measurable, nor is it easily comparable. Examining trust more closely, however, allows 
for several differentiations in the concept, some of which ultimately provide the 
components for an effective comparative framework. Turning again to Luhmann, we 
see that trust can be conceptualized in two distinct ways; the first is a personalized type 
of trust, where trust is based on familiarity and past experiences and is embedded 
within individuals. The second type is an institutionalized type of trust, which is based 
on expectations of stability in often abstract and distant institutions.96 Martin Paldam 
suggests a similar differentiation in distinguishing between generalized trust, which is 
a broad and non-specific “trust to unknown members of society,” and specialized trust, 
which is a very specific and narrowly defined trust often directed towards individuals 
and characterized by more specified norms of reciprocity.97     
 I propose to simplify and combine these two categorizations into one 
differentiation of trust. This differentiation then serves as the basis for analyzing the 
prevalent trust networks in India and China, and by extension, analyzing their 
development from a social capital perspective. While this differentiation is original, it 
overlaps several other trust differentiations and borrows from several existing 
conceptualizations. It must also be stated that the proposed categories are ideal types, 
which seek through the construction of simple models to reduce the complexity of 
reality to a degree that allows for comparison and parsimonious analysis. The ideal 
types do not reflect or replicate every subtlety of reality and are not consistent with 
every individual and particular instance of the phenomena under consideration. 
                                                
96 Luhmann (1979) 
97 Paldam, M. (2000), “Social Capital: one or many? Definitions and measurement”, Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 14 (5). 
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Nonetheless, they reduce the remarkable complexity of trust networks in India and 
China to a degree that allows these phenomena to be considered within the context of 
development and engaged within the social capital comparative framework. The two 
proposed categories are examined below. 
 
Specialized and Personalized (SP) patterns of trust tend to be limited to known actors 
and contexts, as they are highly conditional in regards to actors and contexts, are rigid 
in their norms of reciprocity and are based largely on past experiences. Regarding 
actors and contexts, they are heavily dependent on a specific and narrowly defined 
identity (for example, family, clan, profession, etc.). In terms of reciprocity, norms of 
trust vary and depend heavily on context and identity (i.e. the nature of trust extended 
to any one individual depends strongly on who they are, and will be different than the 
trust extended another person). Lastly, because the trust is a result of repeated 
interactions and personal experiences within a narrowly confined set of conditions, it 
tends to be limited to known individuals and contexts. In short, SP trust is highly 
dependent on the identities of the involved parties, which in turn determine which rigid 
set of reciprocity and interaction norms are adopted.       
 
Generalized and Institutionalized (GI) patterns of trust tend to be more universal and 
thus extend to unknown actors and contexts, including distant ideas and intangible 
institutions. This type of trust tends to be generalized and less dependent on the 
identity of the individual actors involved. Its norms of reciprocity are more universal 
and again less dependent on the nature of the relationship or the involved individuals. 
The trust is also less personalized, meaning it rests in intangible norms, ideas, and 
institutions, rather than in individuals and the histories of their interactions. An 
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extension of this is that it is not limited only to known contexts and individuals, but 
extends to areas in which there is no personal experience.   
 
 The relevance of this trust categorization to social capital, and by extension, to 
better understanding development in India and China, needs to be established. The 
best starting point for this is examining the proposed central mechanism of social 
capital. Putnam argued that two forms of social capital can be conceived of; bonding 
and bridging social capital.98 Bonding social capital is “characterized by dense, multi-
functional ties and strong but localized trust”99 that appears in closed groups based on 
a strong common identity (one can think of the camaraderie in a sports team, or the 
close ties within an extended family, for example). Bonding social capital, 
furthermore, is often seen in a mixed light, as it is hypothesized to reinforce exclusive 
identities and engender greater homogeneity.100 Bridging social capital, by contrast, is 
characterized by weaker and more distal ties that cross prevalent identity lines (such 
as might be formed amongst the diverse and otherwise unrelated members in 
Putnam’s ubiquitous bowling league, for example). This is hypothesized to expand 
general trust across individuals with little common identity or historical connection, as 
well as allow for greater broad cooperation.101 It is the latter bridging type of social 
capital that is often hypothesized in the literature to constitute a necessary condition 
for economic development, good governance, and stable state-society relations.102 
                                                
98 Putnam (1993, 2000) 
99 Onyx, J., Bullen, P. (2001), “The different faces of social capital,” in Dekker, P., Uslaner, E. (ed.) 
(2001). Social Capital and Participation in everyday life. London and New York: Routledge. 
100 Putnam (2000), p. 22.  
101 Putnam (2000) 
102 Next to Putnam (2000), see for example: Woolcock, M. (1998), “Social Capital and Economic 
Development: Towards a theoretical synthesis and policy framework”, Theory and Society 27(2): pp. 
151-208; Van Deth, et al. (1999), Social Capital and European Democracy. London: Routledge.   
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 The link between this differentiation and the proposed trust differentiation is 
clear: GI trust is an intrinsic part of bridging social capital, while SP trust is 
associated with bonding social capital. The logic behind this assertion is likewise 
simple: being more general in nature, less identity dependent, and not reliant on past 
experience, it is the GI trust that bridges the unknown elements and uncertainty 
inherent in the cross-cutting horizontal ties and intangible institutional linkages that 
mark bridging social capital. Juxtaposing the importance of GI trust to bridging social 
capital with the argued necessity of bridging social capital for effective economic, 
social, and political development, then, logically establishes the importance of GI 
trust to the types of development India and China are pursuing. Although approached 
from a different perspective, a variety of research on trust and democracy firmly 
supports this assertion.103 
 
Trust types and developmental goals juxtaposed - 
 More specifically and more importantly, however, the proposed trust 
differentiation shows direct relevance to the three enumerated developmental goals in 
the India and China context. This is examined in detail below.  
 
I. More responsive and effective governance - In order to maintain regime legitimacy 
and respond effectively to the rapid economic and social transformations, the states of 
India and China must increase their ability to formulate effective policy, increase their 
capacity to carry out that policy, and increase the efficiency with which they operate. 
Given their massive sizes and complex societies, this is clearly a daunting task 
without simple solution. There is, however, little contention that achieving those goals 
                                                
103 See, for example, two chapters on differentiations of trust and their impact on political development 
in Warren (1999), as well as Rothstein (2005). 
 62 
requires the respective governments to move towards neutral and transparent 
Weberian type bureaucracies and thus away from more provincial forms of 
personalized governance. The intangible and impersonal institutions and norms which 
comprise Weberian bureaucracies clearly rely on GI trust, and are inhibited by the 
personalized and experience based SP trust. An example illustrates this well: when 
dealing with an administrator within a Weberian bureaucracy, the trust is extended to 
the more distal and intangible institution and to the rules that govern that 
administrator and not to the administrator as a person and individual. The experience 
and outcome of the interaction should be independent of the level of personal 
connection and past experience with the particular administrator; in other words, it 
should be completely independent of the level of SP trust in the administrator as an 
individual.  
 
II. Increased rule of law - A depersonalization of the legal system and an increased 
codification of rights are seen as necessary steps in the creation of a legal framework 
that allows for continued human development and constitutes a necessary condition for 
the advanced economic systems India and China are transitioning into.104 Much as is 
the case with governance, a move towards neutral rule by law entails trust towards 
more distal and intangible institutions and away from the proximate and personalized 
thick trust of SP trust. Illustrated through example again, when dealing with a judge or 
a police officer, prior experience or personal connection to that individual should have 
no relevance and no bearing on outcome within a system of neutral rule of law. The 
officer or judge ideally should neutrally represent the distal and intangible norms of the 
institution he or she represents and should not color those through personal experience 
                                                
104 As previously stated, the highly personalized legal system and lacking protection of basic rights in 
China makes this issue particularly pronounced there, though the notoriously inefficient and corrupt 
Indian legal system means that fundamental improvements must also be made in the case of India. 
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or connection in any way. The trust inherent to this idealized situation is clearly of the 
GI variety.  
 
III. More efficient markets – There is little contention that the transition from the 
previously centrally planned and heavily regulated economies to modern market-based 
economies is largely responsible for the remarkable growth in India and China. This 
transition is far from complete, however, and improving the efficiency of their markets 
is widely recognized as a key criterion to continued growth and development.105 What 
are efficient markets? Economists would argue that they are free and neutral markets 
where price is determined by aggregate supply and demand without external 
interference. How is this related to the proposed trust differentiation? Beyond being 
contingent on good governance and rule of law, free markets are also highly 
impersonal entities, where the intangible and distal concepts of supply and demand, 
rather than personal connection and past experience, dictate outcome. In other words, 
trust in individuals or prior past experience ideally plays no role in a free market, 
where the trust instead is in the intangible mechanisms and institutions of the market.  
 
Clearly, on all three developmental goals the trust pattern required is not the 
identity based thick, proximate, personalized, and experience based SP trust, but rather 
the thinner, more distal, intangible, and institutionalized GI trust. Analyzing the 
predominant trust patterns in India and China in terms of SP and GI trust, then, can 
logically provide significant insight into the two countries’ positions on the three 
developmental goals. The remainder of this chapter undertakes this analysis. 
                                                
105 It may well be disputed that India and China seek to transition entirely into free-market economies. 
Ultimately, however, whether this is the case or not is irrelevant, as it is clear that both seek to 
transform many elements of their economies into market-based systems. Where that holds (and few 
would dispute that it predominantly holds), this argument holds as well.  
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IV.III Trust Patterns in India and China 
The nature of trust networks in China – 
 It is clearly an impossible task to argue that any one type of trust pattern can 
describe with consistency all trust related phenomena within a large and 
heterogeneous country. It is, however, possible to isolate dominant social networking 
structures and examine carefully the trust inherent in them. This is by no means a 
novel undertaking, as much well regarded research has done just this. Fukuyama, for 
example, in his influential book Trust, characterizes China’s dominant social 
networks as being distinctly low-trust in nature.106  His argument is that there is a 
strong inclination in Chinese society for people to trust only those individuals with 
whom they have a special relationship107 and to distrust all others outside of this 
network. Hamrin further argues that the family-clan orientation of traditional Chinese 
society instills distrust of those outside of the kinship and personal networks.108 
Certain events, like the Cultural Revolution, are also argued to have had an inimical 
and lasting effect on many aspects - especially on trust - of interpersonal relationships.  
 The clear emphasis on guanxi in both of these works, as well as the concept’s 
ubiquity in China related trust and social capital literature, makes clear that guanxi is 
widely considered to represent the dominant form of social networking in China. As 
such, it is adopted as the centerpiece of China’s trust analysis in this research as well. 
Guanxi is translated in numerous ways throughout the literature, from “interpersonal 
relationships” to “back-door business” to a “type of personal network”. Disagreement 
about translation aside, it is generally conceded that the behavior it describes acts as 
                                                
106 Fukuyama (1995) 
107 Fukuyama explicitly highlights familial relationships, though there are grounds to argue that other 
guanxi based relationships follow the same pattern.  
108 Hamrin, C. (2006), China’s Social Capital Deficit, A paper for the China Balance Sheet Project, 
online at: http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/Papers_Social_Capital.PDF 
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the “lifeblood of both the macro-economy and micro-business conduct”109 and “is 
used at all levels of social life, from the smallest, everyday aspects to the most 
important events in a person’s life.”110 Luo goes on to state that “one’s [guanxi] 
network ideally should contain everyone from store clerks who control scarce 
commodities to cadres who have final say over such things as housing allotments, 
residence permits, job assignments, and political evaluations needed for Youth 
League or communist party membership.”111   
The word guanxi itself is made up of two characters:    ‘guan’ and ‘xi’. 
Guan can be described as a pass or gateway and implies something of a barrier, as its 
extended meaning can be translated as “to close up”. Xi can be described as a linkage 
or network. It also implies a sense of hierarchy and formality. Li and Li offer a literal 
translation of “tying up interface system”, though the term carries a myriad of 
connotations and implications, some of which stray considerably from the literal 
translation.112  
In the most basic sense, guanxi is simply a relationship governed by certain 
norms of reciprocal behavior.113 Luo suggests that it “refers to the concept of drawing 
on connections in order to secure favors in personal relations,” and further argues that 
it contains “implicit mutual obligations, assurances, and understandings…”114 It is 
viewed as an integral aspect of a shared Chinese morality. The relationship described 
is long-term and open-ended, with ongoing exchanges of favors that are not time 
specific. The guanxi relationship is not static, but rather can be newly established, 
                                                
109 Luo (2007), p.1. 
110 Luo (2007), p. 20. 
111 Luo (2007), p. 20. 
112 Li, S.H., Li, S.M. (2000), The Economics of Guanxi, published online at www.chinaonline.com 
113 It is important to note that the behavior described by the term guanxi is not exclusive to China or to 
Chinese culture. On the contrary, elements of the behavior are endemic to nearly all social structures 
the world over. The ascribed importance of guanxi in the Chinese context, then, is not a product of its 
exclusivity, but rather of the extent to which it structures social interaction, which is far greater than in 
most other societies.  
114 Luo (2007), p. 2. 
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cultivated, and manipulated. Some of the most crucial elements of guanxi are 
considered below.    
 
The importance of a common identity - Guanxi is very dependent on identity, as a 
perceived common identity is viewed as the foundation and base of these 
relationships. Luo (2007) has identified and categorized several possible guanxi 
bases,115 which are briefly considered below. Noteworthy is that most of these bases 
are not voluntary, cannot be altered, and are not a product of choices or decisions. 
Rather, they are fixed identities which define individuals. Those bases which 
individuals have a degree of control over, like association and club memberships or 
friendships, are thought to be significantly weaker than fixed bases and often not 
sufficient grounds for the formation of guanxi relationships without the presence of 
other and more secure bases.   The bases are: 1) a shared locality or dialect, which 
may be of high relevance in a time of increased mobility; 2) a fictive kinship, based 
on common surnames; 3) a direct kinship, often either through patriarchic lineage or 
through marriage; 4) a common workplace, though shared educational experiences, 
i.e., shared institutional attendance, may also constitute a further related base; 5) 
trade association or social club membership; and finally 6) friendship.  
 
The exclusionary nature of guanxi – Guanxi categorizes and structures groups of 
individuals into ‘insiders’ (    - zijiren) and ‘outsiders’ (  - wairen), as is 
suggested by the “barrier” and “gateway” connotations of the guanxi term itself. The 
differentiation between “insiders” and “outsiders” also means that different types of 
trust norms apply depending on which side of the barrier a person may fall into. This 
                                                
115 In this context, guanxi ‘bases’ are defined as the identity based foundations on which guanxi 
relationships can be established.  
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bifurcating world view has several important implications, paramount of which is that 
interpersonal interaction of consequence is largely limited to those within the guanxi 
network, while those outside of the network are to an extent either excluded, treated in 
a less favorable manner, or approached as a last resort.     
 
The private and individual nature of guanxi – Guanxi is inherently an individual and 
ego-centric concept. The principle manifestation of this is that guanxi does not reside 
in groups or organizations, but rather only in individuals. Where groups are involved, 
guanxi is attached to the individuals within those groups, and as such, is dependent on 
them and transfers with them. 
 
The utilitarian and economic nature of guanxi – As previously discussed, friendship 
is not a prerequisite for a guanxi relationship, though it can potentially enhance such a 
relationship. Underlying this is the fact that guanxi is fundamentally utilitarian rather 
than emotional, and as such, increasing and solidifying the network of those with 
whom one can exchange personal favors – whether goods or services – is the sole 
aim.116 Increasing friendship, acquiring social acquaintances or working towards 
collective goods, then, do not play a role in a guanxi relationship, so long as they are 
not undertaken to directly further a guanxi relationship.  
  
 Juxtaposing the characteristic of guanxi networks with the proposed trust 
differentiations leads to several conclusions. Clearly, guanxi relies on a very 
specialized system of trust, where trust is a product of a complicated array of factors 
including a myriad of identity based considerations and economic calculations. It is 
                                                
116 Luo (2007) 
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also very clearly personal in nature, in that it is more often than not sequentially 
accrued as a product of past experiences and successful “transactions” between 
individuals. This is further supported by the fact that it transfers with individuals, 
rather than residing within groups or institutions. In short, the trust mechanisms 
underlying guanxi are clearly of the SP variety. Insofar as guanxi dominates the 
networking structures in China, (and there is little contention throughout the broad 
spectrum of related research that it does just that) China’s prevalent trust patterns can 
clearly be characterized as being SP in nature.      
 
The nature of trust networks in India – 
 An analysis of trust in India is less straight forward than the equivalent in 
China, as India has no cultural equivalent of guanxi to encompass and efficiently 
structure the analysis. When approaching the concept of trust in India, though, one 
can revert back to the starting point of so many analyses in that country: identity. The 
ubiquitous role of this factor cannot be understated, and it is indicative that much of 
the chapter introducing India in the textbook Comparing Asian Politics is dedicated to 
it.117 This is inevitable in a country which does not have the same unitary history and 
cultural heritage that China does, and arguably, is more the product of a political 
willed and invented national identity than any coherent and endemic culturally based 
identity.118 The pre-existing regional and linguistic identities strongly structure 
                                                
117 Charlton, S. (2004). Comparing Asian Politics: India, China, and Japan. Boulder: Westview Press. 
118 The question of “what it means to be Indian” is not easily approached due to the simple fact that 
through the two millennial old and rich history of civilization on the S. Asian subcontinent, there is no 
evidence whatsoever of a unitary Indian history. Cultural development has been geographically 
fragmented and very heavily influenced by external actors. During pre-colonial times (it is difficult, 
incidentally, to speak of a “unified” India even under British rule), the closest the sub-continent came 
to political unification was under the rule of the (invading) Mughals. Even this period (spanning over 
three centuries from the early 1500s), however, saw many regions of the country maintain significant 
autonomy and did not see a level of cultural diffusion that would suggest anything resembling the 
genuine “unification” of ideas and practices necessary to constitute the foundation of a true unitary 
history.   
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political identities to this day and often appear to override national sentiments once 
the surface is scratched.119 Perhaps even more relevant, however, are the ethnic, 
religious, class, and caste based identities that have structured Indian societies for the 
greater part of two millennia. Understanding these, I argue, is one avenue to 
establishing the nature of dominant trust patterns. 
  James Fearon, in a study on ethnic and cultural diversity, finds India to be not 
only significantly more heterogeneous than China (using his conceptualization, over 
four times as diverse), but more importantly to be one of the most diverse countries in 
the world.120 This categorization is based largely on linguistic divides121 and so does 
not fully encapsulate the unrelated remarkable degree of religious and other non-
linguistically based cultural diversity.122 The clearest manifestation of this extra-
linguistic and extra-religious diversity may well be the intra-ethnic caste based 
diversity, which informs all manner of social interaction and social structure in India. 
As caste rigidly structures social interaction and community norms and is an inherent 
part of both the dominant Hindu culture and the local manifestations of Islam and 
Christianity, it serves as an appropriate structure to examine network norms.123  
                                                
119 Modern Indian history is replete with fractionist movements. It has been suggested, even, that it is 
the very strength of regional identity that has kept India’s centrifugal tendencies in check, because the 
intensity of regional identity has kept fragmented regions from grouping together in order to challenge 
the domination of central authority.     
120 Excluding sub-Saharan Africa, India is roughly on par with only three further countries as the most 
ethnically and culturally diverse in the world. China, by contrast, is very homogenous, both relative to 
many of its Asian neighbors, and to much of the remaining world. Fearon, J. (2003) “Ethnic and 
Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2) pp. 195-222.    
121 Following a 2003 constitutional amendment, India has 26 officially recognized languages to 
compliment its two official languages (English and Hindi). This alone serves to enforce India’s position 
as one of the most linguistically diverse in the world, and this assertion is enforced by the greater than 
1,600 recognized dialects found within its borders. Matthew, K. (2006). Manorama Yearbook 2003. 
Malayala Manorama, pg 524.  
122 Nearly all of the world’s major religions find significant representation within India’s borders. India, 
for example, has the world’s third largest Muslim population, behind only Indonesia and Pakistan, and 
has states in which the Christian population is the majority. Even Hinduism, the largest religious 
grouping, contributes to the religious heterogeneity, as the categorization is in many respects an 
umbrella term capturing a remarkably diverse range of beliefs and practices.     
123 South Asian Islam has, much like Hinduism, a caste-like system of social stratification which 
heavily influences social norms and norms of reciprocity. In many regions of India the Christian 
community likewise observes caste stratifications, particularly amongst new converts.  
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 The Indian caste system structures society, and in turn also norms of behavior 
and reciprocity, through the grouping of individuals into (largely) hierarchically 
stratified, hereditary and endogamous “castes”.124  Within India, this stratification 
around castes is an intrinsic part of life and is deeply rooted in the endemic world 
view, leading to the general sentiment that “[r]elations between human beings are and 
should be defined by the behavioral norms and roles that are ascribed to one’s caste. 
Caste, like gender, marks people at birth; only with great difficulty can individuals 
escape the attributes and roles of their caste.”125 These identity based norms influence 
all manner of daily action, from who can be interacted with and in what manner, to 
where one can work and what kind of work one can do, to how one is to relate to 
others around them.  
Clearly, a rigid system of identity based social norms like this has the potential 
to strongly impact social capital. But what, exactly, does this relationship look like? 
Several works have addressed this question while dealing either implicitly or 
explicitly with the caste system as a backdrop.126 The rigidly defined norms of 
reciprocity and interaction that underlie this system depend quite clearly on networks 
within which there are great extents of built-in expectations regarding the behavior of 
others. This, by extension, suggests the presence of a great reservoir of trust. This 
assertion is strongly supported by Blomkvist and several chapters in the Battacharyya 
volume; the ubiquitous caste structure endemic to Indian society can very well be 
perceived of, they argue, as a vast reservoir of social capital and trust. It is, however, 
                                                
124 Within the Hindu understanding, the term “caste” is an umbrella term for two related types of social 
differentiation, the varna and the jati. While the manifestations of these two differentiations vary 
significantly across groups, regions, and time, the important notion is that they are instrumental in the 
formation of identity and in the structuring of at least some norms of behavior.   
125 Charlton (2004), p. 26. 
126 See, for example, Battacharyya, D., et al. (2004), and Blomkvist, H. (2001), “Traditional 
communities, caste and democracy,” in Dekker, P., Uslaner, E. (ed.) (2001). Social Capital and 
Participation in everyday life. London and New York: Routledge. 
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not the existence of trust, but the precise nature of this trust, that is determinate for the 
questions at hand in this examination.  
Logic, supported by the literature, holds this trust to be clearly of the thick 
variety and to be heavily dependent on identity. In this regard, given the proper 
context, a great deal of trust may extended to an individual of the same caste, 
religious denomination, or ethnic sub-group, much in the same way that trust is 
extended within a family or closed organization. This trust is also clearly very 
specialized, as it heavily depends on the norms and guidelines dictated by the nature 
of the relationship. In other words, certain identity based norms dictate the type and 
extent of trust to be extended to others of the same identity. A consequence of trust 
being so identity dependent (and again, specialized and based on that identity) is that 
it also largely dictates the levels of trust to be extended to those outside of common 
identity groups. A thinner, generalized trust, then, which does not depend strongly on 
the identities of the involved parties, has little space in a society which is as strongly 
identity based as India’s is, and where nearly every interaction is bound to have some 
prescribed identity-based norms dictating the bounds and dynamics of the interaction. 
The prevailing pattern of trust in India, then, might also be described as being SP in 
nature.  
The obvious objection to this assertion is that the rapidly modernizing India 
being described in previous chapters of this work is shedding its heavy emphasis on 
identity, especially where its economic sector is adopting “Western” practices and 
norms. This trend is, indeed, undeniable, especially in urban India. There are 
nonetheless two fundamental reasons why this modernization does not obviate the 
assertion of an identity based SP trust being dominant. Firstly, the modernized sectors 
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of society remain a disproportionately small sliver of India’s massive population.127 
Success on the three main developmental goals requires a broad adoption of the 
identified norms – it is hardly feasibly that the transformation of only a very small 
sector of society, even if influential, will suffice to induce the society wide necessary 
changes. Secondly, while some aspects of caste and religious identity may be 
liberalizing, it is hardly tenable to suggest that identity on the whole is losing its 
central position within Indian society. Many points, from the still frequent communal 
violence,128 to increasing polarization on scheduled tribe (STs) / scheduled caste 
(SCs) / other backward class issues (OBCs),129 to the ever increasing role that 
religious affiliation and caste play in political competition,130 all support the notion 
that specialized social identities remain central to the political and social structure of 
India, and as a consequence, reinforce the prevalence of an SP type of trust.   
 
Trust in India and China – 
 Three concrete developmental goals can be isolated for both India and China. 
These broad goals encapsulate many of the arguments presented in the political 
economy and regime type perspectives, and successful progress on them can be seen 
as a necessary condition for continued development in both countries. I have argued 
                                                
127 It must be remembered that to this day India remains largely rural. Many social aspects of rural 
village life remain unchanged, despite the technological improvements and increased well-being they 
enjoy. India’s urban environment also cannot be assumed to have shed its dependence on caste or 
identity across the whole spectrum of its population either, as the socially progressive classes and 
groups make up at best a large minority of urban populations.  
128 While India has been free of large-scale communal violence since the 2002 incidents in the Western 
state of Gujarat, smaller scale incidents remain frequent occurrences, and underlying communal 
tension, whether religious, linguistic, caste, or class based, remains very real.   
129 STs, SCs, and OBCs are officially recognized socially disadvantaged groups, tribes, castes, or 
classes. India has a large system of reservations which acts as a form of affirmative action by reserving 
positions in government, education, the public sector, and some parts of the private sector for members 
of these groups and other recognized underrepresented segments of society. The political wrangling 
around the size of the reservation system, along with entitlement rights to groups, has grown in recent 
years and is among the most contentious issues in Indian domestic politics today, frequently causing 
divisive protests and civil disruptions.  
130 Corbridge, S., Harriss, J. (2000) 
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that the study of these questions can be structured by considering the prevalent trust 
patterns in each country, as progress on each of the three areas is accelerated by the 
prevalence of a certain type of trust (Generalized and Institutionalized) and hampered 
by the prevalence of another (Specialized and Personalized). Both the system of 
guanxi in China and the central importance of identity in Indian society (especially, 
though not exclusively, though the caste system) indicate the presence of strong and 
thick SP trust, where trust is largely extended through encompassing and personal 
identity based rules of reciprocity. The general systems of trust prevalent in each 
country, then, are at least in some respects fundamentally inimical to progress on each 
country’s stated core developmental goals. 
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Chapter Five: Social Capital Components 
 
V.I Theoretical Basis for Social Capital Components 
 As the foundation of social capital, it is safe to assert that patterns of trust are 
important to development in general and to India’s and China’s three principle 
developmental goals specifically. Perhaps even more so than with Putnam’s 
conceptualization of social capital, however, these patterns of trust are not readily 
operationalized and are thus difficult to measure and compare. This obstacle, I 
suggest, can be overcome by comparing several relevant social factors in India and 
China, each of which have either a positive or negative influence on the formation of 
GI trust. Thus, while not a direct measure of trust, examining these factors allows for 
the making of inferences on changes in levels of generalized trust and the potential 
for generalized trust. These factors then, which can be conceived of as the building 
blocks of GI trust (and thus also of the bridging type of social capital argued to be 
relevant to development), are hereto referred to as “social capital components” and 
are used to better understand the dynamics of change in India’s and China’s trust 
patterns.  
 In Making Democracy Work, Putnam turned to historical forces with origins in 
the Middle Ages to explain why northern Italians display more civicness and 
generalized trust than southern Italians.131 Within this conceptualization, social capital 
and patterns of trust are highly path dependent and largely fixed, the product of 
                                                
131 Putnam (1993). Specifically, Putnam suggested that the early experience with self-government in 
Northern Italy relative to the oppressive environment of the more authoritarian regime of the Norman 
invaders in Southern Italy created the foundation for a high trust culture in the North and a low-trust 
culture in the South.  
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centuries old cultural norms.132 Specialized research on trust, however, along with 
more recent social capital research, fundamentally disputes this interpretation.133 The 
trust research identifies several important factors for the transition to generalized trust 
from a state of personalized trust. Extensive socio-psychological experimental 
research, for example, shows that given certain conditions, trust responses and 
willingness to cooperate are very tractable in nature. Context and environment, or in 
other words, immediate and proximate external factors, do significantly impact how 
individuals approach social network situations.134 In particular, the type of 
communication and the environment in which that communication takes place, as well 
as the “rules of the game” for inter-group interaction, all heavily influence trust, and 
again, are all subject, to a certain extent at least, to direction from external forces.135 
On a slightly higher level, the social capital research, by focusing on the proposed 
mechanisms of the concept, identifies several conditions and policy areas that are 
suggested to directly influence a society’s stock of the capital. A review of this broad 
literature leads me to propose the existence of the following three social capital 
components.  
 
                                                
132 It is necessary to state that Putnam sees social capital as something that can be destroyed by certain 
state or society developments. It is the potential for social capital that is fixed, and even within this 
potential, social capital is difficult to restore once it has been destroyed.  
133 See especially: Hall (1999); Rothstein (2005) “How is social capital produced?” and “The transition 
from mistrust to trust”; Stolle (2004), “Communities, Social Capital, and Local Government: 
Generalized Trust in Regional Settings” in Prakash, S., Selle, P. (2004). Investigating Social Capital: 
Comparative Perspectives on Civil Society, Participation and Governance. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications.   
134 See, for example compilation of experimental research in Sally, D. (1995). “Conversation and 
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Metaanalysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992.” in Rationality 
and Society 7.  
135 As trust is a complex psychological response to a myriad of external and internal factors, the process 
of changing it is, of course, highly complicated. Unlike human capital or physical capital, for example, 
which can be directly addressed and fostered, increasing trust cannot be approached in a direct manner 
– as “the [natural] response to self-proclamations of trustworthiness is to ask what is wrong with a 
person or an organization that feels compelled to emphasize that particular trait. Instead of producing 
trust, such messages usually make the recipient suspicious of the sender’s intentions” Rothstein 2005, 
p. 92.    
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 Collective identity (and social stratification) – A weak general collective 
identity and strong societal stratification are hypothesized to inhibit the 
formation of cross-cutting horizontal ties, as well as a weak and non-identity 
based generalized trust.136 
 Education – Education is hypothesized to play a strong bridging role in society 
by crossing identity barriers and creating the identity-neutral value systems 
that foster the development of generalized trust.137 
 Corruption – Corruption is hypothesized to greatly inhibit the formation of 
generalized and institutionalized patterns of trust.138 
 
Detained analyses of the theoretical and empirical bases for each of these social 
capital components, as well as comparisons of India and China on each of the 
components, are carried out in chapters six, seven, and eight. While support for the 
components based on existing literature is already very strong and will be thoroughly 
discussed in those chapters, conducting a full-length empirical study is beneficial to 
developing a clear picture of how the proposed mechanism work in the context under 
study here. The next section of this chapter carries out a study on the social capital 
components at the Indian state level for this purpose. The test illustrates how these 
mechanisms work and shows strong support for the assertion that these components 
are, as suggested, critical for the formation of bridging social capital, and in turn, 
                                                
136 See in particular: Uslaner, E. (2002), The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Rothstein (2005); Boix, C., Posner, D (1998), “Social Capital: Explaining its Origins 
and Effects on Government Performance”. British Journal of Political Science 28(4): pp. 686-695. 
137 See in particular: Hall (1999); Mayer, P. (2004), “Making Democracy Perform: Human 
Development and Civic Community in India”, in Bhattacharyya, D. et al (2004). Interrogating Social 
Capital: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Sage Publications; Serra, R. (2004), “Putnam in India: Is 
Social Capital a Meaningful and Measurable Concept at the Indian State Level?, in Bhattacharyya, D. 
et al (2004). Interrogating Social Capital: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
138 See for example: Levi, M. (1998), “A State of Trust”, in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (ed.), Trust and 
Governance. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
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economic and social development. The final chapter of the chapter then details how 
the components will be used to better understand development in India and China. 
 One important issue regarding these components must be reiterated. 
Development is a multi-dimensional and highly complicated process, resulting in a 
situation where the impact and relevance of certain factors change depending on the 
stage of development in question. Thus it can be argued that the presence of 
corruption and the lack of universal basic education in a given country may have very 
different effects at an early stage of development than it does at a later stage.139 As 
this is the case, this thesis doesn’t claim that the past patterns of social capital 
components (at least, given the mechanisms detailed here) explain why and how India 
and China have developed the way they have (although to a certain extent, analyzing 
the components – for example, considering the different successes in providing a 
universal primary education – can help better understand the past developmental 
trajectories). The argument here is that the proposed social capital components are 
critical to the achievement of more advanced levels of development in India and 
China, which stands independent of their effects during earlier stages of development. 
Lastly, it must again be reiterated that while success with these components does 
seem to be strongly related to economic, social, and political development on both a 
theoretical and empirical basis, the primary mechanism of interest here is their role in 
generating GI trust and bridging social capital, which in turn is argued to foster 
success on the core developmental goals of the two countries.         
 
 
                                                
139 For example, corruption, specifically in the form of collusion and a concentration of economic 
resources amongst elites, may in certain cases have the effect of catalyzing economic growth at early 
stages of development, while inhibiting advancement to more developed states once a certain threshold 
of development has been crossed.  
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V.II Empirical Basis for Social Capital Components 
 
V.II.I. Study overview - 
  
There is a strong theoretical and empirical basis for the assertion that three 
“components” of social capital can be identified and compared across India and 
China. These components are argued to be critical for the formation of the generalized 
and institutionalized (GI) trust, which the achievement of the three main 
developmental goals of both countries is contingent on. It is expected, then, that good 
performance on each of the three components is associated with greater levels of 
social capital endowment, and in turn, with the greater levels of development that 
social capital is theorized to bring about. 
For several reasons this study examines only India. Primarily, this is because 
several elements of the state structure of India are far more conducive to a study of 
this nature than those of the provincial structure of China.140 I suggest that this is, 
however, not a limiting factor for the establishment of the social capital component 
argument, as the assertion that these components are highly significant for the 
formation of GI trust is built on a large body of existing research which already 
comprehensively covers the conditions endemic to India and China. This foundation 
is discussed in-depth in each of the respective social capital component chapters and 
obviates the need to further “prove” the relevance of these issues. The purpose of this 
study, rather, is simply to illustrate the described mechanisms and place their 
                                                
140 There are several reasons for this: first and foremost, the fs/QCA method requires that a given 
variable will have the same effect in all tested areas. This requires all tested areas to have reasonably 
similar basic economic and social structures. The massive asymmetries in structure between China’s 
coastal provinces and inner provinces violate this criterion. India, while also asymmetric is some 
regards, is a far greater fit for this requirement, as it has a core group of large states with numerous 
shared commonalities that allow for potentially effective comparative testing. A significant number of 
studies (reviewed in the test) have taken advantage of this. Secondly, the data availability at the levels 
in question is greater in the case of India.  
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relevance directly into the context under study here. This is difficult to achieve 
without undertaking a full-length examination.  
Thus I test here three critical aspects of the social capital component assertion 
at the Indian state level using the fs/QCA method. First and most importantly, I test 
whether high levels of the social capital components are associated with high levels of 
social capital endowment at the state level. Second, I test whether high levels of the 
social capital components are associated with greater economic development, as is 
expected by the social capital theory. Third, I test whether high levels of the social 
capital components are associated with greater social development, as is also expected 
by the social capital theory. As expected, the tests largely confirm the three 
hypotheses, by establishing a link between high levels of the social capital 
components and high levels of social capital endowment, economic development, and 
social development. 
 
V.II.II. Indian states as a platform for a social capital test –  
At first glance the Indian context seems to offer ideal circumstances for a test 
of social capital. India is divided into 28 states and 7 territories, all of which share 
several important common features in terms of formal governmental structure, while 
at the same time displaying significant cultural and social differences and varying 
significantly in terms of social and economic achievement. It is thus tempting to 
assume that one might explain the divergent levels of economic and social success 
across Indian states through variations of social capital, much like Putnam’s study did 
across Italian regions. 141  
                                                
141 Putnam (1993) 
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Several factors do support this supposition, as historical and cultural 
developments seem to have endowed some states with higher levels of generalized 
trust and the greater tendency towards the bridging type of interaction that is seen as 
relevant to social capital. There are, however, also two fundamental problems. The 
first is the problem inherent to most social capital studies: the variables in question are 
difficult to conceptualize and operationalize. This issue is only exacerbated by the 
high degree of complexity and heterogeneity of Indian society. Consider for example 
the issue of association membership, one of the central proxy measures for social 
capital used by Putnam.142 It is a highly complicated task to define and meaningfully 
quantify association membership in India (let alone to find consistent exiting data on 
it), as the definition of what constitutes an association (and for that matter, 
membership in it) varies enormously throughout the various segments of Indian 
society. The rural/urban divide, the gender divide, the ethnic divide, and the religious 
divide, let alone the all pervasive and complex caste system, all combine in such a 
way that ‘membership’ in an ‘association’ is difficult to capture in a consistent and 
meaningful way. The second issue relates to some complications in the use of states 
as units of analysis. The level of intra-state heterogeneity in India, especially as 
concerns ethnic, religious, rural/urban, and class divides, is not insubstantial and thus 
compromises the suitability of Indian states as units of analysis for studies employing 
traditional statistical techniques.  
While less grave, other atypical features of the Indian system need to be 
factored into a social capital analysis. The lack of uniformity in the developmental 
paths pursued by the various states, for example, complicates the formulation of 
generalized development observations. The most dramatic example of this can be seen 
                                                
142 Putnam (1993) 
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in the cases of the south Indian state of Kerala and the north western state of Punjab, 
two of India’s most successful states in terms of social development. Kerala, which 
has often been led by a local communist party, has invested heavily in social 
infrastructure and is thus replete with extensive publicly funded educational facilities, 
widespread medical clinics, and many programs to eradicate poverty. The heavy 
social investment has not, however, been accompanied by rapid economic growth, 
and Kerala today remains near the Indian state average in terms of per capita income. 
Its success can be classified as ‘bottom up’ in nature and resulting from heavy state 
investment into social programs and infrastructure. This is contrasted strongly by the 
case of Punjab, one of India’s richest states. It has heavily invested in economic 
infrastructure (particularly in agricultural infrastructure and modernization) and has so 
built the foundation for an economically successful state. Social spending has 
generally lagged behind that of other states, leading to the situation where much of its 
social infrastructure has been built up by those segments of society with enough 
capital to self-finance such ventures. Social development in Punjab, then, can said to 
be the result of ‘trickle down’ from very successful economic development.  
These divergent paths to development are not limited to social development 
alone, but are a universal characteristic of a system in which states enjoy a good deal 
of freedom in terms of development investment. This, in combination with the fact 
that relevant social factors display such a significant degree of variation between 
regions, means that it cannot be assumed that a given factor (including those which 
make up the origins of social capital) will have the same effect in each region under 
consideration. This in turn suggests that the methodology used to consider the origins 
of social capital across regions in India must be sensitive to causal complexity, where 
multiple paths and combinations of conditions may be associated with a common end 
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result. Beyond that, the internally heterogeneous nature of the states, juxtaposed with 
the difficulty of consistently operationalizing the concept of social capital, means that 
the employed methodology must allow some flexibility in the measurement of 
variables.     
 
V.II.III. fs/QCA - 
 I suggest that the fuzzy-set (fs/QCA) method, a case-oriented comparative 
method based on the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method, presents a 
viable solution to the above described issues.143 Within fs/QCA, cases are coded 
according to presence or absence of conditions and outcomes on a flexible scale 
between 0 and 1 (0, .25, .5, .75, 1 – fully-out, almost-out, neither-in-nor-out, etc). The 
method then tests for the presence or absence of conditions and outcomes based on 
these scores in all of the given cases. Unlike traditional statistical methods however, 
which assume linear causation and estimate average effects of given variables, fuzzy-
set provides solutions in sufficient and necessary conditions.144  
Following one of the prescribed protocols, I use a combination of existing data 
and qualitative case specific research to place cases into a loose and flexible (in, 
almost-in, neither-in-nor-out, almost-out, out) matrix of conditions across the 
dependent and independent variables. This allows flexibility when dealing with data 
that contradicts logic or established knowledge, while still allowing existing 
indicators to form the foundation for categorization when appropriate. Furthermore, it 
                                                
143 See Ragin, C. (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
144A necessary condition is one in which every instance of an outcome involves the presence of that 
particular condition. For example, if a large military were the necessary condition for a powerful state, 
then every time the outcome of a powerful state was seen, the condition of a large military must be 
there.  A sufficient condition is one in which a condition (or a particular combination of conditions) 
produces a particular outcome. For example, if a large military were a sufficient condition for the 
outcome ‘powerful country’, then every time the condition large military were present, the outcome 
‘powerful country’ would likewise be present. 
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allows for the classification of cases even where gathering precise quantitative data is 
infeasible.145 The causal complexity that can be expected in the case of the Indian 
states (where multiple paths and combinations of conditions may be associated with a 
common end result) is also mitigated by the fs/QCA method, as it can output results in 
combinations of jointly sufficient conditions. Besides effectively capturing interaction 
effects, this also allows the method to differentiate between “the many roads which 
lead to Rome”, rather than trying to determine a median route between distinct paths. 
 
V.II.IV. Case selection – 
The time period under consideration becomes the first factor in the selection of 
states, as operationalization of the conditions and outcomes will consider data going 
back to the 1996 elections. All states created after 1996 are thus excluded from 
consideration.  
The so called “hilly states” in the north east of India are small and relatively 
underdeveloped states both socially and economically. They are marked by large 
tribal populations and are demographically significantly dissimilar from the larger 
states. As both their economic and social structures differ fundamentally from the rest 
of India, it cannot be assumed that the chosen conditions will have similar effects. 
These states are thus also excluded from consideration in this study. The exception to 
this is the state of Assam. Both in terms of its population and economic structure, it 
displays enough congruence with the larger states to warrant inclusion in the 
population of cases.  
                                                
145 While it may be difficult to precisely quantify the “education” variable, it isn’t difficult to 
categorize, for example, Kerala as “completely in” is the fully educated category and Bihar as “almost 
out”, based on the available data and a general understanding of the state of education in the two 
respective areas.   
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Himachal Pradesh and Goa are also removed: Goa on account of its small 
population and the high degree of urbanization, which does not reflect the 
predominant rural/urban divide of the major states, and Himachal Pradesh (a small 
mountainous state contiguous to the Himalayas) on account of the unique Himalayan 
conditions which prevail in the state. Jammu and Kashmir was excluded on the 
grounds of the special circumstances which have prevailed in the state due to the long 
running internal and cross-boarder conflicts. India’s 7 territories were excluded on the 
same grounds as Goa.  
This leaves a case population of 15 states, all of which were created during or 
before the early 1970’s and have a population of at least 21 million. It is a fairly 
common procedure to isolate these ‘major’ states in studies of India. Table 5.1 below 




Fuzzy Set Scores 
    SOC CAP 
ECON 
DEV SOC DEV COLL ID STRAT EDU CORR 
1 Andhra Pradesh 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
2 Assam 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.5 
3 Bihar 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 
4 Gujarat 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 
5 Haryana 0.5 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.5 
6 Karnataka 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 
7 Kerala 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 
8 Madhya Pradesh 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 
9 Maharashtra 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.75 
10 Orissa 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 
11 Punjab 0.5 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 
12 Rajasthan 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
13 Tamil Nadu 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.5 
14 Uttar Pradesh 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 
15 West Bengal 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 
 
- "1" denotes fully in a 
category, "0" denotes fully 





V.II.V. Operationalization of outcomes – 
 Fuzzy-set analysis handles outcomes as traditional statistical methods handle 
dependent variables: In fuzzy-set analysis the outcome is essentially the phenomenon 
being tested for. In the case of this study, I test for three outcomes - the endowment of 
social capital, economic development, and social development, all at the state level.  
 Social capital endowment is operationalized based on the 1996 National 
Election Study Post-Poll Survey, conducted by Centre for the Study of Developing 
Societies (CSDS).146 I use my own calculations of the survey data to create an index 
which best captures the conception of bridging social capital used in this paper and 
related to GI trust. See chapter three of the thesis for a full discussion of social capital. 




Social Capital Scores and Composition 
  States 
SOC 
CAP   Interest % Assoc % Info % 
LG 
trust % Incid % 
1 
Andhra 
Pradesh 0.75  4.8 69 9.7 100 49.5 123 31.8 80 0.66 100 
2 Assam 0.75  7 100 18.4 190 49.1 122 64.9 163 0.49 74 
3 Bihar 0.25  9.5 136 6.6 68 40 99 29.8 75 0.73 110 
4 Gujarat 0.5  3.3 47 4.5 46 43.7 108 39.8 100 5.47 827 
5 Haryana 0.5  7.1 101 3 31 24.4 60 28 70 0.12 18 
6 Karnataka 0.5  9.6 137 10.3 106 40.4 100 34.6 87 1.53 232 
7 Kerala 1  19.5 279 35.6 367 83.4 206 58.6 147 0.45 68 
8 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.25  6.6 94 6 62 33.5 83 35.2 88 0.68 103 
9 Maharashtra 0.5  6.3 90 11.8 122 37.7 93 40.8 103 2.24 339 
10 Orissa 0.5  5.6 80 9.1 94 29.8 74 51.5 129 0.22 33 
11 Punjab 0.5  4.1 59 3.1 32 24.1 60 13.8 35 0 0 
12 Rajasthan 0.25  2.8 40 4.1 42 32.8 81 36.4 91 0.45 69 
13 Tamil Nadu 0.75  7.5 107 16.5 170 66.1 164 40.3 101 0.29 43 
                                                
146 Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (1996). National Election Study 1996, Delhi, also used 
by Serra (2004).  
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14 Uttar Pradesh 0.5  7.1 101 12.5 129 51.1 126 42.1 106 1.01 152 
15 West Bengal 0.75  11.7 167 20.1 207 42.1 104 50.6 127 0.85 129 
    Mean   7.5   11.42   43.18   39.88   1.01   
    Median   7   9.7   40.4   39.8   0.66   
- % is the percent of the median value for each state. 
- Interest: Percent who answered 'Great Deal' to the following question: "Leaving aside the 
period of elections, how much interest would you say you have in politics and public affairs, a 
great deal of interest, some interest, or no interest at all?" Taken from the National Election 
Study, 1996 Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. 
- Assoc: (Association) Cumulative percentage of those who declare membership in 
religious/caste and/or other associations. Taken from the National Election Study 1996. 
- Info: Percent who gave any answer other than 'no' to the question "...On which source did 
you depend most for getting information about election, parties and candidates? None, 
newspaper, radio, TV, or [any combination]?". Taken from the National Election Study 1996. 
- LG Trust: Percent who answer 'Great Deal' to the question "How much trust do you have in 
local government/panchayat/municipality?" Taken from the National Election Study 1996. 
- Incid: (incidents) Own calculation of instances of Hindu-Muslim riots per 1M population 
from 1967 to 1995. Based on riots data from VARSHNEY-WILKINSON Dataset on Hindu-




 Economic development is operationalized by constructing an index based on 
Gross State Domestic Product for the halfway point and finishing point of the time 
period in question. Economic growth is also taken into consideration. The results 
show little aberration from the Rich, Middle, and Low income classification used by 
















Economic Development Scores and Composition 
    GSDP   GSDP   Growth 
State ECON DEV 1980-83 % 1990-93 % (in %) 
High Income States      
Punjab  1 3174 189 4286 185 135% 
Maharashtra  1 2695 160 3931 170 146% 
Haryana 1 2705 161 3843 166 142% 
Gujarat  0.75 2280 135 3118 135 137% 
Middle Income States      
Tamil Nadu 0.75 1743 104 2578 112 148% 
Karnataka 0.75 1739 103 2462 106 142% 
West Bengal  0.5 1871 111 2448 106 131% 
Andhra Pradesh 0.5 1673 99 2312 100 138% 
Kerala 0.5 1683 100 2158 93 128% 
Low Income States      
Rajasthan 0.25 1416 84 2129 92 150% 
Madhya Pradesh 0.25 1529 91 1882 81 123% 
Uttar Pradesh 0.25 1449 86 1833 79 127% 
Assam  0.25 1485 88 1719 74 116% 
Orissa 0.25 1371 81 1639 71 120% 
Bihar  0 1080 64 1291 56 120% 
Mean  1860  2509   
Median   1683   2312     
- GSDP is the 3 year avg. of Gross State Domestic Product 
- Numbers in bold italics are the relative values above and below the median values. 
- Growth is % change from 1980-83 to 1990-93. 
- High, Middle, Low Income classification from Government of India. 
- FS are the assigned fuzzy scores. 
 
  Social development is operationalized by constructing an index based on 
certain key social indicators, all chosen as representative for well-developed 
educational and health infrastructure. Included are literacy rates, infant mortality, life 
expectancy, access to safe drinking water, and attachment to a sewage network. The 
classification shows little deviation from the UN Human Development Index. Table 





Social Development Scores and Composition 
States 
SOC 






Ex % Water % Sewage % HDI 
Kerala 1  91 147 15 420 72.3 120 38.6* 45 28 122 0.591 
Punjab 1  66 106 54 117 66.5 111 94.2 110 49 213 0.475 
Tamil Nadu 1  66 106 54 117 62 103 74.2 86 48 209 0.466 
Maharashtra 1  72 116 55 115 64.2 107 90.5 105 40 174 0.452 
Gujarat  0.75  66 106 62 102 60.1 100 87.2 102 38 165 0.431 
Haryana 0.75  62 100 69 91 63.1 105 93.2 109 28 122 0.443 
West Bengal  0.75  66 106 58 109 61 101 86.2 100 20 87 0.404 
Karnataka 0.5  57 92 62 102 61.8 103 81.4 95 38 165 0.412 
Andhra 
Pradesh 0.5  51 82 63 100 60 100 73.8 86 11 48 0.377 
Assam  0.25  62 100 76 83 55 92 64.1 75 16 70 0.348 
Rajasthan 0.25  48 77 86 73 58.1 97 86.5 101 10 43 0.347 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.25  52 84 99 64 54 90 79.5 93 8 35 0.328 
Uttar 
Pradesh 0.25  50 81 86 73 55.8 93 85.8 100 14 61 0.314 
Bihar  0.25  44 71 73 86 58.2 97 73.4 86 23 100 0.308 
Orissa 0.25  50 81 103 61 55.4 92 62.8 73 10 43 0.345 
Mean     60.2   67.7   60.5   75.5   25.4     
Median     62   63   60.1   85.8   23     
- FS are the assigned fuzzy-set scores. 
- Lit Rates are 1991 literacy rates (Office of the Registrar General Of India). 
- Inf M are 2001 infant mortality rates (Office of the Registrar General of India). 
- Life Ex is 1992 life expectancy rate (Central Statistical Organization). 
- Water is 1991 population served by safe drinking water (Census of India).  
- Low score for Kerala is due to the very high percentage of households with private wells.  
- Sewage is 1991 attachment to sewage network (National Institute of Urban Affairs). 
- HDI is 1991 Human Development Index (Planning Commission of Govt. of India). 
 
V.II.VI. Operationalization of conditions – 
Fuzzy-set analysis handles conditions much like traditional statistical methods 
handle independent variables. The conditions are the phenomena whose presence or 
absence in a certain case corresponds to the given outcome of that case. For the sake 
of better illustrating the proposed mechanisms, the first social capital component 
(collective identity) is split into two conditions, as this allows for a more detailed 
analysis of the component. The two remaining components (education and corruption) 
are handled individually. 
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The collective identity component is discussed in chapter six of this thesis. For 
the purpose of this study, it is operationalized by creating an index based on such 
things as whether a state is formed on linguistic lines (i.e. whether it has a language 
unique to itself), whether there is a large linguistic mixture (i.e. whether a large 
percentage of the population speak a language other than the official language of the 
state), whether there is an overriding religious identity in the state, as well as several 
historical adjustments, such as whether a state has had (or still has) a significant 
secessionist movement, whether a state has particularly rich and long unitary history 
(whether pre-European or due to early European seafaring influences, later colonial 
influences, or independence struggles), or whether a state is simply a political 
demarcation aggregated from once historically rather disparate principalities. Table 
5.5 gives an overview of the scoring and the calculations.  
 
Table 5.5 
Collective Identity Scores and Composition 
States 
COL 










Pradesh 0.75  0.66 100 X   15 
Assam 0.75  0.49 115 X X  42 
Bihar 0.25  0.73 93    19 
Gujarat 0.5  5.47 60 X   8 
Haryana 0.5  0.12 130    9 
Karnataka 0.5  1.53 75 X   34 
Kerala 1  0.45 118 X   3 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.25  0.68 96    26 
Maharashtra 0.5  2.24 70 X   17 
Orissa 0.75  0.22 125 X   26 
Punjab 1  0 135 X X X 7 
Rajasthan 0.25  0.45 118    10 
Tamil Nadu 1  0.29 125 X X  13 
Uttar 
Pradesh 0.25  1.01 80    10 
West Bengal 0.75  0.85 90 X   14 
  Mean   1.01           
  Median   0.66           
- % is the percent of the median value for each state. 
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- Incid: (incidents) Own calculation of instances of Hindu-Muslim riots per 1M population 
from 1967 to 1995. Based on riots data from VARSHNEY-WILKINSON Dataset on Hindu-
Muslim violence in India (Varshney, Wilkinson 2004). 
- Own Language denotes the states whose borders follow linguistic lines. 
- Separatist Movement denotes those states which have had a significant separatist movement 
during the time period under consideration. 
- Religious Identity denotes Punjab, in which followers of the Sikh religion are in the 
majority. While there are other states in which Hindus are not the majority, those states are 
not being considered in this study. 
-  % who speak non-majority language - data collected from the state reports of the Indian 
Census of 2001. 
- Various historical adjustments were made to account for long/short unitary histories.  
 
 
The stratification component, which can be conceived of as an intrinsic part of 
the collective identity component, is likewise discussed in chapter six of this thesis. 
Here it is operationalization through an index based on such factors as the difference 
in male to female literacy rates, the difference in the ratio of males to females, the 
difference in literacy rates between the majority and scheduled castes and tribes, the 
difference in literacy rates between the majority and Muslims, as well as several 
historical adjustments. The heavy reliance on literacy rates as an indicator for social 
integration and unity may from a Western perspective seem initially suspect, though 
in a developing country like India where literacy is not only an indication of a 
relatively privileged upbringing, but also represents a ticket to social and economic 
self-empowerment, it is a valuable tool for gauging stratification. Table 5.6 displays 











Stratification Scores and Composition 





















Pradesh 0.75  19.9 100 102 96 29 106 -8 65 30 100 
Assam 0.75  16.7 84 107 100 6 23 22 43 11 75 
Bihar 0.25  26.6 134 109 102 27 100 6 71 24 53 
Gujarat 0.5  21.9 110 109 102 8 30 -5 81 43 130 
Haryana 0.25  22.8 115 116 109 29 107 30 73 42 167 
Karnataka 0.5  19.2 96 104 97 29 106 -5 69 30 106 
Kerala 1  6.5 33 94 88 11 40 1 69 52 89 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.25  25.8 130 109 102 29 106 -7 62 21 78 
Maharashtra 0.5  19 95 108 101 21 77 -2 78 36 172 
Orissa 0.5  24.8 125 103 96 26 97  55 13 70 
Punjab 0.75  11.8 59 101 94 29 106  88 72 184 
Rajasthan 0.25  31.8 160 109 102 34 127 3 86 47 91 
Tamil Nadu 0.75  18 90 101 95 27 98 -10 69 34 110 
Uttar 
Pradesh 0.25  26.6 134 111 104 29 109 10 76 33 78 
West 
Bengal 0.5  17.4 87 107 100 27 99 15 74 16 108 
  Mean   20.6   106   24           
  Median   19.9   107   27           
- % is the percent of the median value for each state. 
- Dif M/F L: Difference between the male and female literacy rates. Calculated with 2001 
Census of India data. 
- M/F Ration: The ratio of males to females. Due to the prevalence of female infanticide, this 
is occasionally used as a supplementary indicator of the standing of females. Calculated with 
2001 Census of India data. 
- Dif M/STSC L: Difference between the majority literacy rates and the literacy rates of 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes. Data collected from various parts of the 2001 Census of 
India.   
- Perm Struct Urb: Percentage of urban housing which uses permanent construction methods. 
Data from the state supplements to the 1991 Census of India. 
- Perm Struct Rur: Percentage of rural housing which uses permanent construction methods. 
Data from the state supplements to the 1991 Census of India. 




The education component is discussed in chapter seven of this paper. Here it is 
operationalized by relying on literacy rates together with both elementary and tertiary 
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level graduation rates, as well as the per state and per capita prevalence of engineering 
colleges and top colleges (as ranked by the prominent GATE rankings). Table 5.7 
gives an overview of some of the considered factors and the subsequent scores.  
 
Table 5.7 
Education Scores and Composition 




per M % 
Top Coll 
per 10 M % 
Andhra 
Pradesh 0.75  60.5 91 2.9 264 7.17 332 
Assam 0.25  63.3 95 0.25 23 1.12 52 
Bihar 0.25  47 71 0.1 9 0.36 17 
Gujarat 0.5  69.1 104 0.77 70 1.78 82 
Haryana 0.75  67.9 102 2 182 4.73 219 
Karnataka 0.5  66.6 100 2.3 209 2.27 105 
Kerala 1  90.9 136 2.1 191 2.81 130 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.5  63.7 96 0.85 77 2.66 123 
Maharashtra 1  76.9 115 2.2 200 6.25 289 
Orissa 0.5  63.1 95 1.1 100 2.16 100 
Punjab 0.75  69.7 105 1.6 145 2.04 94 
Rajasthan 0.25  60.4 91 0.7 64 1.57 73 
Tamil Nadu 0.75  73.5 110 3.8 345 1.04 48 
Uttar Pradesh 0.25  56.3 85 0.65 59 1.76 81 
West Bengal 0.5  68.6 103 0.6 55 2.38 110 
  Mean   66.5   1.46   2.67   
  Median   66.6   1.1   2.16   
- % is the percent of the median value for each state. 
- Literacy Rates: Literacy rates per state, taken from 2001 Census of India. 
- Eng Coll per M: Engineering colleges per million population. Data from state government 
websites, source: http://india_resource.tripod/higher-education.html  
- Top Colleges per 10 M: Top colleges per 10 mil population, based on GATE 2004 rankings 




The corruption component is discussed in chapter eight of this paper. Here it is 
operationalized using data from the “India Corruption Study 2005”, carried out by 
Transparency International India in cooperation with the Centre for Media Studies in 
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New Delhi.147 This study is particularly well suited for the purposes of this paper, as it 
focuses exclusively on the day-to-day and mainly low-level petty corruption 
experienced by the “common man” in interaction with various government 




Corruption Scores and Composition 
States 
Corruption 
Score   
Corruption 
Index   
Andhra 
Pradesh 0.75  421 86 
Assam 0.5  542 110 
Bihar 0  695 142 
Gujarat 0.75  417 85 
Haryana 0.5  516 105 
Karnataka 0.25  576 117 
Kerala 1  240 49 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.25  584 119 
Maharashtra 0.75  433 88 
Orissa 0.5  475 97 
Punjab 0.75  459 93 
Rajasthan 0.25  543 111 
Tamil Nadu 0.5  509 104 
Uttar 
Pradesh 0.5  491 100 
West 
Bengal 0.75  461 94 
  Mean   490.8   
  Median   491   
- % is the percent of the median value for each state- 
- Corruption Index: Index of corruption by state. Taken from India Corruption Study 2005 
(Centre for Media Studies 2005). 
 
Results -  
The following chapter proceeds through the fuzzy-set analysis and displays the 
results. The analysis of necessary conditions is carried out first, followed by the 
                                                
147 Centre for Media Studies (2005). “India Corruption Study 2005”. Issued by Transparency 
International India, New Delhi, India. Available online at www.tiindia.in 
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analysis of sufficient conditions. The analysis is done using the program fs/QCA 
1.1.148 
 
V.II.VII. Necessary conditions results – 
A necessary condition is one in which every instance of an outcome involves 
the presence of that particular condition. For example, if a large military were the 
necessary condition for a powerful state, then every time the outcome of a powerful 
state was seen, the condition of a large military must be there. As the conditions and 
outcomes are large and fairly general categories, the test is run with the following 
stringent settings: A probabilistic analysis, with no fuzzy adjustment, a test proportion 
of .80 – which translates into “almost always” necessary – and an alpha level of .05. 
The following table summarizes the results. A score of 1.0 would correlate with the 
finding of “always” necessary, while the .80 proportion used here is often referred to 
as “almost always” necessary. Table 5.9 below displays the results. 
 
Table 5.9 

















(.167)  0.64  
0.8 
(.648)  
col id  0.79  0.45  0.73 
STRAT 
0.8 
(.65)  0.5  0.6  
Strat  
0.93 
(.198)  0.55  0.73 
EDU 
0.8 
(.65)  0.64  0.73  
Edu  0.71  0.64  0.73 
CORR 0.73  0.57  0.6  
Corr   0.79   0.45   0.64 
- Capitals represent the presence of an outcome or condition, lower case and italicized, the 
absence. 
                                                
148 Ragin, C. and Drass, K. A. (2003): Fuzzy-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 1.1 software. 
Available online at: www.u.arizona/~cragin 
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- Test run as a probabilistic analysis, no fuzzy adjustment, a proportion of .80 and an alpha 
level of .05 
- "1" denotes "always necessary", "0" "never necessary" - the threshold of .8 denotes "almost 
always necessary". 
- Numbers in parentheses are significance levels. 
 
Theory suggests that the divergent social and economic conditions endemic to 
the Indian states would mean that several paths, rather than one central one, could 
lead to the outcomes of high social capital or high social and economic development. 
The results support this supposition, as they do not reflect the existence of any one 
statistically significant necessary condition for any of the tested outcomes. 
Nonetheless, the very high correlation of all four conditions with each of the three 
outcomes supports the hypothesized central importance of the social capital 
components; with the exception of one combination (STRAT and ECON DEV) - 
every combination crosses at least the often used “usually necessary” threshold. When 
the slightly less restrictive (and often used in other fs/QCA) criteria of a .65 “usually 
necessary” test proportion and a .10 alpha level is used, COLL ID becomes a 
statistically significant necessary condition for high social capital endowment and the 
remaining three conditions all cross the relevant threshold. Especially in regards to 
social capital endowment and social development, the results again support the 
importance of the social capital components; an absence of the four conditions is 
strongly correlated with low social capital endowment and poor social development.   
 
V.II.VIII. Sufficient conditions results – 
A sufficient condition is one in which a condition (or a particular combination 
of conditions) produces a particular outcome. For example, if a large military were a 
sufficient condition for the outcome “powerful country,” then every time the 
condition large military were present, the outcome “powerful country” would likewise 
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be present. It is, however, not necessary that this particular condition (or combinations 
of conditions) is the only one that produces the particular outcome. It is entirely 
possible that multiple paths – conditions or combinations of conditions – lead to the 
same outcome. This is the idea of multiple conjunctural causation, or in simpler terms, 
the “many roads that lead to Rome.”149   
For the analysis, I test using stringent settings: probabilistic analysis, no fuzzy 
adjustment, .80 – “almost always” sufficient – test proportion, and .05 alpha level. It 
is necessary to note that results are displayed following the rules of Boolean algebra, 
in which a ‘·’ denotes ‘and’ and a ‘+’ denotes ‘or’. All simplifying assumptions are 
included. 
 The sufficient conditions test for social capital endowment return the 
following results with a relatively strong fit factor (.699): 
COL • (strat + corr) + 
STRAT • corr 
 
From this it can be inferred that the social unity factors (strong collective identity or 
limited levels of stratification) are pivotal in the formation of social capital. 
Juxtaposing this with the confirmed importance of all four components in the 
necessary conditions test, the assertion of a strong correlation between the 
components and high levels of social capital is stable and well supported.    
 The sufficient conditions tests for economic and social development do not 
return any results at the stringent .80 “almost always” test proportions. At the slightly 
more lenient “usually sufficient” test proportion of .65, a broad range of paths – four 
in the case of economic development and five in the case of social development – are 
returned.150  
                                                
149 Ragin, C. (1987). The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
150 For economic development: colid • (STRAT + EDU) +  
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 In short, the tests conducted offer strong support to the hypothesized 
mechanisms and serve to illustrate exactly how these mechanisms operate. This is 
especially the case for the assertion that the proposed social capital components are 
critical to the type of bridging social capital that is theorized to promote development, 
as a prevalence of the components is highly correlated with high levels of social 
capital and an absence of the components with lacking social capital. Furthermore, the 
results underline the complex and heterogeneous nature of social capital and 
development at the Indian state level, as a significant degree of causal complexity is 
apparent.     
  
V.III Application of Social Capital Components 
The remainder of this chapter discusses how the social capital components can 
be used to compare India and China. As the three social capital components are 
hypothesized to significantly influence the developmentally important levels of GI 
trust, understanding both the present states of these components and the trend of their 
developments in India and China provides a perspective of development that the 
prevalent political economy and regime type perspectives at best only address 
tangentially. Logically, regions which exhibit good performance in these three criteria 
also benefit from the proposed developmental advantages that high social capital 
endowments provide. By considering these components, then, significant obstacles to 
the achievement of the three core developmental goals in India and China can be 
identified and analyzed. Furthermore, trends in these components will allow a 
structured consideration of ongoing developmental trajectories. Likewise, comparing 
                                                
                                                            CORR • (strat + (COL ID • EDU)) 
   For social development:  COL ID • strat + 
                                           STRAT • col id + 
                                           EDU • ((CORR • strat) + (COL ID • corr) + (STRAT • corr))  
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India and China on the components further develops the understanding of the 
developmentally relevant similarities and differences between the two countries.  
The remaining chapters, then, each cover one of the three proposed social 
capital components. They begin by arguing the importance of each component and 
briefly reviewing the existing literature on the proposed mechanisms. They then 
proceed to conduct a basic comparison of India and China on that component. A word 
of caution is in order regarding causality: The causal connection between state 
performance and relatively multifarious social phenomenon like trust is intrinsically 
complicated, and thus while a plausible theory can be constructed to show a simple 
one-directional causal flow, reality likely offers a more nebulous reflection including 
at very least a fair amount of feedback. The connection between trust in government 
institutions and corruption provides a good example. Logic dictates that citizens will 
only place trust in state institutions that they consider trustworthy and free of 
corruption. Corruption in government, then, by this logic, will reduce the levels of 
institutionalized trust in society. Numerous studies support this causal assertion.151 
Nonetheless, examining reality carefully would certainly also present ample instances 
where instances of trust in government institutions bolster trust in non-state related 
realms, thereby seemingly reversing the causal connection. These apparent 
contradictions need not undermine the theoretical argument, however, so long as the 
overwhelming direction of influence follows the theoretical expectations. Each of the 
remaining chapters will address this issue for the component in question.   
 
                                                
151 See for example: Levi (1998) 
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Chapter Six: Collective Identity 
 
 The idea that a strong collective identity and the related feelings of equality 
amongst individuals are central to cooperation, trust, and by extension, social capital, 
is intuitive and has found a place in social capital research from the earliest phases of 
the concept’s usage. The underlying logic is easy to decipher; it is basic human nature 
to be wary of the unknown and of that which is different. Conversely, there is an 
inclination to trust the known and familiar. On the theoretical level, then, weak 
collective identity and strong social stratification is hypothesized to inhibit 
generalized and institutionalized (GI) trust while fostering the formation of SP type 
trust. This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical basis for these assertions and 
then considers the position of India and China. A thorough comparison is clearly 
beyond the scope of this research; the intent of the chapter is to establish the relevance 
of the considered factors and to provide a brief but structured overview of this 
perspective. 
 Collective identity and stratification both revolve around the concept of 
equality. The ability of an individual to see a fellow citizen as “one of their own” will 
logically play a large role in determining the conditions of the interactions between 
the two. This type of equality (and inequality) is perhaps most visible in economic 
differences, as these are not only readily measurable, but also in many parts of the 
world highly determinate for a broad range of everyday concerns. Rothstein152 
succinctly captures the proposed mechanisms at play in his summary of Uslaner’s153 
argument: 
                                                
152 Rothstein (2005), p. 100. 
153 Uslaner (2002), p. 189. 
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Uslaner has suggested that one of the strongest predictors of social 
trust is economic equality and he also specified how the causal 
mechanism may operate. First, equality of opportunity increases 
feelings of optimism because individuals will feel they have a fair 
chance for improving their situation. Secondly, in societies with high 
levels of economic inequality there will be less concern for people of 
different backgrounds. The rich and the poor in a country with a 
highly unequal distribution of wealth such as, for example, Brazil, 
may live right next to each other, but their lives do not intersect. 
Their children attend different schools, they use different health care 
services (and in many cases, the poor cannot afford either of these 
services). The rich are protected by both the police and private 
guards, while the poor see these as their natural enemy. In such 
societies, neither the rich nor the poor have a sense of shared fate 
with the other, and this makes both groups stick to their own. 
 
 This principle has been used to explain the relatively high levels of social 
capital endowment in the Scandinavian countries, which have some of the lowest 
inequality levels in the world.154 Other studies have explained differences in society-
wide generalized trust levels through income inequalities,155 or have applied the 
principle to specific cases, as a study linking decreasing trust to increasing inequality 
in the United States does.156 The tendency towards “tribalism” – numerously 
confirmed through socio-psychological experiments – at the individual level when 
communication between horizontal or vertical societal divisions is occluded, provides a 
solid theoretical causal mechanism for this phenomenon.157 The clear strong 
correlation between equality (in the form of mild social stratification and strong 
collective identity) and social capital endowment as well as high economic and social 
                                                
154 Rothstein (2005) 
155 Boix and Posner (1998) 
156 Uslaner (2002) 
157 Sally (1995) 
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development at the Indian state level found through the fs/QCA test (see chapter five) 
further supports the applicability of this principle to the context in question.158 
 
Table 6.1 
Economic Equality in India and China 
      Gini     top 20% bottom 20% Below  Below 
  2001 pre regional rural urban pre post pre Post 1$/day 2$/day 
China 0.45 0.33 0.25 0.34 0.28 36 51.4 8 4 16.6 46.7 
India 0.34 0.32 0.23 0.26 0.34   42   9 34.7 79.9 
- Pre and Post refer to the economic reforms described in chapter two, or roughly 1978 for 
China and 1991 for India. 
- Regional is intra-regional Gini index disparity. 
- Top 20% and bottom 20% is percentage of total income earned by the respective categories.  
- Government of India (2001) 
- UNDP (2004) 
- World Bank (2004) 
- Saich (2005) 
- Swamy (2005) 
 
Urban – rural divide - 
An economic equality comparison, then, is an ideal starting point for 
considering the concepts of collective identification and stratification in India and 
China. Table 6.1 above captures some of the key points of this comparison between 
India and China, largely by centering on the frequently employed Gini index.159 There 
is little question that income inequality has increased in China, and much research 
suggests that the same is true, though to a more moderate extent, in India.160 The jump 
in China’s Gini coefficient alone seems to support this and is frequently at the core of 
attacks on China’s growth and apparent massive inequality. Before India’s present 
economic equality and equality trends are declared more equitable, and thus more 
                                                
158 Numerous other studies consider, albeit often indirectly, the role of inequality on trust in India and 
China and offer arguments and findings consistent with the proposed mechanisms. See, for example, 
Bhattacharyya et al. (2004); Tubilewicz (2006); Li, Y. (2005). The Structure and Evolution of Chinese 
Social Stratification. Lanham: University Press of America.   
159 The Gini index measures the distribution of income (or wealth) on a 0 to 1 scale, where a 0 indicates 
perfectly equitable distribution and a 1 an extreme concentration.  
160 See, for example, Saich (2005); Rahman and Andreu (2006). 
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conducive to the formation of GI trust, a closer inspection of the available data is in 
order though. A large degree of regional disparity is present in the two countries, 
which obfuscates a clear interpretation of the macro-level Gini data.161 More 
importantly, both India and China are marked by a massive urban – rural 
developmental cleavage, which manifests itself in everything from substantial 
infrastructural and quality of life differences, to large differences in income equality.162 
It is interesting to note that when taking this cleavage into account, equality differences 
– as measured by the Gini coefficient - between the two countries become significantly 
less strong (though there remains a strong difference in that in China it is the urban 
environment which appears to be more equitable, while in India’s case the inverse is 
true). 
What do these contradictory indicators suggest about the state of economic 
equality in the two countries? The significant increase in China’s Gini coefficient can, 
it has frequently been suggested, be largely ascribed to the remarkable growth of 
several of its urban areas, in which personal income rates have increased at a rate over 
three times as great as in rural areas.163 This divide and the resulting inequality, it has 
again been suggested, are in many respects a necessary byproduct of the type of growth 
India and China are pursuing. China’s apparently greater economic inequality, then, 
may in significant part be a product of its greater growth rates, rather than purely the 
                                                
161 Development in China is heavily concentrated in the Eastern coastal areas, in particular centered 
around the Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, while the Western provinces have lagged significantly. 
In India’s case, development is heavily centered around the industrialized Western coast and the south, 
while several northern and eastern states are mired in stagnant growth states. Alarming, perhaps, is that 
these regional disparities have significantly increased in both countries since the 1980s.   
162 The data on the urban rural split borders occasionally on shocking: in the case of some Indian states, 
permanent buildings constitute the vast majority of structures in urban areas, while in the rural areas of 
the same states, they make up less than 15% of structures. On the whole in India, only 18% of rural 
persons have access to piped water, as compared to over 70% in urban areas. Government of India 
National Census of 2001.  
163 The World Bank estimates that 75% of the inequality increase comes from the greater urban growth 
rates alone. 
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result of a fundamentally more inequitable system.164 A recent study, in fact, suggests 
that when taking regional differences and the urban – rural divide into account, intra-
regional inequality in China is not exceptionally large  (and certainly not significantly 
greater than in India), in particular when compared to other developing countries.165 
Economic inequality then (together with the resultant instability it engenders)166 
is fundamentally tied to the urban – rural societal cleavage seen in both countries. This 
recognition again emphasizes the importance of equality undermining societal 
cleavages. While the urban – rural divide shows much similarity between the two 
countries,167 India and China do differentiate themselves significantly on further 
fundamental societal cleavages.       
 
Heterogeneity –  
 With populations of well over one billion spread across vast expanses, it is little 
surprise that India and China are linguistically, ethnically, and culturally heterogeneous 
countries. James Fearon’s assessment that India is the significantly more 
                                                
164 If nothing else, this perspective makes clear that simple aggregate Gini coefficient comparison is not 
sufficient to draw any sweeping conclusions about the fundamental structural “fairness” endemic to the 
respective economic and social systems.  
165 Herrmann-Pillath et al. (2006). “The Evolution of Regional Disparities in China, 1993 – 2003: A 
Multi-level Decomposition Analysis.” Working Paper Series. It should also be noted that while China’s 
aggregate Gini coefficient’s growth is the cause of great concern and it’s absolute value (at .45) high in 
international comparison, it is in the company of other developmental “success stories” like Brazil (.57) 
and some developed countries, like the United States (.45).  
166 Particularly in the case of self-described “socialist” China, there is recognition that the spiraling 
well-being gap between urban and rural environments has the potential to fundamentally undermine 
social stability and spark challenges to the state’s legitimacy. The ever increasing incidence of rural 
protest and the general labor unrest certainly appears to lend substance to these concerns.  
167 Both India and China are (and have been) rapidly urbanizing, resulting in a simultaneous 
confrontation with many similar issues. The character and scale of the urbanization, however, does 
show some variation. The absence of any state imposed restrictions on mobility in India has allowed 
for a far more organic (and in many respects earlier) evolution towards urbanization than in China, 
where residential and job mobility was (and to a certain extent still is) heavily restricted through the 
Hukou system of household registration. The greater structure and planning endemic to China’s 
urbanization accounts at least in part for several differences in development between the two countries 
– the lesser degree of urban poverty and the greater infrastructural development in urban China, for 
example – but also does not offer the natural pressure release valve of India’s more fluid system. How 
China handles the ever increasing mobility of its population and how India manages to structure its 
population to mitigate some of the inimical effects of urbanization, will take a role of great significance 
in how development proceeds in the two countries.    
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heterogeneous of the two countries underscores the fact that national identity in the 
countries is based on different foundations.168 As the discussion in chapter three 
concluded, China can base its identity on a unitary and natural “national” history to a 
far greater extent than can India, with its largely “created” political history.169 Yet this 
fact alone carries only the potential for certain political consequences; it is in how 
these different identity “natures” manifest themselves on the political and social stages 
that determine how their consequences will play out.170 
 The ever-presence of calls for hindutva,171 the ever more contentious nature of 
caste and tribal based reservations, and the emergence of governance by coalition 
(which gives far greater prominence to smaller, often caste or other identity-based, 
parties) signals the growing importance of identity politics in the Indian political 
system. While this trend has allowed for a more active role in the political, economic, 
and social spheres for India’s traditionally relegated segments of society,172 it has also 
frequently reinforced divisions, engendered confrontation, and polarized society in the 
process.173 There is every indication that this process will continue, and in the case of 
                                                
168 Fearon (2003). See chapter three for a discussion of Fearon’s observations on heterogeneity in India 
and China.  
169 As has been discussed, it is often suggested that India can be thought of as a region, much like S.E. 
Asia for example, whose status as a unitary nation is more the result of historical processes than the 
natural conclusion of an endemic unitary culture.  To a certain extent this can also be applied to China, 
in particular with regard to certain (particularly Western) regions of the country, though China (as 
opposed to India) clearly does have an identifiable national “core” under which the great majority of its 
population can be said to fall.   
170 As the trust being examined is relevant at the individual level, cleavages are primarily relevant in 
terms of how they structure individual inter-personal interactions at the community level. The high 
degree of nationwide heterogeneity in India, thus, is pertinent only when it is reflected at the individual 
and community levels.     
171 This translates into “Hindu-ness” and is used in reference both to the idea of Hinduism as India’s 
core national religion, and to movements advocating Hindu nationalism.  
172 The strengthening of these identities has a complicated relationship with social capital, as tightly 
knit groups certainly do have a fair degree of intra-group “bonding” social capital. These rigid group 
identities and resultant segmented social capital, however, are at best irrelevant and at worst inimical, 
to the creation of “bridging” inter-group social capital.   
173 The very process of recognizing lower castes and other disadvantaged segments of society, for 
example, has had the effect of strengthening the relevance of this identity. While it is undeniable that 
the social treatment of disadvantaged groups has largely improved over the past several decades, it is 
also clear that many affirmative action measures have had the effect of emphasizing the very 
differences they are designed to mitigate. Far from the independence era expectation, then, that the 
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the de-nationalization of the party system (with the resultant bolstering of more narrow 
issue and identity based parties), even grow. The long feared splintering of India into 
regional sub-entities due to national level heterogeneity seems unlikely to occur; the 
community level heterogeneity, however, enforced in many respects through the 
increasing relevance of certain identity types, could engender a wide range of inimical 
pressures which manifest themselves in everything from continued communal 
pressures to reliance on specialized and personalized trust, the latter occluding 
effective progress in key developmental areas through the mechanisms described in 
previous chapters.174 
 While heterogeneous as well, the character of China’s diversity is 
fundamentally different than that of India’s. The year 2000 census lists the ethnic 
minority (non-Han)175 population at 106.4 million, comprising slightly less than 10% 
of the total population. Unlike in India, however, where minorities are largely 
dispersed throughout the whole country, China’s minority population is heavily 
concentrated in what might be called “outer-China”, the thinly-populated mountainous 
and desert regions in the West and North of the country and the areas bordering the 
Southern neighbors. While the regional concentration of ethnic minorities does induce 
fissionous tendencies in some areas,176 the lack of significant intra-regional 
heterogeneity means that ethnic or cultural based identity differences do not factor 
                                                
importance of caste would fade over time, primordial identity (especially within politics) has only 
grown in relevance. See, for example, Corbridge, S., Harriss, J. (2000). Reinventing India: 
liberalization, Hindu nationalism, and popular democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
174 Communal violence and trust, in fact, seem to be very closely related: Varshney (2002) finds strong 
evidence that variances in communal violence can be explained through the extent of identity cross-
cutting ties in a given community. Across multiple regions in India, evidence supports the notion that a 
greater level of cross-cutting ties (which rely heavily on a GI type trust) is associated with lower levels 
of inter-group violence.   
175 While there are substantial cultural and linguistic differences between the numerous Han subgroups, 
a common written language, literary history, cultural legacy, and broadly similar genetic makeup binds 
the group.    
176 While Tibet dominates international headlines in regards to China’s ethnic minorities, it is widely 
accepted that the most serious threat to Chinese territorial unity comes from the north-western province 
of Xinjiang Uyugur, segments of whose largely Muslim population have long advocated full 
independence and statehood under the name of East Turkestan.   
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significantly into the formation of trust patterns in the way they do in India. Identity 
based differences, of course, do exist, but are not generally based on primordial factors, 
and so are inherently more flexible. 
 As argued in chapter four, certain elements of social interaction relevant to trust 
formation in China are structured through guanxi. It is useful to briefly contrast this 
with the Indian caste system, as both play similar roles structuring patterns of 
interpersonal interaction. Guanxi is in many respects flexible in terms of how networks 
are constructed, as the relationships can be built on a diverse range of (largely non-
primordial) bases. While the strongest of these bases are likely to include only those of 
similar social standing and background, the utilitarian nature of guanxi allows for the 
inclusion of individuals from very differing backgrounds, so long as that relationship 
fulfills the criteria of being mutually beneficial. The Indian caste system, by contrast, is 
far more rigid and is far more determinate in establishing a broad array of trust relevant 
identity factors. The following passage captures this sentiment well: 
 
Besides the minorities, the whole Indian society is divided on a caste 
basis. In fact, an individual in India receives his identity through the 
caste of one’s birth. One’s whole vision of life, values, beliefs, 
attitudes, learnings and achievements for the most part are 
determined by one’s caste. The system of caste even goes beyond 
social aspects to the economic and political. Each caste is assigned a 
specific economic activity. Access to power too is decided by 
caste.177 
 
                                                
177 Pinto, A. (2000). “Basic conflict of “we” and “they” between social and ethnic groups”, in Ahmad, 
I., et al. (2000). Pluralism and Equality: Values in Indian Society and Politics. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, p. 185. See also: Beteille, A. (2003). “Race, Caste, and Ethnic Identity”, in Chakrabarty, 
B. (ed.) (2003). Communal Identity in India: Its Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth 
Century. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
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There is a very strong utilitarian nature to the caste system, but unlike with guanxi, the 
effect often is to reinforce the identity boundaries, rather than to expand them.178 As 
chapter four expounds, both guanxi and the caste system (together with other identity-
based social structuring factors) have a strong potential to inhibit the formation of 
developmentally-critical GI trust, as they are based on intricate, specialized, and 
relationship-dependent norms of interaction. Clearly these systems of social structuring 
do not inform all relevant interactions in India and China, and so a definitive analysis 
of how these systems impact prevalent trust patterns and the dependent core 
development goals in the two countries depends on establishing exactly the extent of 
their prevalence. This is a task, however, that lies far beyond the scope of this research, 
if it is possible at all. It is safe to say, at least, that the relevance of these structures is 
decreasing in the public realm in urban environments in both countries.179 The 
aforementioned increased importance of identity in the Indian political system does, 
again, indicate a worrying trend in this regard which is not reflected in China’s case,180 
and it is likewise a safe assertion to make that on a primordial level at least, identity in 
India is of far greater relevance (and far more complex) in structuring social interaction 




                                                
178 Perhaps the most apparent manifestation of this is the strictly endogamous nature of the caste 
system, which is not directly mirrored in China. 
179 It is likely beyond dispute that in a major Chinese urban center like Shanghai, identity (particularly 
primordial) would be of less relevance in dealings with public institutions than would be the case in the 
comparable Indian city of Mumbai. This is to say nothing of other factors like education and 
corruption, however, the inclusion of which creates a picture too nebulous to formulate consistent 
generalizations.  
180 Quoting again, “[Caste] has come to play a decisive role in politics. While caste is being politicized, 
politics too centers on caste. Not only are caste leaders transforming themselves overnight into political 
leaders, politicians too appeal to caste sentiments for votes. Castes as social groups have therefore been 
strengthened in recent years.” Ambrose (2000), p. 185. See also Corbridge and Harriss (2000); 
Charlton (2004).  
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Further cleavages – 
 Beyond the urban – rural cleavage and the importance of heterogeneity to 
identity, there are several further (often related) factors which are of high relevance to 
the collective identity, stratification, and the underlying concepts of equality. Some of 
these are briefly reviewed below.  
 
A gender cleavage – Both India and China have a very mixed history in regards to 
gender equality and the inclusion of women into society. While both can point to 
certain high-points,181 the underlying picture is still (and perhaps increasingly) one of 
great concern in terms of equality. In both societies, the public sphere has long been 
regarded as the sole domain of males, resulting in a wide array of advantages being 
conferred onto males.182 Table 6.2 below captures some of the relevant aspects of this 
consideration. While societal modernization may be displacing certain aspects of the 
endemic male-centric social norms, the massively asymmetrical sex ratio in both 
countries is indicative of an ongoing society-wide preference for males.183 
Nonetheless, India and China do differentiate themselves significantly on some 
                                                
181 India does have a long history of women’s rights movements, argued to be in some cases amongst 
the oldest in the world. (see Kumar, R. (1993). The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of 
Movements for Women’s Rights and Feminism in India, 1800 - 1990. New York: Verso). Women’s 
groups also play a very central role in certain social area, grassroots poverty relief efforts being a 
prominent example. It must also be remembered that India had one of Asia’s first female Heads of 
State (Indira Gandhi, the daughter of India’s first Prime Minister). Women’s status in China improved 
somewhat by international comparison during the 1950s to 1980s through efforts to emancipate women 
and draw them into the workforce, and today women fare reasonably well in terms of access to 
education, for example.   
182 India society’s preference for males has deep cultural roots across both Hinduism and Islam, and 
manifests itself in countless advantages for males. Likewise in China, the preference for males can be 
traced back to ancient Confucian texts, where male dominance is an integral part of social harmony and 
the natural order.   
183 The 2001 Census of India indicates that there were 933 females to every 1000 males in India. 
China’s Fifth National Census shows the comparable figure for China to be an even more asymmetrical 
862 females to every 1000 males. The CIA factbook lists India and China as having an equal sex ratio 
of 1.06 males to 1 female. Regardless of the exact figures, industrialized countries without exception 
have a surplus of females (generally around .96 males to every female), owing to higher male mortality 
rates. Troubling as well is that the sex ratio imbalance in India and China seems to be growing, rather 
than stabilizing. The significantly greater disequilibrium in China is partially a result of that country’s 
one child only policy, which limits couples to one child under most circumstances and thus often drives 
a higher degree of gender driven reproductive selectivity.    
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measures. At 40%, China’s women have a far higher participation rate in the non-
agricultural wage labor force, for example, than do India’s (16%). Though China’s 
National Congress has a significantly greater percentage of women than does India’s 
parliament, women are more prominent at the high level of politics in India.184 There is 
little contention that China has done a far greater job of educating its youth than India 
has, and this extends to females, the generally dismal education of which continues to 
blight India’s developmental record. While the formulation of sweeping conclusions on 
a topic as broad and multifarious as gender equality is replete with opportunities for 
contradiction, the basis for asserting that China has provided greater opportunity for 






ratio FSOWE SIP FYLW 
  F to M % % % 
China 862 40 21.8 99.2 
India 933 16 8.9 66.8 
- sex ratio F to M is females to 1000 males, 2001 data. 
- FSOWE is the female share of wage employment in non-agricultural sector in percent, 1999 
for China, 1998 for India. 
- SIP is female percentage of parliament (congress) seats held in 2002.  
- FYLW is female youth (16-24) literacy rates 2002. 
- source: Unifem (2002) 
 
 
A modernization cleavage – The remarkable pace of growth and modernization in 
both India and China produces the many scenes that visitors to the two countries find 
so often comical; an ox-drawn cart trudging along on a (relatively) modern multi-lane 
                                                
184 Besides the dynastically driven prominence of several female Indian political figureheads (Indira 
and Sonia Gandhi in particular), Indian states have been led by females on several occasions.   
185 Without mincing words, Meredith captures the poor state of women in India well: “In much of 
India, the birth of sons is celebrated, while the birth of daughters is viewed as a future financial strain 
because of the wide-spread practice of brides’ families paying dowries. The result is sex-selective 
abortion and female infanticide… India cannot seem to shake traditions the rest of the world assumes 
are long abandoned. India still has child brides. More than half of rural girls are married off before they 
turn eighteen…” Meredith (2007), p. 218.   
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highway in India, or a modern skyscraper alongside a dilapidated, centuries-old 
building in Shenzhen, are just two amongst the many such paradoxes. These are 
nothing less than the confrontations between the old and the new, between “Shining 
India” and the “developmental basket case”, or between the modern China vying to 
assert its place as a global power, and the tumultuous, often dysfunctional state of the 
early post-revolution period.  
These visible paradoxes, though, are far more than just a magnet for clever 
comments, or the ideal backdrop for National Geographic pieces; they are 
manifestations of two societies fundamentally torn between the old and the new, 
between life as it was for centuries and life as forces foreign to it are molding it into. 
The consequences of this extend far beyond occasional confused gazes between 
generations or awkward cultural clashes. Rather, this cleavage has the potential to 
unravel the very thread of the extant cultural cohesion without offering a coagulating 
replacement (or at least, without offering one on time). This is not to suggest, as has 
been done by alarmists around the world, that modernization will decimate anything 
and everything of value indigenous to the two countries, but rather that the pace of 
change in the two countries has the potential to compromise the ability of individuals 
to see their fellow citizens as “one of their own”, the very foundation of the GI trust 
generating concept of equality. 
This is a nebulous cleavage and one that is difficult to effectively compare 
across India and China. Nonetheless, the fact that China registered 74,000 “mass 
incidents” (read: protests, demonstrations and mass petitions) in 2004, a number 
greatly increased from the roughly 10,000 reported in 1994, confirms that this 
cleavage is very real, as these protests are very often a direct reaction of those 
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segments left out of China’s economic miracle.186 This discontent, which is often not 
so much with the pace of change, but rather with its seeming inability to cross the 
cleavage into some “traditional” realms of Chinese society, has led some to call China 
a “powder-keg” of potential social strife.187 India fares little better. Adding to the 
haunting specter of communal violence that has plagued India for much of its 
Independent history is the threat of new social sectors disenfranchised not only on 
account of religion, class, or caste, but also on the grounds of being left behind by 
very rapidly transforming social and economic structures.188 For example, much 
needed productivity increases in agriculture (which are in part decades behind 
regional neighbors and China) resulting from a modernization of means of production 
are critical to growth in India, but create large masses of under and unemployed poor 
who have no place within the new framework of India. Irrespective of the measure, 
there should be little contention that how the two countries manage to reconcile their 
deeply-rooted cultural traditions with the often incompatible forces of modernization 
will (at least partially) determine whether the countries’ respective developmental 
trajectories continue their momentous climbs. And so it is with the other expounded 
cleavages; there is little questions of their importance, any yet they are often treated as 
tangential factors somehow insulated from greater questions of development in the 
literature.  
The conceptualization of social capital developed in this thesis, however, 
provides a structure for better understanding these issues, as it is clear that the nature 
of their evolution in India and China will fundamentally impact the patterns of trust in 
each of the countries. Where the cleavages deepen, one can expect patterns of 
interpersonal interaction to trend away from those integral to generalized and 
                                                
186 These are official figures released from the Ministry of Public Security in 2005.  
187 See, for example, Smith (2007). 
188 Corbridge, S., Harriss, J. (2000) 
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institutionalized trust patterns and towards specialized and personalized trust patterns. 
The inimical consequences of this for the three established core developmental goals 
(see chapter 4), and thus by extension for the further development of India and China, 
have been comprehensively established both theoretically and empirically. Thus, 
understanding the social capital component of collective identity and stratification as 
being vital to the process of generating the developmentally crucial society-wide 
generalized and institutionalized patterns of trust provides a mechanism for 
structuring and explaining how and why the equality stratifications, the urban – rural 
divides, the gender cleavages, and the identity-based social differentiations in India 
and China are so crucial, and how changes to them may impact development in Asia’s 
two giants.    
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Chapter Seven: Education 
 
 Collective Identification and social stratification, collectively the first of the 
social capital components reviewed in chapter six, play a central role in the rigid 
conceptualization of social capital as found in Putnam’s Making Democracy Work.189 
These characteristics - which can be thought of as a reflection of how able individuals 
are to see others as “one of their own” – were perceived as being largely a product of 
history and an intractable fixture structuring how individuals relate to and trust one 
another. In Making Democracy Work, Putnam suggests that these patterns stemmed 
from the way the endemic medieval social structures influenced norms of cooperation 
and inter-group interaction.  
This conceptualization of the origins of interaction norms, however, is one of 
most contested facets of Putnam’s early social capital work. Several of the most 
cutting critiques focus on the absence of any consideration of the role of education. In 
discussing the findings of Peter Meyer’s study, for example, Bhattcharyya et al. point 
out that “Putnam neglects a strong Christian educational tradition in the northern 
regions of Italy. Consequently, he fails to recognize the significance of education in 
fostering civic community and considers only path dependency to explain the uneven 
distribution of social capital among the regions of Italy.”190 Perhaps more importantly, 
Peter Hall’s influential article exploring changes in social capital in Britain identifies 
education as one of the chief mechanisms accounting for changes in social capital and 
generalized trust levels.191 This chapter examines the relationship between education 
and trust (and by extension, social capital), identifies the mechanism through which 
higher levels of education bring about generalized trust, considers the position of 
                                                
189 Putnam (1993) 
190 Bhattacharyya et al. (2004), p. 31, discussing Meyer (2004).  
191 Hall, P. (1999) “Social Capital in Britain.” British Journal of Politics, Vol 29. 
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India and China in terms of education and discusses the potential consequences of 
these findings.  
 Numerous studies have found that whether looking at individual, regional, or 
national levels, wealthy and successful “haves” are far more likely to be “high 
trusters” than “distrusters.”192 Trusting, then, is clearly correlated with economic 
success. As high levels of education and economic success are similarly highly 
correlated, it is no surprise that many studies find a robust connection between high 
levels of education and high levels of trust as well.193 Table 7.1 below, which captures 
the percentage of people who display social trust by education level at three time 
periods in Britain, illustrates this phenomenon well.194  
 
Table 7.1 
Trust across Education Levels 
    Percent who display social trust 
Education   1951   1980   1990 
Primary  50  37  42 
Secondary 64  42  41 
Post-
secondary 79   60   62 
Note: Percent who display social trust is those who respond positively to “in general, you can 
trust other people”. 
Source: 1959, Civic Culture survey; 1980 and 1990, World Values Survey 
 
But how is this relationship explained, and how does education lead to greater 
willingness to trust? Rothstein, in his 2005 work on trust, summarizes a possible 
mechanism by stating that “in short, in a society that… gives individuals opportunities 
to seek contacts outside their routine and ingrained frameworks, the likelihood 
                                                
192 See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997); Uslaner (2002); Delhey, J., Newton, K. (2003), “Who 
Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies”. European Societies 5:93-137. 
193 See, for example, Inglehart, R. (1999), “Trust, well-being, and democracy”, in Warren (1999); 
Hughes, P., Bellamy, J., Black, A. (2000), “Building Social Trust through Education”, in Winter, I. 
(2000), Social Capital and Public Policy in Australia. Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family 
Studies.  
194 From Hall (1999) 
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increases that overall social intelligence and social trust will rise.”195 Education 
provides not only such opportunities through bringing together individuals from 
different backgrounds, but it also provides both shared platforms and the ability to 
make use of such opportunities. Putnam alludes to this in explaining why the better-
educated are more trusting by stating that it is mostly “because of the skills, resources, 
and inclinations that were imparted to them at home and in school.”196 
Peter Hall explores this mechanism in greater depth and discusses several 
aspects of the relationship.197 A primary factor addressed is that the community 
involvement of individuals in Britain seems to increase for every additional year of 
education received, with the latter years having a particularly pronounced effect. 
Orlando Patterson confirms the education – trust link across a greater than ten year 
period in the United States, with the largest increases coming at higher levels of 
education.198 Further studies have found a similar effect in other (including non-
Western) societies. Additionally, other studies have suggested that inter-group 
activity in general is more prevalent amongst individuals with higher levels of 
education.199 Juxtaposing these two effects, it is clear how education acts as a vehicle 
towards greater levels of inter-group contact, which is, as has been discussed, 
hypothesized to engender greater levels of generalized trust.200 Furthermore, Inglehart 
suggests that education imparts a set of liberal values that not only debase otherwise 
                                                
195 Rothstein (2005), p. 99. 
196 Putnam, R. (1996), “The Strange Disappearance of Civic America”. The American Prospect, 24, p. 
5. 
197 Hall (1999) and Hall, P. (2002) “The role of government and the distribution of social capital”, in 
Putnam, R. (ed.) Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Societies. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
198 Patterson, O. (1999), “Liberty against the democratic state: on the historical and contemporary 
sources of American distrust”, in Warren, M. (ed.) (1999). Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
199 See, for example, Inglehart (1999). 
200 This effect may be particularly pronounced in traditionally stratified and developing countries like 
India and China, where the social barriers separating groups have traditionally been both pronounced 
and rigid. In many cases, the state-run education system is the first platform on which individuals from 
different backgrounds interact, and also the first opportunity for these individuals to “speak the same 
language”.     
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bifurcating ideas and perceptions, but also (much in line with Putnam), provide the 
common foundation and skills to communicate and cooperate horizontally across 
social divisions.201  
This bridging and GI trust-generating effect of education has similarly been 
observed in both India and China. The fs/QCA study of chapter five, for example, 
clearly captured a strong correlation between higher levels of education and greater 
social-capital endowment at the Indian state level. This is strongly in-line with 
Meyer’s assertion that education, through its role in producing greater human capital, 
emerges as the strongest explanation for the varying levels of institutional 
performance and civic community at the Indian state level.202 Serra’s study, again at 
the Indian state level, approaches the situation from a different angle, but arrives at a 
similar conclusion. Summarizing her findings, Bhattacharyya et al. state that in India 
“education could be the key variable, which could take society out of the vicious 
cycle of distrust, defection and exploitation by enabling high participation, 
mobilization and effective interaction with the government and promoting 
democracy.”203 Again, the hypothesized mechanism of education promoting greater 
GI trust, which in turn engenders a host of political, social, and economic 
improvements, is clearly supported. Ke and Zhang assert the existence of the above 
discussed mechanisms in the Chinese context and likewise posit a causal connection 
between education and trust levels. Their statistical analysis at the regional level in 
China confirms their expectations.204  
                                                
201 Inglehart (1999) 
202 Meyer (2004). It should be noted that trust plays an important role in the said conceptualization of 
human capital. The link between education, trust, and better institutional performance, thus, is 
supported.   
203 Bhattacharyya et al. (2004), p. 32, discussing Serra (2004).  
204 Ke, R., Zhang, W. (2003). "Trust in China: A Cross-Regional Analysis," William Davidson Institute 
Working Papers Series 2003-586, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen 
M. Ross Business School. 
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Education in India and China - 
Despite the wealth of evidence linking education to the creation of GI trust, 
and thus in turn to the potential for continued strong development in India and China, 
it is very rarely addressed as a significant factor in comparative studies of the two 
countries. The remainder of this chapter reviews the state of education in both 
countries and discusses the potential consequences of several key indicators.  
China has a nationalized system of public education extending from 
elementary education through a well established university system. After being nearly 
decimated during the Cultural Revolution, education was again been ascribed a high 
level of priority during the Deng era and was regarded as the foundation of the Four 
Modernizations.205 The approach to developing it has been highly pragmatic, with an 
emphasis on training a modern workforce. A 1986 law established a standardized nine 
years of mandatory schooling across all provinces, beginning (in most provinces) 
from age seven. Schooling is generally free for the first six years, after which fees are 
imposed. Financial support in the form of subsidies is theoretically available to those 
with need, though in practice this varies significantly depending on a myriad of 
factors. Provincial level authorities have significant flexibility in regards to planning, 
administering, and funding the primary and secondary schooling systems. The 
education system in general is considered to be far more decentralized than the one in 
India.206 Funding is often strongest at the primary school levels, as this level has been 
the primary focus of many developmental efforts. Schooling systems are categorized 
                                                
205 The Four Modernizations (modernizing agriculture, industry, technology, and defense) were 
introduced in 1975 as the goals of the Deng-era reforms. 
206 This appears to be somewhat counter-intuitive in communist China and federalist India, but holds 
true for a range of areas, from education through healthcare and the management of the economy. See, 
for example, the discussion in Guruswamy (2006). It is fruitful to bear in mind the socialist structure of 
the early post-independence Indian government, in which many of today’s policies have their roots.   
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depending on level of development of their locations; urban and the developed coastal 
areas, moderately developed districts, and economically backward rural areas. 
Funding, quality of teaching staff, standards of learning, and development of 
infrastructure differs drastically across the categories. Admission to tertiary level 
education is based on competitive nationalized examinations. While education at this 
level is not free, there is an extensive array of available scholarships and other 
funding opportunities, making higher level education generally accessible to capable 
and prepared students, relative at least to many other developing countries. 
India has traditionally, and continues to this day, to ascribe a high degree of 
importance to education. The education system prevalent today has its roots in 
Western tradition, as it was established largely by the British during the 1800’s. While 
aspects of the planning and administering of the educational system fall within the 
competency list of the individual states, the national level government has a large say 
in setting educational guidelines, resulting in more centralized system than in China. 
There are significant structural and performance differences between states, in part 
resultant from funding differences, corruption, and administrative differences. As in 
China, national law mandates nine years of compulsory education, beginning at the 
age of six. Education is highly subsidized by the state at all levels, though 
increasingly tertiary education is fee based. India also has a highly developed system 
of private schooling at all levels, something not found to a significant extent in 
China.207 As in China, though, nearly all aspects of education, from infrastructure to 
quality of instruction, vary markedly across regions and across the urban – rural 
divide. To a varying extent, the English language appears in all levels of education in 
India, lending the country’s workforce significant advantages in certain sectors. 
                                                
207 At the secondary level, over 40% of Indian students attend private schools. This figure is negligible 
in China’s case. See UNESCO (2003).  
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Educational efficacy – 
 Structure and compulsory years of schooling, while informative, reveal little 
about the fundamental efficacy of the respective education systems. At the most 
general level, this assessment will inevitably address how well the two countries have 
produced populations possessing the fundamental competencies for effective 
participation in modern economies and societies. The most revealing measure of this 
is basic literacy, as this skill is not only the key to functioning within modern 
societies, but is also a necessary condition for acquiring more advanced skill sets.208 
Table 7.2 below captures this information. China holds a clear overall advantage in 
this regard, with an overall literacy rate of roughly 85% relative to India’s roughly 
57%. By international comparison, China fares strongly, being roughly equal to other 
“successful” developing countries like Mexico, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Turkey. 
India, by comparison, is significantly lower on a global ranking, surrounded by such 
countries as Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Eritrea.209 Equally revealing is that the gap 
between genders is significantly smaller in China than is the case in India, where over 
half of the female population remains functionally illiterate. The rural – urban literacy 
gap is similarly greater in India. It has frequently been suggested, based largely on the 
                                                
208 Despite being a seemingly simple statistic, capturing basic literacy rates is exceedingly complicated. 
In largely rural developing like India and China, the line between being literate and illiterate is often 
nebulous. This is especially the case for China, whole character-based language dictates that reading 
and writing function very differently than they do with the phonetical alphabets of the various Indian 
languages. Furthermore, there is an issue of who to include in the measure. Generally only those above 
15 are counted, but it is often the case that elderly, amongst whom illiteracy is very high in India and 
China, are also excluded. The available data is also often founded on very rough estimates, as data 
collection is difficult in many regions of the two giant countries. There is, lastly, reason to be skeptical 
of some official data, both in the case of China and India. Quoting on the example of primary school 
enrollment rates in India, “the government of India … indicates that in 2001-02, the enrollment ratios at 
lower primary level stood at 86.9% for girls and 96.2% for total boys and girls. But, it is common 
knowledge in villages, where 70% of Indians live, that very few girls from landless and land-poor 
families, from families belonging to scheduled castes and tribes, attend primary school. Hence, the 
86.9%... refers to the presence of the names of girls in school registers but not to their… active 
participation in class activity.” Chai and Roy (2006), p. 194.  
209 Data from the United Nations Development Program (2007), available at www.UNDP.org. Of the 
177 ranked countries, China is ranked 87th, while India is ranked 147th.   
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literacy differences alone, that the effort to develop a society with the requisite skills 
to participate in a modern economy largely a success in China and a failure in India.    
 
Table 7.2 
Literacy in India and China 
  Literacy Rate 
  Overall Male  Female 
China  85% 92% 78% 
India  57% 68% 45% 
Source: UNESCO (2003) 
 
 There is, however, reason to be distrustful of such a one-dimensional 
assessment. The prevalence of functional literacy is notoriously hard to conceptualize 
and measure. Furthermore, the demographic differences between the two countries 
mean that the available data may indicate subtly different things for the future of the 
two countries, and thus also for the formation of trust. A more directed assessment, 
then, is in order. This chapter will proceed by considering the performance of the 
respective education systems directly, level by level.210 This provides a far clearer 
indication of the current efficacy of the education system, and thus a far better 
indication for ongoing development.   
 
Primary Education – 
 Assessing the efficacy of primary education in India and China is important 
for several reasons. Both countries still have large rural populations without 
established histories of universal formal education, and without established cultures of 
                                                
210 The data comes from an extensive UNESCO (2003) report on education in South and East Asia, 
which considers data from 1999 and 2000. As noted above, data of this type is notoriously inconsistent, 
depending on interpretation and measurement techniques, and as such basing the comparison on a 
single source improves comparability and consistency. Many other studies on India and China have 
presented findings strongly in line with this report, bolstering confidence in its accuracy. For other 
reports, see, for example: World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators 2007.   
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inculcating into non-school going individuals the liberal skills and ideas that are 
associated with formal education. Formalized primary schooling, then, is often the 
only opportunity for individuals to acquire competency in basic skills such as literacy 
and simple mathematics. The primary level also covers the bulk of the legally 
mandated schooling in both countries.  
 Table 7.3 below captures the net primary school enrollment rates in India 
(86%) and China (93%). This is crucial information, as there is a strong history in 
both countries of children – especially female – working or staying at home in lieu of 
receiving even a basic education. Clearly, mandated minimum years of education are 
effective only when the stipulations are adhered to and children are enrolled in 
schools. In this regard, China again displays significantly better performance, 
attributable largely to the significant gender gap of enrollment in India. From a 
regional perspective India is in the company of Cambodia (85%) and Thailand (85%), 
but significantly better than several laggard countries (Iran: 74%; Pakistan: 60%; 
Laos: 81%). China is approaching the regional leaders (Sri Lanka: 97%; Malaysia: 
98%; Vietnam: 95%), but still lags significantly behind the 99% mark of nearly all 
developed countries.211     
 
Table 7.3  
Primary School Enrollment 
  Net Primary School Enrollment Rates 
  Net Male Female F/M 
India 86% 93% 77% 0.83 
China 93% 92% 93% 1.01 
Source: UNESCO (2003) 
- Net enrollment rate is percentage of eligible children enrolled in school.  
- F/M is the ratio of female to male amongst enrolled students.  
 
 
                                                
211 UNESCO (2003)  
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 Even this data, however, does not present a complete picture of actual school 
attendance, as it captures only enrollment rates. Table 7.4 below provides a clearer 
picture of the overall primary education attendance situation, as it displays both the 
percentage of non-school-going children and the survival rate to grade five for both 
countries. The differences between India and China are significantly starker on this 
level, again particularly as concerns the gender divide. A startling 44% of female 
children in India are non-school-going, compared to 13% in China. Even more 
startling is the marked difference in the survival rate to grade five (which measures 
the percentage of a cohort of students who begin grade one together that reach grade 
five): there is a greater than 50% dropout rate amongst Indian children, compared to a 
2% rate amongst Chinese children. This makes India the poorest performer in this 
regard in South and East Asia, below even Laos (47% drop-out rate), Myanmar 
(45%), and Nepal (38%).212 The gender disparity is again evident, as a significant 
larger portion of female students who begin primary schooling do not continue their 
education through grade five.  
 
Table 7.4 
Primary Level School Going in India and China 
  Non school-going 
  Total Male Female 
grade five 
survival rate 
India 35% 22% 44% 47% 
China 18% 25% 13% 98% 
Source: UNESCO (2003) 
- Non school-going is the percentage of school aged children who do not regularly attend 
school. 
- Grade five survival rate is the percentage of a cohort who begin together at grade one that 
continue through grade five. 
 
 
                                                
212 UNESCO (2003) 
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 Clearly, there are marked differences in the efficacy of the education system 
between India and China at the primary school level. The mandated nine years of 
education do little to guarantee that children receive a basic education, particularly in 
India, where less than 50% of children complete grade five with their cohort and 
nearly half of enrolled female children are non-school-going. This difference in 
performance can partly be explained by the very low pupil to teacher ratio in China 
(20-1), relatively to the very high ratio in India (40-1).213 It is often argued that the 
presence of female teachers at the primary levels acts as an incentive for families to 
send their female children to school. This may partly account for the large gender 
disparity in India, as only 36% of primary level teachers are female, ahead of only 
Nepal and Bangladesh, and behind even Pakistan.214 Given the importance of the 
basic skill set delivered at the primary level, and the importance of education to 
continued development in India and China (amongst other reasons, the mechanisms 
building GI trust), this is clearly an area that warrants close scrutiny. 
 
Secondary and tertiary education – 
 Extensive research has shown that every year of additional education received 
has the effect of increasing generalized trust and that this effect becomes particularly 
pronounced at higher levels of education.215 Thus, despite secondary and tertiary 
education being visited by relatively small portions of society in India and China, it is 
important enough to the trust formation process to receive brief attention here. Several 
key economic sectors in both countries are also highly dependent on a well educated 
workforce, which is contingent on at least a secondary - if not tertiary - level 
education. Lastly, according to established economic theory, the heavy migration to 
                                                
213 UNESCO (2003) 
214 UNESCO (2003). In China, by comparison, 53% of primary education teachers are female.   
215 Hall (1999) 
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urban areas, rapid industrialization, and the decrease of the agricultural population in 
both countries are all indicative of a developmental stage in which secondary level 
education becomes the main driver of continued growth from the perspective of 
human capital.216     
 Table 7.5 below captures gross enrollment rates for secondary level by gender 
and for the total tertiary level.217 Continuing the previous pattern, China has greater 
enrollment rates at the secondary level, though there is a significant drop from the 
exceptionally high primary schooling levels. In regional comparison, China remains 
fairly strong behind leading Thailand (82%), Sri Lanka (72%), and Malaysia (70%), 
while India performs relatively poorly above only Bangladesh (46%), Myanmar 
(39%), and Laos (38%). Notable is that gender disparity is significant in both 
countries at this level, marking a significant decline for China, which shows parity at 
the primary level. Both countries are nearly equal in terms of tertiary level enrollment, 
though it should be noted that China has a nearly 4% enrollment rate in non-tertiary 
post-secondary education, relative to under 1% for India, giving it a sizable margin in 
the portion of its population receiving an advanced education.     
 
Table 7.5 
Secondary and Tertiary Level Gross Enrollment 
  Gross Enrollment 
 Secondary  Tertiary 
  Total Male Female   Total 
India 49% 57% 40%  11% 
China 68% 77% 58%   13% 
Source: UNESCO (2003) 
                                                
216 McMahon, W. (1998), “Education and Growth in East Asia”, Economics of Education Review, 
17(2). 
217 Gross enrollment is defined as the number of pupils enrolled in a given level of education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the relevant official age group. This 
measure tends to produce slightly inflated numbers, making it difficult to directly compare to the net 
enrollment figures used for the primary level.  
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 These enrollment figures, of course, do not speak directly towards the quality 
of education at tertiary levels. Enthusiastic reports suggesting the imminent arrival of 
India and China as economic superpowers often quote figures of vast armies of 
engineers and professionals being trained in both countries on a yearly basis.218 These 
reports need to be handled with significant caution. It must be understood, for 
example, that in India individuals trained as auto mechanics and radio repairmen are 
designated engineers. Further, there are a myriad of grounds to seriously question the 
quality of training from many – if not most – of the non-elite institutions in both 
countries. These two points lead many to assert that both countries – but especially 
India – face a significant shortage of well-trained professionals in one capacity or 
another, which inevitably engenders a host of troubling issues from sub-standard 
infrastructure to lost growth opportunities.219     
 
Conclusion – 
 Extensive experimental and empirical research supports the assertion that 
education plays a critical role in the creation of bridging GI trust. Despite this, the 
state of education in India and China plays a very small role in the existing 
                                                
218 It is quite often claimed, for example, that India trains more engineers per year than Europe and the 
United States combined.  
219 Consider, for example, Tilak’s assessment: “India has a huge stock of science and technology 
manpower, consisting of scientists and engineers. But the myth of the third largest stock of scientific 
and technical manpower in the world stands exploded if one carefully examines the quality of the 
manpower and their utilization. The stock is not so huge to match the requirements of the economy. 
Any standardized international comparisons of the stock of science and technology manpower would 
not make any tall claims tenable.” Many other countries, he points out, have a relative share of scientist 
and engineers 10 to 30 times greater than India does. Tilak, J. (2005), “Post-elementary education, 
poverty, and development in India”, 8th UKFIET Oxford International Conference on Education and 
Development, p. 28. The poor training offered by many universities in India is demonstrated, for 
example, by the fact that many companies are forced to provide comprehensive supplementary training 
to recent graduates before they are able to fill positions.      
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comparative studies.220 This chapter details the mechanism explaining how education 
impacts the creation of the generalized and institutionalized type of trust on which 
continued development in both countries is argued to be at least partially contingent.  
The importance of primary level education is especially clear, because 
“research suggests that five to six years’ schooling at the primary level is a critical 
threshold for the achievement of sustainable basic literacy and numeracy skills.”221 In 
terms of basic literacy, the far greater performance of China at the primary level 
results in literacy levels which compare favorably to many other developing countries. 
India, by contrast, which is plagued by massive drop-out rates and gender disparities, 
had the basic literacy levels in the year 2000 that China did during the mid-1960s, 
over 35 years earlier. The massive gender disparity and very poor attendance of 
disadvantaged children (whether from poor backgrounds or scheduled castes and 
tribes) that fuels this dismal performance has shown some amelioration, but remains 
deeply entrenched with little perspective of fundamentally improving in the 
foreseeable future. India’s “primary schools remain in shambles… Classes are over-
crowded, and teacher absenteeism is rampant.”222 While many of China’s rural 
schooling systems are also plagued by significant shortcomings, the vast gap between 
enrollment rates, out-of-school rates, and basic survival rates – not to mention the 
overwhelming assessments of many expert field reports – leaves little doubt that the 
two systems are in fundamentally different realms with regards to their basic efficacy.    
                                                
220 In some cases, as the following quote makes very clear, the consequences of deficiencies in the 
education system are very clear. They are, however, often seen as an afterthought (appearing in this 
case on page 227, without significant prior mention), and are nowhere treated as central to 
understanding the developmental differences between the two countries. “We do believe that a primary, 
more protracted, and modern education system for children, in particular for girls… should be the 
greatest priority for the Union and the state governments of India. Indeed, higher public expenditure in 
primary and secondary education is the most profitable business that any public sector may undertake 
in developing countries.” Rahman and Andreu (2006), p. 227. 
221 Chai and Roi (2006), p. 253.  
222 Meredith (2007), p. 128.  
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Ultimately, this comparison is complex and far greater in scope than what this 
chapter can hope to address in proper detail. While India heavily advertises its elite 
technology institutions and the advantages of a partially English-language based 
education system, however, few would challenge the assertion that China has far out-
performed India in providing a strong basic and universal education to its population, 
which, given the current levels of development in each country, is of far greater 
value.223 The thirty-five year lag in literacy rates in India relative to China may 
somewhat oversimplify the situation, but there is little question that vast portions of 
India’s society – starting with women and the myriad of caste, religion, or ethnic 
based minorities – are fundamentally being failed by the education system and are 
thus excluded on fundamental levels from participating equitably in society and the 
country’s growing economy. The economic consequences of this are clear; Meredith 
comments, for example, that even if India could attract the FDI that China does, much 
of its workforce wouldn’t qualify to work in modern factory jobs.224 Beyond this, 
however, the consequences for the building of generalized trust across many of 
India’s stratifications, divisions, and cleavages, are even more startling and nothing 
short of grave. 
 
                                                
223 It is instructive to note that the number of graduates from elite institutions in India number in the 
thousands every year, out of the many million within the country’s vast schooling system. In some 
respects the high profile of the elite universities mirrors the situation of the IT sector, which is also 
highly publicized and offered as an example of shining India, while employing 1% of the country’s 
service sector workforce and less than 0.4% of the total workforce. Given the generally poor level of 
education in both India and China, the most significant strides to be made are those that impact the 
lives of tens of millions, not a select half or one percent. 
224 Meredith (2007) 
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Chapter Eight: Corruption  
 
 The previous two chapters have argued the case for considering a measure of 
equality and education as significant components for creating generalized and 
institutionalized trust in a given society. The relevance of these two mechanisms to 
social capital levels, and by extension to development, has been established by a wide 
range of studies. This final chapter argues that corruption at various levels of 
government and society is also fundamentally inimical to the creation of GI trust, and 
as such, that considering the extent of corruption in a country completes the “social 
capital component” picture. Given the well-publicized rampant corruption levels in 
India and China, this component is of significant value to furthering the understanding 
of social capital levels in the two countries.  
 Research examining the relationship between corruption and trust is extensive 
in breadth and scope. Rothstein dedicates a chapter to this question in Social Traps 
and the Problem of Trust that proposes several possible mechanisms for how the 
interactions of individuals with political and administrative institutions affect 
individual worldviews and, by extension, how they can influence the production or 
destruction of the trust that forms the foundation of social capital.225 “The causal 
factor,” he finds, “seems to be the degree of universalism in those institutions, 
understood as impartiality, objectivity, and equal treatment.”226 In A State of Trust, 
Margaret Levi similarly argues that a state can create an environment conducive to the 
formation of generalized trust only when the state and its institutions itself can be 
considered trustworthy.227   
                                                
225 Rothstein (2005) 
226 Rothstein (2005), p. 129. 
227 Levi (1998) 
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 From this perspective, the state’s universalism influences general trust levels 
because it acts to oversee and regulate the free-rider problem that breaks the circle of 
reciprocity critical to the perpetuation of generalized trust. The mechanism at the 
heart of this relationship operates at the individual level and is fairly straightforward: 
Rothstein captures it by asserting that when individuals believe the state and its 
governance culture is impartial and effective in its handling of trust-violating 
behavior, they will interpret the general climate as being unconducive to free-rider 
behavior, and thus be inclined to extend trust more readily.228 Thus, objectivity at the 
state level creates an environment at the societal level that is characterized by an 
increased level of expectation that given extensions of trust will be reciprocated in 
turn. It is this generalized expectation that trust will be reciprocated that constitutes 
the core of GI trust and bridging social capital. 
 This situation clearly begs the question of causal direction. It would not be 
difficult to conceive of a situation where extant high generalized levels of trust and 
the scarcity of free-rider behavior within a society create institutions with the same 
characteristics. While it would be naïve to claim that the causal flow in question is 
entirely one directional, or that there didn’t exist some extent of feedback within the 
relationship, there are ample examples to support the notion that corruption within 
institutions and a society’s interactions with them significantly impact the levels of 
generalized trust within that society, particularly in the Asian context. Hilton Root’s 
detailed accounts of institutional creation in Singapore and Hong Kong strongly 
support this notion, as the universalism intentionally built into the institutions of both 
countries clearly created a greater culture of universalism in those societies than 
                                                
228 Rothstein, B. (2000), “Trust. Social Dilemmas, and Collective Memory.” Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 12(4).  
 130 
previously existed.229 A consideration of the neighboring countries, along with a 
comparison of Singapore and Hong Kong pre and post institutional restructuring, does 
much to support the plausibility of this assertion. 
 A narrow interpretation of this mechanism would clearly run counter to 
Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital as being the result of largely inexorable 
cultural traits, since social capital and generalized trust could be created simply by 
introducing well-structured and functioning institutions.230 A belief in the possibility 
of this is inherent in the developmental efforts of many organizations, from the UNDP 
and the IMF, to the World Bank. By tying funding to progress in the implementation 
of institutions characterized by low corruption and universalism in governance, there 
exists an implicit assumption that universalism at these levels will filter through to 
society to create the generalized trust necessary for improving functionality at that 
level. Even a precursory examination of developmental efforts around the world, 
however, makes clear that creating institutions characterized by universalism in not 
purely a calculated exercise of implementing a designated set of rules, systems, and 
procedures. Indeed, institutional culture, which is not only far more nebulous, but also 
occasionally seemingly intractable and capable of undermining all other efforts to 
create the objectivity critical to the trust generating process, plays a highly critical role 
in the equation of institutional universalism. Whether from a conceptual perspective, 
for example that of Douglass North, or through the socio-psychological experimental 
work of Tom Tyler, this principle seems very well supported.231 
                                                
229 Root, H. (1996), Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East Asia. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press.  
230 In many respects, a simplistic interpretation of this mechanism also reverses the causal direction 
proposed in Putnam’s early work, as Putnam looks at social characteristics as the root cause of good 
institutional performance.  
231 North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Tyler, T. (1998), “Trust in Democratic Governance”, in Braithwaite, V., Levi, M. (ed.) (1998), Trust 
and Governance. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
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 As with education, the comparative literature on India and China does often 
give corruption a brief mention. The discussion, however, is generally limited to the 
assumed economic costs of corruption: reduced productivity, lower investment, and 
lost resources. What is lacking is an analysis of the political and social implications of 
corruption, and specifically a mechanism of how corruption impacts development in 
general. A systematic comparison of the two countries from this perspective doesn’t 
factor in any of the existing studies. Given the argued importance of corruption within 
social interaction in general, and within relevant institutions specifically, evaluating 
China and India on this basis again provides significant insight into the prospects for 
moving towards greater levels of GI trust and in turn succeeding in the three core 
developmental goals. The rest of this chapter reviews the state of corruption in the 
two countries, conducts a preliminary comparison, and then discusses the results. 
 
Corruption in China -  
 China is often described as having a “red envelope” culture, a reference to the 
social networking system guanxi described at length in chapter four. The reason for 
this label is clear: the line between the reciprocity – whether in the form of returned 
services, general favors, or gift giving – inherent in guanxi and outright bribery is 
often not clear, especially from a Western perspective.232 Irrespective of definition, 
                                                
232 In analyzing the relevance of cultural perspective on the differentiation of gift-giving and bribery, as 
well as on the interpretation of the “red envelope” culture, Luo (2007), p. 26 writes: “Gift giving 
practices… are often governed by strange and seemingly arcane rules in many societies. In the 
marriage market, for example, a hopeful suitor may buy a conventional gift like a box of chocolates. He 
will remove the price tag even though the recipient will probably have a good estimate of the cost. He 
will enclose the gift in wrapping paper, even though he wants his prospective partner to unwrap it 
almost immediately. Then he will present it when he meets her at the door, before any meaningful 
conversation has begun. Such gift-giving practices vary substantially among different cultures. The 
suitor in the West would never consider giving money to the woman he woos, although chocolate is 
acceptable. If he did so, he might find the gift rejected and the door closed in his face. In Chinese 
society, however, money is the most important gift exchanged in arranging an engagement and 
marriage. If a friend invites you to attend her wedding, you must prepare a red envelope containing 
money, the amount of which differs across regions, periods, and the closeness of the relationship. Gift-
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however, there is little question that corruption in its most inimical forms is a very 
real issue within China today. Transparency International (TI), a prominent anti-
corruption organization, ranks China in 72nd (out of 179 countries) place in its 2007 
corruption perceptions index.233 Angang Hu estimates the average yearly economic 
losses during the late 1990’s related to corruption to be in the order of 13.3 and 16.6 
percent of GDP, clearly making the issue central to further economic growth.234 
Transparency International’s National Integrity System country report (which assesses 
the key institutions and activities in a country that relate to corruption) on China calls 
corruption in that country pervasive and suggests it is well established in a broad 
spectrum of the country’s most critical institutions.235 Corruption is, however, nearly 
always a matter of perception, and there is little question that corruption is widely 
perceived as being a significant problem in China; even the communist party itself 
perceives the widespread perception of it as being corrupt as one of the most central 
threats to its legitimacy.236  
 Many analyses on the origins of corruption in China begin with the concept of 
guanxi and do not clearly differentiate it from genuine corruption. This is – especially 
from a Western perspective – entirely logical, as the methods and actions comprising 
the two concepts are often the same – the differentiation is largely a product of 
context and intent, making it inherently nebulous. Within a stable social structure, 
then, guanxi and corruption may not significantly intertwine. Many have argued, 
                                                
giving practices in China are part of a dynamic process which must constantly be trained and 
perfected.”  
233 Transparency International (2007), Corruption Perceptions Index 2007.  
234 Hu, A. (2001), “Economic Losses Caused by Corruption in the late 1990’s in China.” International 
Economic Review, Issue 5-6. 
235 Transparency International (2006b), National Integrity System: Country Report China 2006. Berlin: 
Transparency International. 
236 Jackson, S. (2000), “Introduction: A Typology for Stability and Instability in China”, in 
Shambaugh, D. (ed.) (2000), Is China Unstable: Assessing the Factors. Armonk: East Gate. This idea 
is underscored by then Prime Minister Jiang Zemin’s statement in front of the 1997 Fifteenth National 
Congress that the fight against corruption was vital to the very existence of the party and that if the 
problem could not be countered, the party would lose the confidence and support of the people.    
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however, that China’s explosive economic growth has triggered a parallel erosion of 
the traditional moral order which has in many respects policed Chinese society for 
much of its history.237 Luo argues that this demoralization further blurs the line 
between guanxi and corruption and results in a shift in the perception of guanxi from 
“a long traditionally-embedded culture to a rent-seeking practice involving 
corruption.”238 Luo further writes that while “guanxi is not necessarily an origin or a 
source of corrupt behavior, it is a critical facilitator of corruption in a demoralized 
society. In a demoralized context, the general rule of guanxi is shifted toward power 
exchange and gain sharing without obligating formal laws and informal relational 
norms.”239 Guanxi, then, in the current social context, can transform into the 
mechanism that bypasses standardized bureaucratic procedure and collects rent in the 
grey and black sectors of the economy. 
 The difficulty in effectively curbing corruption is also attributed in part to this 
hypothesized erosion of moral cohesion, as the traditional counter to the practice has 
been re-education and moral reform, rather than explicit threats of corporal 
punishment. Jenson writes that this appeal to public virtue “may have been [effective] 
in the past when the CCP was the guarantor of a successful revolution, [but] today it 
no longer possesses the moral authority of its revolutionary heyday and popular 
disillusionment is so widespread that the recurring appeal to morality as a counter to 
corruption’s illegality… has little effect.”240 
 In practice this corruption takes on a myriad of forms. Jenson refers to a recent 
report from the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, which investigates and 
                                                
237 See for example: Luo (2007); Hamrin (2006) 
238 Luo (2007), p. 227. 
239 Luo (2007), p. 227. 
240 Jenson, L. (2000), “Everyone’s a Player, but the Nation’s a Loser: Corruption in Contemporary 
China”, in Weston, T., Jensen, L. (2000), China beyond the Headlines. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, p. 38. 
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prosecutes corruption. It details a staggering list of offenses committed by national 
and regional level officials, including “smuggling, bribery, bribery in exchange for 
omission of action, fabrication, prostitute visits, illegal fund raising, illegal release of 
smuggled goods, armed resistance to the anti-smuggling squad, arbitrary imposition 
of service charges, collection of illicit fees, random installation of highway 
checkpoints, using public funds for tourism in foreign countries, unwarranted fees in 
elementary and middle schools, and kickbacks for the purchase or sale of medical and 
pharmaceutical products.”241 Equally as damaging to the perception of neutrality 
within the ranks of the CCP is that the remarkable prevalence of officials’ family 
members in lucrative positions leaves little doubt that many sought-after positions 
within China’s new economy are distributed on the basis of connections rather than 
ability. Jenson cites a 1998 CCP Central Committee inquiry to illustrate the extent of 
this graft: it reported that of the direct family members of Guangdong’s three leading 
bodies of the party and government, fully 92% were involved in some form of 
lucrative business related to China – Hong Kong / Macau ventures.242  
 These examples leave little doubt that official corruption in some of China’s 
key institutions is deeply entrenched and significant. Determining the exact extent of 
the corruption is, however, exceedingly difficult. This is due not only the generally 
nebulous nature of corruption, but also to the fact that the CCP tightly controls 
research and reporting on corruption within its borders.243 One potentially objective 
measure of the trend in corruption, at least, is the number of anti-corruption cases 
taken up. Jenson cites government data that list over six hundred thousand cases being 
tried between 1992 and 1997, and greater than 2200 senior party officials being 
                                                
241 Jenson (2000), p. 47. 
242 Jenson (2000) 
243 This lack of objective reporting and media freedom in particular makes direct comparisons with 
India, where the media is less restrained, difficult.  
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prosecuted in 1995 alone.244 Both of these figures have risen significantly in recent 
years, which Jenson implies is the product of an ever growing problem. Yang Dali 
similarly cites an ever-increasing number of prosecutions. Much as is the case with 
measuring the extent of corruption by the perception of the extent of it, a change in 
rates of prosecution is a fundamentally problematic measure of underlying corruption, 
as it could reflect both increasing corruption as well as increasing – and perhaps 
effective – persecution of corruption. The latter is exactly the stance taken by Yang, 
as he attributes the increase in reported corruption to increased efforts to curb the 
problem; efforts which he views as largely – and increasingly – effective. He suggests, 
in fact, that some of the recent anti-corruption initiatives have shown enough impact 
that corruption in China may have peaked and that the country may have crossed a 
critical threshold after which the issue will no longer present the threat to stability that 
it recently has.245 The fact that the nebulous nature of corruption in China leads two 
experts to fundamentally differing conclusions underscores the difficulty of making 
an objective assessment on this issue in China. India, by contrast, with its freer media 
and more transparent structure of government, offers a far clearer picture of its warts.    
 
Corruption in India – 
 The state of corruption in India is perhaps best captured through the words of 
Bimal Jalan, the two-time governor of the Reserve Bank of India; “The most 
repugnant aspect of corruption in India is not that it is there, not that it is so pervasive, 
but that it is widely accepted as an unavoidable feature of Indian life.” Far from 
fading in significance as India develops, he argues that corruption has slowly evolved 
from being regarded as morally reprehensible, to the point where there “is now much 
                                                
244 Jenson (2000) 
245 Yang, D. (2004), “Has Corruption Peaked in China?”, EAI Background Brief No. 214. 
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greater tolerance of corruption as an essential element of India’s democracy and its 
governance structure.”246  
Transparency International ranked India in 88th place globally in its 2005 
Corruption Perceptions Index, alongside such countries as Armenia, Gabon, Mali, 
and Tanzania. This placement clearly indicates that corruption is a serious problem at 
all levels of India’s government, society, and economy.247 Its country specific report 
details a view of significant corruption endemic to everything from high-level politics 
through local-level services, with few unaffected areas in between.248 A review of 
some book titles on the subject supports the notion of a broadly affected spectrum: 
Ministers’ Misconduct; The Corrupt Society – The Criminalization of India from 
Independence to the 1990s; Who Owns the CBI – The Naked Truth.249  
In-depth analyses of the evolution of corruption in India often stretch back to 
the “license Raj” system of restrictive licensing borne out of the Nehru era in the 
1950s. Tight supply and high demand of goods and services, together with great 
power in the hands of low-paid bureaucrats who issued the requisite licenses, created 
the ideal environment for widespread and systematic corruption.250 Indira Gandhi’s 
declaration of a State of Emergency in 1975 (during which standard judicial 
procedures were suspended and the government was given a broad range of 
unchecked powers) after being found guilty of fraud is seen by many as being 
“tantamount to an open invitation to every public servant to milk the system” and the 
                                                
246 Jalan, B. (2005), The Future of India: Politics, Economics and Governance. New Delhi: Penguin 
Books, p. 118. Italics added.  
247 Transparency International (2005), Corruption Perception Index. Available at 
www.transparency.org 
248 Centre for Media Studies (2005), India Corruption Study to Improve Governance. New Delhi: 
Transparency International India. Available online at www.tiindia.in 
249 Mitra, C. (1998), The Corrupt Society: The Criminalization of India from Independence to the 
1990s. New Delhi: Penguin Books India.  
Lall, B. (2007), Who Owns the CBI: The Naked Truth. New Delhi: Manas Publications. 
Noorani, A. (1973), Ministers’ Misconduct. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.   
250 See, for example the “Supply and Demand of Corruption” chapter of Jalan (2005), and Gill, S. 
(1998), The Pathology of Corruption. New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India. 
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culmination of an slide towards accepting corruption as a standard feature of the 
bureaucratic system.251 This incentive to engage in corruption, juxtaposed with the 
implicit acceptance of the practice, has led to corruption being widely seen as a low 
risk – high reward activity, making the control of it exceedingly difficult. Further 
entrenching corruption in India is what Guhan and Paul term the “vertical integration” 
of corruption at different levels of government, where the widespread acceptance and 
practice of corruption at all levels obviates the normal hierarchical oversight process 
in bureaucratic organizations.252 In other words, the high extent of vertical collusion 
on matters of corruption means that superiors no longer police subordinates (in 
regards to corruption) as would be assumed according to norms of standard 
organizational behavior. The horizontal spread of corruption through all rungs of 
business, media, the legislature and judiciary, as well as through public institutions 
and independent professionals, further cements the practice.253    
Many attempts to measure the corruption issue are, as with many other issues, 
spearheaded by the business community. The emphasis here is clearly on the specific 
manifestations of corruption that impact the economy, rather than on the more 
generalized and institutionalized corruption that this analysis is focused on. 
Nonetheless, considering the results underlines the extent of the corruption problem in 
India. The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report 2005 
ranked India in 72nd place (out of 117 countries) for “irregular payments to officials 
associated with imports and exports”, 83rd for “irregular payments in public utilities”, 
and 75th for “irregular payments in tax collection.”254 Transparency International’s 
2006 Bribe Payer’s Index, which measures the propensity of MNCs to pay bribes, 
                                                
251 Smith (2007), p. 78. 
252 Guhan, S., Paul, S. (1997), Corruption in India: Agenda for Action. New Delhi: Vision/Orient. 
253 Jalan (2005) 
254 World Economic Forum (2005), Global Competitiveness Report 2005.  
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ranks India in the dead last position out of the thirty countries assessed, just below 
China and significantly below countries like Malaysia, South Korea, Russia, Turkey, 
Brazil, and Saudi Arabia.255  
Transparency International India’s country report also paints a bleak picture of 
corruption in both basic and need based government services.256 Table 8.1 below 
captures some of the critical findings. These areas are of particular concern for this 
analysis, as they most directly capture those elements that factor into the creation and 
destruction of generalized trust levels. A startling 80% of respondents who have had 
contact with the police admit to having paid a bribe, leading to nearly 90% of 
respondents viewing that institution as corrupt. Within the judiciary, of the nearly 
50% who have paid brides, 41% paid to influence the judgment, 31% to speed up or 
delay the judgment, and 28% to get routine jobs (like the collection of documentation, 
for example) expedited. The level of corruption is particularly disconcerting in a 
country in which less than 2% of individuals pay income tax, as many studies have 
found that it is the perception that taxes are fairly assessed and paid by all that impacts 
the willingness of individuals to pay taxes.257 The monetary value of this petty 
corruption alone (meaning small-scale day-to-day non-economic corruption excluding 
high-level singular events and any kind of economic corruption involving tenders, 





                                                
255 Transparency International (2006), Bribe Payer’s Index 2006. Berlin: Transparency International. 
256 Centre for Media Studies (2005) 
257 Rothstein (2005) 
258 Centre for Media Studies (2005) 
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Table 8.1 











Income Tax 20 62 38 
Municipal 
Services 23 75 60 
Lower Judiciary 47 81 58 
Police 80 88 64 
School 18 45 27 
Electricity 20 67 50 
Govt. Hospital 27 67 48 
Source: Centre for Media Studies (2005) Transparency International India Country Report 
- Direct experience of bribing is percentage of respondents who admit to paying a bribe 
 
 
 Perhaps as a result of the complacency of corruption and the level of vertical 
and horizontal integration of the process, there is a perception in India that corruption 
is pervasive and too entrenched to be significantly mitigated within the foreseeable 
future. Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 2007 underscores this 
perspective.259 The report finds that Indians have the worst perception of corruption in 
their political parties of any of the more than 60 countries included in the study. 
Further, the perception of corruption in their police force is greater than in any other 
included Asian country.260 The same is true of the education system, NGOs (with the 
exception of Pakistan), religious groups (with the exception of Japan), the legal / 
judiciary system (with the exception of Indonesia), medical services (with the 
exception of Japan), and the tax system (with the exception of Pakistan and 
Indonesia). In short, Indians view critical elements of their country’s institutions as 
more corrupt than nearly any other major country in the world, and on the whole, 
more than any other included Asian country. This negative view is only strengthened 
by the fact that 90% of respondents in India expect that corruption will increase over 
                                                
259 Transparency International (2007b), Global Corruption Report 2007.  
260 The report included Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Notably, China is not included in the study.   
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the next three years – again, the highest percentage of any of the greater than sixty 
surveyed countries in the TI study.261  
Lastly, corruption in India, when juxtaposed with the complicated and 
unwieldy bureaucracy, has often been criticized as being nebulous, inefficient, and 
risky, unlike in some other Asian countries – China, for example, where there is a far 
greater extent of clarity regarding the payoff for illicit services rendered or money 
spent. David Smith writes of the experiences of the BBC’s former South Asia editor 
Mark Tully: “Worse even than having to pay bribes to get things done is the fact that 
in India bad governance means that corruption is intertwined with inefficiency. He 
cites a non-resident Indian industrialist, who says ‘I would prefer to invest in my own 
country but I go to East Asia instead because there I certainly have to pay but I know 
I’ll get my money’s worth. In India the system is so complicated and everything takes 
so long and you never know whether you’ll get what you paid for in the end.’”262   
 
Comparing corruption in India and China –  
 Corruption in India and China is clearly not a one-dimensional matter that 
readily lends itself to analysis. Attempts at objectively assessing the respective 
situations from a comparative perspective are necessarily fraught with hurdles, 
contentious in nature, and best handled with a degree of caution.263 Nonetheless, 
exactly such an attempt is called for to further the structure of the proposed 
comparison in this thesis. The rest of this chapter, then, will examine several 
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263 As has been argued, this is especially difficult in the case of India and China, where access to the 
data necessary to construct objective reports is handled very differently. As many reports rely on media 
exposure, it in interesting to report that Reports Without Borders ranks India somewhat, though not 
substantially, higher (120/169) in it’s 2007 World Press Freedom Index than China (164/169). 
Reporters Without Borders (2007), 2007 World Press Freedom Index. Available online at www.rsf.org  
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comparative tools, analyze their results, and align their findings with the country 
profiles developed in this chapter above.  
 The clear starting point for a comparison of the state of corruption in India and 
China is TI’s Corruption Perception Index, if for no other reason than that it is the 
most widely referred to source of comparative information on corruption. The most 
recent 2007 report assesses both India and China with a 3.5 on a 10 point scale, 
ranking them evenly in place 72 out of 179 examined countries.264 Table 8.2 below 
captures this data for the past five reports. It is notable that both countries show very 
close performance and have been consistently clustered near one another on the 
relative global scale. Both have also displayed moderate improvements in the past 
several years.         
 
Table 8.2 
Corruption Perception Index 
  Corruption Perception Index 
  2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
India  3.5 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 
China 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.4 
Source: Transparency International CPI Index 
- Scores are on a ten point scale, where a high score indicates less corruption 
 
 It is also notable, however, that the perspective gleaned through the CPI 
somewhat contradicts previously discussed data. It seems fairly indisputable, for 
example, that there is a belief in India that corruption is on the rise and will continue 
to be so for the foreseeable future.265 This is clearly incompatible with the notion of 
the perception of corruption improving in India, as implied by the CPI index. This 
                                                
264 Transparency International (2007) 
265 The TI Global Corruption Report 2007 reported that 90% of the Indians surveyed expected 
corruption to become worse in the foreseeable future, which ranked India last among all countries 
included in the study. Transparency International (2007b)  
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discrepancy highlights several issues with the index: it is composite ranking based on 
a number of reports that vary from year to year and country to country; it is based in 
part on surveys that use various definitions and conceptions of corruption; it is heavily 
biased towards the perceptions of the private sector and wealthy individuals; and it is 
in part based on the – often politically imbued – opinions of a small group of 
“experts”. Lastly, there is a fundamental problem with measuring success in the 
eradication of corruption by the perception of corruption because the two variables 
have a complex relationship which may at times be negative. Success in combating 
corruption, for example, may well involve the widespread exposure of corrupt 
practices and officials, which may easily increase the visibility of corruption – and 
thus the perception of its prevalence – while actually reducing the practice of it. 
 An alternative comparative dataset comes from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) research project.266 Of particular interest here are two 
variables which directly address issues of corruption and universality in governance: 
the Control of Corruption (CC) variable and the Rule of Law (RL) variable. Control 
of corruption measures the “perception of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as the [capture of] the state by elites and private interests.”267 Rule of law captures the 
“perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”268 The scores 
result from aggregating data from 35 sources, produced by 32 different organizations. 
The sources range from “surveys of firms and individuals, as well as the assessment 
                                                
266 Kaufmann et al. (2008), Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
267 Kaufmann et al. (2008), p. 8. 
268 Kaufmann et al. (2008), p. 7. 
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of commercial risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of 
multi-lateral aid agencies and other public sector organizations.”269 Table 8.3 below 
captures these two variables at three intervals between 1998 and 2007 for India and 
China. 
  A precursory glance at the data makes clear that from the perspective of the 
World Bank’s governance research, India outperforms China on matters of corruption 
control and rule of law. This is especially the case with the RL variable, though it also 
must be noted that both countries appear to have regressed somewhat in this regard 
over the past decade. In terms of CC, India again displays somewhat better 
performance than does China, though the gap is small, and when incorporating the 
margins of error associated with the variable (around +/- .15), not significant. Both 
countries again appear to have regressed somewhat over the past decade.   
 
Table 8.3  
World Wide Governance Indicators 
  Control of Corruption Rule of Law 
  2007 2003 1998 2007 2003 1998 
India -0.39 -0.34 -0.28 0.10 0.03 0.16 
China -0.66 -0.43 -0.38 -0.45 -0.45 -0.38 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
 
 A further point of reference for a corruption-based comparative perspective 
between India and China is the Global Integrity Report: 2007, put together by the 
governance and anti-corruption tracking IO Global Integrity.270 The index does not 
measure corruption directly, but rather focuses on “the existence, effectiveness, and 
citizen access to key national-level anti-corruption mechanisms used to hold 
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270 Global Integrity (2007), Global Integrity Report: 2007. Washington D.C.: Global Integrity. 
Available at www.globalintegrity.org 
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governments accountable.”271 In other words, it is a measure of the availability and 
practical accessibility of tools to counter corruption. The index is an aggregate of 
more than 300 indicators for each country developed both through surveys and expert 
opinions.  
For the purposes of this chapter, three categories are of particular interest: 
Administration and Civil Service (ACS), which focuses on bureaucratic regulation, 
whistleblower protection, and transparency around government procurement and 
privatization; Oversight and Regulation (OR), which assesses the effectiveness of the 
national ombudsman, supreme audit institution, taxes and customs agencies, 
transparency of state-owned enterprises, and business licensing requirements; and 
Anti-corruption and Rule of Law (ACRL), which anti-corruption laws, anti-corruption 
agencies, citizen access to justice, and law-enforcement accessibility. Table 8.4 below 
captures these scores for India and China. 
 
Table 8.4 
Global Integrity Index 
  ACS OR ACRL 
India 8.0 7.0 8.2 
China 6.4 6.8 6.1 
Source: Global Integrity (2007) 
- Scores are on a ten point scales, with high scores indicating greater efficacy. 
- ACS: Administration and Civil Service 
- OR: Oversight and Regulation 
- ACRL: Anti-corruption and Rule of Law 
 
 
 With the exception of OR, India appears to have a more developed system of 
anti-corruption tools available to it. Examining these results together with the 
Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, India 
appears to have an empirically-backed advantage in terms of the perception and 
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control of corruption. Before accepting this conclusion as an end to this comparison, 
however, it is fruitful to carefully consider several key mitigating points. The first 
involves the extent to which normative assumptions permeate the indexes: several of 
the variable definitions alone are clearly founded on norms endemic to Western ideals 
of governance (read: democracy) and individual freedom. It is then no surprise that 
India, whose system is modeled after the oldest parliamentary system in the world, 
appears to perform better. This point is only strengthened when considering some of 
the key sources used in constructing the indexes: data from the very conservative 
American think-tank Freedom House, for example, whose research focuses on 
individual liberties and democratic values, figures heavily in the indexes. The fact that 
all three of the indexes are researched and published by Western organizations, two of 
which are based in Washington D.C., further underscores the expected bias towards 
clearly more Western-oriented India.272  
 These normative biases aside, all of these indexes are necessarily based on 
proxy indicators, many of which have even under ideal circumstances a tenuous 
correlation to the phenomenon they are assumed to measure. Given the argued paucity 
of reliable and objective data available on corruption in China, the indexes are replete 
with opportunities for misrepresenting the actual conditions on the ground in China. 
Lastly, the notion of aggregating phenomena with remarkable breadth – consider 
again the argued urban – rural, and modern – traditional, cleavages in India and China 
– into a single measure on a one-point or ten-point scale calls for caution in 
interpreting the results at best and stretches seriously the credibility of the findings at 
worst.  
                                                
272 One is strongly reminded here of the Cold War era JFK quote referencing the developmental race 
between India and China as a test of which system and set of beliefs (ie, Western, free, and democratic, 
or Eastern, collective, and socialist) could be seen as the ultimate truth.  
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 Corruption is clearly a complicated issue with substantial potential to impact 
the levels of generalized trust – and by extension, development – in India and China. 
It is also clear that corruption is a serious problem in the two countries. Ultimately, 
the mechanism relevant to levels of generalized trust is the perception of universalism 
and equity in governance. While this is directly related to levels of corruption and to 
the tools in place to counter it, it is on many levels also independent and not 
influenced by comparative standings. From this perspective, the Corruption 
Perception Index (which ranked China and India evenly this year and India lower in 
recent years), despite its shortcomings, may be the most relevant of the considered 
measures.273 It is also necessary to refer back to TI’s Global Corruption Report, 
which found Indian respondents to hold the most pessimistic views of all the surveyed 
countries not only of their politicians, but also of the prospects of improved levels of 
corruption.274 Furthermore, it is also instructive to again note the frequent assertion 
that on the whole, the Chinese population has a strong degree of trust in the senior 
ranks of its leadership, and that the problem of corruption is often considered to be 
endemic mainly at the regional and local levels. Perceptions of the Indian leadership 
do not appear to show this same differentiation. Bruce Gilley’s research on legitimacy 
indicators clearly shows that the Chinese state enjoys significantly more attitudinal 
support than does India’s.275 Developing any conclusive stances on the state of trust-
influencing corruption in India and China will clearly require analysis beyond what 
this chapter can offer. This chapter has, however, highlighted the relevance of the 
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issue to the developmental comparison and made the case that the complexity of the 
issue precludes any simple and clear declarations of advantage.   
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
IX.I The India and China Comparative Landscape 
 As grand celebrations ushered in a new millennium several years ago, the air 
was abuzz with commentators’ thoughts on what the next thousand years would bring 
for mankind. The less far-sighted of the group limited their view to the next century 
alone, and not few amongst them made the claim that this period would eventually be 
seen as Asia’s century. Indeed, after nearly half a millennium of domination by a 
relatively under-populated collection of Western countries, many predicted that 
history would again be driven forward by the world’s largest continent, home to a full 
sixty percent of humanity and today already the largest economic zone in the world 
(in terms of PPP).   
 While fully-developed Japan will likely remain a prominent economic power 
for the foreseeable future, Asia is very much expected to be carried to new heights on 
the shoulders of the world’s two most populous countries, India and China. As many 
have commented, this rise is less the awakening of two giants as it is the reawakening 
of two of the world’s oldest and richest civilizations. The specter of this fundamental 
shift in global power looming ominously on the horizon has sparked nothing short of 
a storm of interest in better understanding what these two countries are, how they 
came to occupy their current positions, and what their manifestations of today 
suggests about the paths they will take in the coming decades.  
 Many of the efforts to better understand the development of India and China 
compare the two countries, both with one another and with established theory on 
economic and political development. As wealth and economic clout are 
unquestionably the preeminent drivers of global influence today, this is the area that 
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garners the greatest share of research attention. It is also an area of clear 
differentiation between the two countries, as despite starting their independent 
modern histories as equally undeveloped and poor countries just over 50 years ago, 
China has built a very clear lead in the race towards economic development. Chapter 
two of this thesis reviews this comparison in detail, but it is nonetheless instructive to 
summarize the scale of this contrast. Consider, for example, that China today has a 
per capita GDP 2.2 times greater than India’s (in USD PPP).276 China has had greater 
year on year growth since the 1970s and has domestic savings and investment rates 
that are nearly two times those of India.277 China is also far more integrated into the 
world economy, with average tariff rates of less than half those of India’s and a trade 
surplus of nearly 57 billion USD (4% of GDP), relative to India’s trade deficit of 25 
billion USD (-4% of GDP). Furthermore, Foreign Direct Investment of over 50 billion 
USD in China (2004) dwarfs the less than 5 billion USD invested in India during the 
same year.  
This lead, along with several successful developmental initiatives, has 
engendered significant differences in the landscapes of the two countries. China, for 
example, is significantly ahead in the UNDP’s Human Development Index, which 
measures key elements of development like longevity, education, and poverty.278 The 
wealth generated by China’s greater economic success also manifests itself in greater 
infrastructural development and prosperity. Consider that China generates nearly three 
times the electricity of India, and that it loses a mere 6.8% of this power to 
                                                
276 World Bank (2007) 
277 World Bank (2007): With the exception of a brief period in the late 1980s, China’s year on year real 
GDP growth has consistently outpaced India’s. Its 2004 gross domestic savings of 50% of GDP was 
considerably higher that India’s 24%. Its gross domestic investment of 45% of GDP also significantly 
outpaced India’s 23%. 
278 UNDP (2007): China (.777) is ranked 81st out of 177 countries (surrounded by the Dominican 
Republic, Thailand, and Turkey), significantly higher than India (.619) in 128th place (surrounded by 
Equatorial Guinea, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma). 
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transmission and distribution losses relative to a staggering 23.4% in India. 
Alternatively, consider that in 2005 China had 161 cell phone connections per 1000 
people, relative to only 12 in India.279 This staggering lead alone is enough for some 
researchers to conclude that the earlier and more revolutionary approach to economic 
liberalization adopted by China has brought about a clear developmental victory for 
China, and that India can at best limit the gap by continuing to push through similar 
reforms. 
Still other political economy researchers, however, question the assumptions 
underlying the conclusion of China’s inevitable domination and suggest a more 
nebulous picture in which India fares more strongly. This line of argument suggests 
that the gradualism inherent in India’s democratic system has produced a more stable, 
efficient, and sustainable system, characterized by a sounder financial system and a 
culture of home-grown entrepreneurship that is capable of producing exceptional 
growth with far fewer resources than China has had at its disposal. 
Both of these political economy perspectives, however, are challenged by 
several key criticisms, most of which revolve around two key points. Firstly, China’s 
advantage is not solely the product of differences in the economic liberalization 
process that the political economy perspective builds its argument around. A close 
analysis of several key economic indicators, in fact, shows that the timing and 
character of the liberalization process does not account for many of the 
transformations it is associated with, at least not in entirety. India’s perhaps most 
well-known intellectual Amartya Sen summarizes the necessity of looking beyond 
economic reform by asserting that “China’s relative advantage over India is a product 
                                                
279 Guruswamy, M. (2006), India: Issues in Development, Gurgaon: Hope India Publications. 
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of its pre reform (pre 1979) groundwork rather than its post reform redirection.”280 A 
glance at some data illustrates this point well: the infant mortality rate in 1980 China 
was 42 (per 1000) relative to 119 in 1991 India, eleven years later; life expectancy in 
1980 China was 67 years relative to 59 in 1991 India; and the adult literacy rate in 
1980 China was 66%, relative to 48% in 1991 India. Thus, China had a higher literacy 
rate pre-economic liberalization in 1980 than India does today, nearly thirty years 
later and over 15 years after its own economic liberalization.281  
Perhaps more importantly, however, the future of development in the two 
countries is contingent on many factors that fall beyond the scope of what the political 
economy perspective orients its focus on. Chapter two examines these criticisms in 
further detail. Roderick MacFarquhar, for example, concludes a comparison of India 
and China by asserting that “in two key arenas, handling succession and dealing with 
society, India has built better than China.”282 Others still focus on issues ranging from 
human rights to individual freedom and conclude somewhat vaguely that the 
repression inherent in China’s one-party authoritarian regime compromises the 
integrity of its developmental successes and somehow occludes a stable and 
prosperous future. Still others point to fundamental demographic and diversity 
advantages in India.283 Often lacking from this broad but nebulous range of assertions 
are concrete mechanisms detailing why some issues are relevant to development and 
how they will impact the future of the respective countries. 
                                                
280 Sen, A., quoted in Gurusawamy, M. (2006), p. 91.  
281 World Bank (2004) 
282 MacFarquhar (2005), p. 9. 
283 The demographic advantage is said to come from India’s significantly younger population (the 
result of China’s slowing birth rate following the introduction of the one-child policy). This has been 
thoroughly examined, however, and convincingly shown to have as much – if not more – potential to 
become a liability as to be an advantage. The outcome is largely contingent on whether India manages 
to improve on its appalling record of basic education and whether it manages to expedite its pace of job 
creation. If it fails in either area, it faces the prospects of several hundred million under- and 
unemployed youths, a potentially catastrophic situation. See, for example, Smith (2007). The diversity 
situation is discussed in detail in chapter six and again can be seen as a potential liability rather than 
advantage based on several factors whose development remains at present unclear.   
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Perhaps the most concrete of these regime-based criticisms focuses of the lack 
of a progressive and representative multi-party political system in China, which is 
seen as incompatible with the level of development and prosperity China is racing 
towards. Specifically, the argument states that a (relatively) wealthy population with 
the free access to ideas that comes with the interconnectivity intrinsic to today’s 
globalized economy will demand certain freedoms that can be realized only within the 
framework of a more liberal (implied: democratic) political system. As Gilley states, 
“of all the predictions one might make about the [political future] of China, a 
prediction of “no change” seems the least plausible.”284 Many assume that this 
inevitable transition, given China’s record of reluctance in liberalizing politically, will 
not be a smooth one and will come at a potentially significant and debilitating cost. 
India, having such a system in place already, does not face these necessary 
transitional costs and thus can look forward to smoother ongoing development 
uninterrupted by deep institutional and social upheavals. 
Even this argument, however, is based on several tenuous assumptions which 
chapter two covers in detail. To briefly summarize, both states in question are 
relatively weak in their capacity to influence society, meaning that the state-society 
relationships are based in significant part on endemic social patterns, perhaps to a 
greater extent than in more strongly developed political systems – especially at the 
local levels and in less-developed rural areas. Furthermore, the notion of an “Asian 
model” of state-society relations, while somewhat less in-vogue amongst researchers 
today than a decade ago, cannot be entirely dismissed. This is especially the case 
when considering the very high levels of support the CCP enjoys at its upper levels of 
                                                
284 Gilley (2005), p. 44. 
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leadership, which patently defy theoretical expectations.285 Lastly, the rise of Asia’s 
two giants is in many respects a fundamental shift in the practice of politics with the 
potential to re-write many of the assumptions that collectively form the prevalent 
theories on democracy, development, and state-society relationships. 
 
IX.II Social Capital, Trust, and Development 
 Thus, while greatly developed, the comparative literature of India and China 
remains in many respects in an inchoate form and replete with gaps. There are clearly 
established mechanisms detailing how various political economy-related factors 
influence development in the two countries, yet it is clear that economic growth is 
only a part of the developmental picture. Likewise, some concrete mechanisms have 
been suggested concerning how the respective regime types have and will influence 
development in India and China, but it is again clear that even this addition does not 
comprehensively encapsulate all of the factors relevant to the development of the two 
countries. The many other less visible factors that have received attention in the 
literature, from demographic differences, to governance, to education, to simple 
observations of how very different the course of life in the two countries appears to 
be, all seem to be naggingly relevant and yet are almost without exception discussed 
devoid of any mechanisms explaining in concrete terms why they are important, how 
they impact development and what the differences in them mean for the futures of 
Indian and China. 
 This is a thesis about those “other” factors. However, rather than simply 
selecting several headline-worthy issues at random, analyzing them descriptively, and 
suggesting that they seem important, this thesis builds a concrete structure detailing a 
                                                
285 Several studies reviewed in this thesis – see Gilley (2006), for example – find that the CCP has 
greater levels of support at the upper levels of government than does the political leadership of India, 
which is viewed with great skepticism. 
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mechanism of how three key (non-political economy and regime-type) factors are 
critical to ongoing successful development in India and China. Through the 
establishment of clear definitions and concrete mechanisms, it is able to do what the 
purely descriptive analyses and commentaries can not: it is able to stand side-by-side 
with the political economy and regime-type perspectives and offer conclusive insight 
into why some visible differences between the two countries matter, and how they 
matter.  
 Establishing a mechanism requires the existence of a clearly defined end. In 
the case of India and China, this end is without question a state of full development 
characterized by stable institutions, material prosperity, high quality of life indicators, 
and stable state-society relations. Reaching this state, I have argued (in chapter three) 
is contingent on success in three core areas: the development of more effective and 
responsive governance, increased rule of law, and establishment of more effective and 
efficient markets. These goals are widely discussed in both countries and underlie 
(either explicitly or implicitly) much of the development analysis both for India and 
China specifically and for other developing countries in general.  
 In developing mechanisms for the movement towards this state, I have turned 
to the concept of social capital. Specifically, I have argued in chapter four that success 
on the three core developmental goals is contingent on the movement towards greater 
bridging social capital in the form of greater levels of generalized and 
institutionalized (GI) trust. The importance of bridging social capital and GI trust is 
supported by an extraordinary range of literature and has become a key component of 
the development strategies of organizations from the World Bank to UNDP.   
Engaging these concepts in a comparative framework analyzing differences 
between India and China, though, requires the conceptualization of mechanisms 
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detailing how social capital and trust change. Based on the review of a myriad of 
research, ranging from socio-psychological individual-level experimental research to 
multi-country survey-based research, I proposed in chapter five the existence of three 
social capital components, each a social factor that is instrumental in the creation or 
destruction of generalized and institutionalized trust. An original fs/QCA study on the 
social capital components at the Indian state level provided strong support to the 
notion that these components were critical not only to bridging social capital, but also 
to economic and social development on the whole. Determining then how India and 
China perform on these factors provides insight into why they have developed as they 
have, and how their current positions lend themselves to continued successful 
development.     
The comparison of collective identity and social stratification, detailed in 
chapter six, underscored the notion that the differences in social structures and 
diversity in India and China are highly relevant to their development. This argument 
often makes an appearance in claims that India’s diversity constitutes a significant 
comparative advantage, yet these claims are often not backed by a clear mechanism, 
precluding an objective analysis of how the differences endemic to the two countries 
impact development. I argue that focusing alone on the degree of homo- or 
heterogeneity is risky, as this does not directly address the relevant aspects of 
diversity; it is the existence of a common identity and the lack of significant 
stratification – in short, the feeling amongst individuals that others in the society are 
“one of their own” – that is of primary importance to development, as it fosters the 
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creation of bridging social capital and GI trust. Without this, the potential of great 
diversity cannot be realized and can instead manifest itself in social strife.286  
Of the two countries, China, with its fairly homogenous population and strong 
unitary history, faces significantly fewer obstacles to the building and maintenance of 
collective identity points. The rapid increase in economic stratification resultant from 
the strong growth of the past several decades, along with several still divisive social 
cleavages, however, threatens to undermine this unity. The often discussed moral 
decay (see chapter eight for a full discussion) is frequently attributed to the growing 
prominence of these cleavages, making mitigating them critical to continued stability 
and development.  
India faces a significantly more daunting task in maintaining a strong 
collective identity, as it is confronted by the same challenging cleavages as China is, 
but has to simultaneously deal with significantly greater – and potentially divisive – 
heterogeneity. Indeed, there are ample signs that at present, many segments of Indian 
society are significantly less inclined to see other segments as “similar to themselves” 
than in the past, a trend that is being accelerated and reinforced by the greater 
fragmentation of politics and the increased importance of primordial identities in the 
formation of political identity. As chapter six argues, this may to some extent be a 
necessary constant in Indian politics, but it is also clear that the current trend is 
strongly moving towards a worsening of the situation.287  
Both India and China are struggling with deeply entrenched and highly 
inimical problems of corruption. Beyond the obvious losses in governance efficiency, 
                                                
286 The fact that one of India’s most diverse states, Kerala, scores strongly on collective identity and 
social stratification and is the most successful state in terms of social development, underscores this 
point. See chapters five and six for an in-depth discussion of this point.   
287 A quote by Gill captures this sentiment well: “God seems to have taken special care to make India 
ungovernable. Her extreme diversities and disparities make the emergence of large common 
denominators almost impossible. Our much flaunted unity in diversity has a very narrow base… Thus 
it becomes extremely difficult to evolve common codes of behavior and conduct.” Gill (1998), p. 251.   
 157 
this problem is of great significance because corruption fundamentally undermines the 
creation of bridging social capital and GI trust, and thus intrinsically presents an 
obstacle to progress on the core developmental goals of the two countries. Chapter 
eight examines the state of corruption in both countries and concluded that the 
complexity of the situation, as well as the fundamental differences in the way 
corruption is perceived in India and China, prevents a direct and conclusive 
comparison. Structurally, India appears to have a greater framework in place for the 
control of corruption. Its politicians and system, however, are perceived as more 
corrupt than those in China – especially at the higher levels of government – which 
may negate any structural advantages and even prove to hinder the formation of GI 
trust to a greater extent than in China.    
Both countries will need to work feverishly to bridge the developmental 
cleavages bifurcating them, as continued progress on their core developmental goals 
is contingent on this. The development of a corruption-free culture is likewise of high 
priority, as the perception of universalism and neutrality in governance strongly 
encourages the formation of GI trust and bridging social capital. These two factors 
alone make the state of education in each country highly critical, as a broad range of 
research has shown that education plays a key role in the development of a collective 
identity, in the mitigation of social stratification, and in the amelioration of 
corruption. Even more importantly, however, a significant breadth of research 
suggests that education may be the single most important component in the creation 
of GI trust and bridging social capital.  
Chapter seven considers in detail the state of education in China and India, 
focusing in particular on the critical primary level. This comparison offers perhaps the 
strongest contrast between the two countries, as China’s performance in providing a 
 158 
broad range of its citizens with at least a basic level of education pales the poor record 
of India on those same grounds. Illustrating this point well is the fact that the illiteracy 
rate of 15-24 year olds in China is just 1% for males and females, while in India the 
comparative rate is 20% for males and an appalling 35% for females. The exclusion 
from education of females and underprivileged members of society in India is nothing 
short of a blight on its developmental record and a fundamental obstacle precluding 
the achievement of even a significant portion of its developmental potential. The few 
apparent bright-spots of education in India – the prevalence of English language usage 
and the high profile of a small number of elite tertiary level institutions, for 
example288 – show on closer inspection to hardly, if at all, mitigate the generally poor 
state of education in India, both in absolute terms and relative to China.   
 
This work does not seek to replace or disprove the outstanding comparative 
literature on India and China. It seeks, rather, to add to its breadth and fill certain 
critical gaps in it through the inclusion of several highly relevant factors that have to 
date been either neglected in the China – India context, or handled in such a way that 
disallows the rigorous comparative analysis central to academic work. The length 
constraints inherent in a work of this type clearly preclude a comprehensive analysis 
on issues as broad and multifarious as collective identity, education, and corruption 
                                                
288 English language education is often quoted as being the key to the development of the IT sector in 
India, the success of which is broadcast around the world as an example of modern and shining India. 
The IT industry, if fact, is often argued to constitute an Indian equivalent of China’s manufacturing 
sector and is cited occasionally as proof that India has also succeeded in becoming a world leader in an 
economic sector. While no one can dispute that both the IT sector and the ITT institutions are a real 
successes, a closer examination debases many of the inferences behind these claims. The IT sector in 
India employs less than one million, or under 1% of the countries service sector workforce (less that 
0.4% of the total workforce). Half of the often touted service sector, in fact, is still in unorganized 
retail. Similarly, the high standards of India’s ITT institutions, while impressive in their own right, are 
hardly representative of the general state of education in that country, whether at the tertiary or primary 
levels. The IT sector and ITT institutions are unquestionably good marketing tools for India and are 
likely also indicative of the great potential in the country; they are not, however, engines of sufficient 
breadth to fundamentally transform the country itself.       
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therefore this thesis cannot be viewed as the end-all in the social capital India – China 
comparative research; it is, rather, the creation of a new comparative framework, and 
an initial examination of the findings this perspective provides.  
Ultimately, this thesis set out to achieve three points: Firstly, it argued that the 
gestalts of India and China were such that a thorough understanding of their 
development could not be won through comparisons on the grounds of differences in 
the respective political economies or regime types alone. Secondly, it sought to 
establish mechanisms detailing how and why certain factors outside of the PE and 
regime type-based differences were important. The concepts of bridging social 
capital, GI trust, and social capital components provided the substance towards this 
end. Lastly, the thesis tried to conclusively illustrate that the comparison between 
India and China cannot be reduced to simple terms and headline worthy conclusions: 
India cannot be seen as the obvious victor of the developmental race on account of its 
democratic system of government, nor does that system’s gradualism guarantee that it 
will succeed in eventually reaching a developed state. Similarly, it cannot be assumed 
that China is destined to maintain its current advantage on account of its greater 
economic success, as the wealth and development levels it has generated are tenuous 
and not sufficient alone for the ongoing march towards full development. Even the 
inclusion of the factors considered in detail within this thesis do not provide the solid 
foundation necessary for the development of concrete and thorough prognoses, as the 
clear insights gained are still overshadowed by variables whose clarity remains in the 
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